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During times of war, the decision-making influence
of the American military establishment has traditionally

been exercised by chari smatic field commanders.

This in-

fluence has at times been considerable, owing both to wartime exigencies and the unfamiliar! ty of civilian leaders

with wartime situations.

Thus, General Washington chas-

tised and frequently ignored a Congress he regarded as

timorous and petty.

Array

officers in 1813 refused to obey

orders issued by their civilian superior, the Secretary of
War.

General George McClellan defied and ridiculed Lincoln

in public.

General John J. Pershing used the American

Expeditionary Force of 1917-1918 virtually as he wished,
becoming almost the sole author of military decisions.
World War Two provided the American military with
the opportunity for further expansion of decision-making

influence.

However, the primal military representative was

no longer the field commander.

Between the two world wars,

the United States had adopted
the European general
staff

structure, resulting ultimately in
the creation of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Decision-making
authority was now
in the hands of officers who, for
the most part, had never
heard the sound of battle. Nonetheless,
the military staff
were better equipped to handle matters
of Grand Strategy

than any other stratum of the armed forces
leadership.
Joint Chiefs of Staff served as direct advisors

The

to the

President, and were also in close contact
with British and
Soviet helmsmen. One of the most momentous
issues involving
all of these decision-makers was the Second
Front problem,

1941-1945.

From the first Allied conferences in Washington,
1941-1942,

it became evident that the Joint Chiefs of Staff

did not function simply as objective advisors to their

Commander-in-Chief.

They regarded themselves as the sole

competent architects of strategy and accordingly displayed
a fierce loyalty to

their strategic proposals.

The mili-

tary staff was not especially deferential to the opinions
of the Commander-in-Chief, as he was considered an amateur

at war.

This attitude was a traditional one displayed by

the American military toward civilian decision-makers.

Additionally, the Joint Chiefs perceived their British and

Soviet Allies as impelled by political considerations and
thus incapable of originating militarily sound strategy.

vii

As a result, the Joint Chiefs entered
into a qua si- adversary

relationship with their Commander-in-Chief
and with the
alliance leadership.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were
determined to see
their Second Front proposals implemented,
despite opposition
from other quarters. They saw their plan as
based on
strictly military considerations. Any indication
that the

Commander-in-Chief favored other policies was viewed
as a
capitulation to political influences (usually thought
to

be

British-inspired), and the Joint Chiefs worked to thwart

such influences.

In this manner the military overstepped

their authority, and exceeded their advisory capacity.
Because of the persistence with which the Joint

Chiefs argued their position, and because of the limited
success achieved by British strategic options, Roosevelt

eventually endorsed the American Second Front proposals.
As policy advocates, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proved to be

more influential than any civilian leader other than the

Chief Executive.

They enjoyed a close relationship with

the President, to the virtual exclusion of all other offi-

cials.

Nevertheless, with the exception of its obduracy

on the Second Front issue, the military did not attempt to

extend its prerogatives.
Finally, despite the merits of their Second Front

proposals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff displayed a lack of

political sensitivity in their role as decision-makers.

viii

Their singular dedication to "military"
conaiderationa
ignored the fact that wars are waged for

political reaaona

and that political issues are not suspended
during hostilities.
The failure to realize this would
cause further

problems during the Korean War.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

failed also as members of a coalition war effort,
and retained a nationalistic outlook to the end of the
war.
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CHAPTER

I

AMERICAN MILITARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONS
IN WARTIME
Introduction
Military organization have historically
been
regarded with ambivalence in democratic societies.

Although clearly necessary instruments of maintaining
the security of a state, armed forces have
also posed
constant potential threat.
tise as well as

a

a

Possessing combative exper-

monopoly on the use of legitimized

violence, armies could be, and frequently have been, used

by ambitious commanders

to bring about political change.

Constitutional and legal safeguards have proscribed such
activity, but military interference in politics has not
in fact been legislated out of existence. 1

At the same

time the military has been a fundamental ingredient in
a

successful foreign policy.

The influence of the

military obviously becomes more pronounced during times
of war.

The prestige and responsibilities of military

leaders increase accordingly, which is to say that

Such military intrusivenes s was common in the
as
West even
far back as the Roman Empire. As Tacitus
notes in his Annals (A.D. 14-66), every period of succession was usually accompanied by military Intrigue or reIn more recent times, the roles of the Wehrmacht
volt.
and the Imperial Nipponese Army provide illustrations of
military involvement in high politics. The frequent
military coups of South America Indicate that this in-

clination still exists.

2

military loaders become more powerful.
But have military helmsmen in wartime consis-

tently sought to abuse their power and extend their pre-

rogatives?

Have they been mindful of the constitutional

limitations of their authority and have the parameters
of their authority been clearly spelled out?

The involve-

ment of the United States in the Second World War provided a debilitated American military
of vast power.

with a position

But precisely how sweeping was military

power in 1941-1945?

Did military leaders merely assist

and advise the Commander-in-Chief in the making of

strategy or did they make strategy largely on their own
initiative?

Were they involved in political issues?

Was their relationship with the civilian authorities

(mainly the Chief Executive) antagonistic?

understand the requirements of alliance?

Did they
All of these

questions are used to clarify the role of American

military leaders in decision-making during World War Two,
This investigation is a case study of a single

historical incident, with the purpose of examining the
extent of wartime military decision-making,

A case

The federal expenditures allotted to the armed
forces in the period 1919-1938 were consistently and
appallingly low. Low tide for the military budget was
1933, a resurgence not taking place until 1938 with the
approval of Roosevelt's first major rearmament proposal.

3

study of the Second Front decisions is useful for
a number
of reasons.

First, these decisions constituted "Grand

Strategy," strategy at the highest level.

The wide scope

of this strategy calls for the involvement of civilian-

political leaders as well as military figures.

Grand

Strategy enjoys a dual existence; it is clearly a matter
for the military decision-making sphere, but also for the

political sphere.

Political decisions are necessary for

the direction of such strategy and the determination of
ends, but military competence and advice is also essential.

Both military and political spheres have laid claim to

Grand Strategy as "their" arena, but in truth neither
civilian nor military leaders alone can determine it.

Whatever the intentions of generals and statesmen, Grand
Strategy, of which the Second Front issue is an excellent
example, demands the cooperation of both.

The nature and

scope of Grand Strategy make this cooperation inevitable.

Grand Strategy is quintessentially military, that

is,

consists in plotting the effective use of armed force.

^Since the end of war is the alteration or
restoration of the status quo it is ultimately a
political matter. As Raymond Aron observes in Peace
and War war is waged between political units with
ramifications extending beyond wartime. Similarly,
Augustine notes that it is "with the desire for peace
that wars are waged." City of God XIX, 11-13? trans.
Marcus Dods.
,

,

,

it

Thus the maxims of military science and the
special knowledge provided by military training are indispensable.

Further, Grand Strategy is directly concerned with
the

waging of war; thus, to

a considerable extent, warriors

must be its architects.

Despite this inescapable fact,

the vast scope of Grand Strategy necessitates the
involve-

ment of political helmsmen.
a

The decision to go to war is

political one, hence the ends of war are not strictly

military.

Too, non-military considerations are a facet

of Grand Strategy.

The diplomacy within an alliance,

recognition of neutrals, limitations on means of fighting (rules of warfare), secondary aims of a war, domestic

political concerns, are all relevant considerations.

In

this manner the military nature of Grand Strategy is

accompanied by the political implications of its vast
scope.

Accordingly, decisions of Grand Strategy must

involve both political and military participation.
This sharing of the decision-making responsibi-

lity makes

a

civilian-military disagreement probable.

Operating within different frameworks, holding different
perspectives, generals and statesmen cannot be expected
to see eye to eye.

Grand Strategy decision-making

to an important extent, a conflictual terrain.

is,

This

characteristic emerges clearly with respect to the Second
Front decisions, as will be demonstrated.

At this point a comment on methodology
is in
order.
In examining the Second Front
decisions and
analyzing the military-civilian relationship,
it is necessary to review considerable historical
detail. We cannot
properly draw conclusions or entertain
notions on
the

political meaning or significance of

a

certain incident

without first understanding that incident
within its
historical context. Clearly, various historical

factors

and diverse personal motives can influence
decision-

makers •

Wartime Military-Civilian Relations
Prior to World War Two
To understand the relationship between military

and civilian authorities in the United States during the

Second World War, it will be useful to review the historical record of the interaction between military and civilian

agencies during previous American Wars.
The U.S. War Department was founded on June 12,

1776 as the "Board of War."

It was at first comprised

entirely of civilians, but military officers were included
before the war with Britain ended.

The Board of

V/ar

was

formed by Congress and in fact made up of committees

without real authority.

Congress, anxious to maintain

"democratic" control, decreed that the Board "could only

6

study the problems and make reports, after which
Congress
engaged in long-winded debates while the Army stood in

urgent need of men and supplies." 4

Thus, the conduct of

the war was to be essentially a Congressional prerogative.

Despite this initial arrangement, constant
problems and continual pleas from General Washington in the

field led to the termination of the War Board in 1781 and
the appointment of General Benjamin Lincoln as "Secretary
of War."

Even so, the office was largely superfluous

since actual control over the military remained with

Congress and with the individual states, which were responsible for providing troops.

Nor was the Secretary of War

able greatly to influence military decisions, as the only

author of strategy and doctrine was the field commander,

Washington.

There was no General Staff.

Accordingly,

the War Secretary was little more than a nominal inter-

mediary between Y/ashington and Congress and in reality
almost without function.

Washington and Congress con-

tinued to deal directly with each other, ignoring the

Secretary of War.

Congress, for its part, remained sus-

picious of a strong military, even in the darkest days
of the war.

Too, through a parsimonious control of the

Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, Ame rican
Militar y Policy: Its D evelopment Since 1775 (Harrisburg:
Stackpole Company, 196i77~P» 2 3.
C.

J.

military purse, Congress virtually determined
all military policy. As a result no military
establishment

came

into being during the war or in the period
immediately

following it.
The confused state of military-civilian decision-

making reached critical dimensions during the War of 1812.
To begin with, the war was

a

federal venture undertaken

without the unanimous support of the individual states,

which retained a substantial degree of autonomy.

The cry

for war was initiated in Congress by the War Kawks, and
the President simply acceded to their demands.

The Army,

never a popular institution, was in a state of disintegration.

Officer commissions were more often than not handed

out as tokens of political favor.

Entirely incompetent

men were placed in command positions with disastrous
results
Clearly, the most important change in the military-

civilian structure during the War of 1812 was the transformation of the Secretary of War's office into
of considerable power.

a position

The change was due to the aggres-

sive personality of the Secretary, who took advantage of
the lack of clear-cut directives defining his role.

Secretary of War John Armstrong was inclined to bypass
his chain of command and issue orders directly to the men

in the field.

This tendency may have been prompted by

the incompetence of officers but its effect was to

8

exacerbate, not to remedy, the problems in
the militarycivilian relationship. Generals, even
incompetent ones,
are jealous of their commands.

According to C.

J.

Bernardo, "Secretary of War John Armstrong
assumed his
duties with a fixed notion that the direction of
the

armies in the field fell within his proper sphere of

jurisdiction.

Convinced that he possessed a broader view

of the situation than the individual commanders, he
tried
to direct all military operations,

open hostility of many generals." 5

notwithstanding the
The hostility of the

military to the Secretary's interventions erupted after
Armstrong's decisions resulted in the torching of Washington by British marines.

Military units refused to follow

orders bearing his seal and forced his resignation.

Armstrong's duties "were turned over to the vigorous

Secretary of State (Monroe)."
The crucial point in this affair requires further

comment.
a

The Secretary of War saw himself as possessing

broader view of the war than his generals.

Consequently,

he felt himself to be in a superior position to dictate

strategy, especially in view of the inactivity of President

Madison in all matters concerning the war.

This same

attitude was to afflict various high-level civilian

policy makers in future situations, including the Civil

5

Ibid., p. 128

6 Ibid.,

p.

137

War,

The Civil War (1861-1865) brought
about more
changes in the respective military-civilian
decisionmaking roles. Prom the outbreak of Inutilities

onward,

various members of the Lincoln cabinet acquired
extensive
influence in the shaping of military decisions.
As a

biographer notes, "The President, the Secretaries
of State,
War, Navy, and the Treasury, together with the
Congres-

sional Committee (To Investigate the Conduct of the
War)

each claimed special powers over the conduct of the war.
All of this meant constant interference with the plans
of military commanders by civil authorities who were

uninitiated in military affairs." 7

The greatest civilian

offender was, as in 1812, the Secretary of War.

Secre-

tary of War Cameron ignored rather than cooperated with
the Army Chief, Winfield Scott.

In addition, he refused

to obey the directives of his Commander-in-Chief, Lincoln.

Cameron was grossly insubordinate and acted as high-

handedly as Armstrong had, eventually suffering the same
fate,

removal from office.

On this occasion it was the

President rather than the military that sponsored the
forced resignation.

Too, Lincoln selected the new Secre-

tary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, a lawyer of some repute as

well as an ambitious politician.

The selection of Stanton

was to prove unfortunate for the President.

Ibid.

,

p. 215.

Stanton

10

persisted in maintaining what had by now become

a pattern:

the use of the Secretary of War's office
as a sort of

counter-Executive device, rather than as an integral
part
.of a smoothly running military-civilian
machine. The
extent of Stanton's political ambitions remains unclear,
but it is certain that he courted the Army in an attempt
to turn it against the Commander-in-Chief.

The most

prominent military figure during the early years of the

war was not the Army Chief but

a

field commander, General

George McClellan, in charge of the Army of the Potomac.
It was McClellan that Stanton attempted to influence.

McClellan in his memoirs noted that Stanton "often advocated the propriety of my seizing the government and
taking affairs into my

o
ov/n

hands."

McClellan rejected

this advice and no military elements were ever involved

in planning a coup.

Despite the rejection of Stanton's intrigue,
the military was not on generally good terms with the

^Burton Hendrick, Lincoln 's War Cabinet (Boston:
Brown and Co., 19467^~p« 43. Although loyal to
the civilian leadership, McClellan occasionally acted
with arrogance toward the Chief Executive. One evening
McClellan refused to see Lincoln when the President
called at his room in Washington, informing a presiden"It is the first
tial aide that he was going to sleep.
indication I have yet seen of the threatened supremacy
of the military authorities." Lincoln a nd the Civil War
Diaries of John Hay (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1939),
Little,

p.

35.

administration.

Winfield Scott, the ancient and senile

Chief of the Army, was a ceremonial figurehead,
trotted
out for parades, and was involved in little else.

McClellan was perhaps the most important military leader
during the war and he constantly protested the drafting
of strategy and doctrine by Congress and the Cabinet.

Similarly, he believed Lincoln inept in military affairs
and frequently ignored his Commander-in-Chief.

As a

result, McClellan eventually fell from favor and was

replaced by Ulysses Grant.

But even Grant was hampered

by Congressional and Cabinet interference,

a situation

which persisted until the end of the war.
Thus, the influence of Congress upon military

affairs was still notable at the time of the Civil War.
The President did occasionally determine strategy.

Lincoln
great.

1

s

interest In the course of military affairs was

Also, the post of Secretary of War had become a more

powerful office than It had ever been during the long
course of the Revo3.utionary War.

Secretary Cameron

attempted further to increase the power of his office at
the expense of the Commander-in-Chief and failed.

But

the Secretaryship under Stanton remained an important

factor, though it suffered from Cameron'

3

legacy of abuse.

Military authority once again existed in the personage of
a field commander (McClellan and later Grant) and not In

12

the appointed Chief (Scott) who
was ignored for all but

ceremonial purposes,

it is also significant
that the

politically inclined McClellan, constantly
at loggerheads
with his Chief, was eventually replaced
by the

a-political

and taciturn Grant.

Nor did the military gain responsi-

bility or power in the civilian realm
despite the exigencies of war and the cries for military
control
heard in

some civilian quarters.
The Spanish-American War of 1898, a
relatively

unimportant struggle in military terms, underscored
the
lack of communication between the civilian
political
officials and the military.

The War Department assumed

responsibility for conducting the war but failed to
coordinate the war effort or to provide the needed trans-

portation and logistical support.

If nothing else was

accomplished, the blunders of the War Department during
that conflict illustrated the need for extensive reforms. 9
As a result, Secretary of War Elihu Root created a

General Staff of the Army in 1903, whose purpose it was
to provide an "official" Army viewpoint on various matters

and so prevent the re-emergence of unofficial charismatic

9

Preparations for the war "became chaotic under the
genial misrule of the politician who ran the War Department.
Russell Alger seems to have been the sort of man
who meets problems in logistics with a cheerful smile."
Robert Leckie, Wars of America (New York: Harper & Row,
1968), II, 28.

13

spokesmen

~

field commanders such as McClellan.

The

General Staff was also to advise the
President and the
Secretary of War on military affairs.
It was hoped

that

a regular channel of military advice
and influence would

minimize the military decisions made by
civilians, thus
averting the problems of civilian meddling
that
had

hindered military efforts in the War of 1812
and the Civil
War. The General Staff would eventually
serve
in this

capacity, but did not do so during the First
World War.

With American involvement in the First World War
in 1917, Secretary of War Newton Baker stated
that "The

Chief of Staff, speaking in the name of the General Staff,
will coordinate and supervise the various bureaus, offices,
and departments of the War Department; he will inform him-

self in as great detail as in his judgment seems necessary
to qualify him adequately to advise the Secretary of War." 10

But it was not to be.

Congress distrusted a strong mili-

tary establishment in Washington, the same fears that had

afflicted this body in 1776.

Too, commanders in the field

regarded the Staff with contempt and preferred to make
their reports directly to the President rather than to an

intermediate military authority.

Finally, "President

Wilson himself, seemed determined in 1917 to keep the

L0 Harvey

-

(New York:

Fights His War
DeWeerd, President Wilson
*
1968)", p. 204.

MacMillan Co.,

14

General Staff weak." 11

And the General Staff remained

weak, either through design, as has been
shown, or through

sheer governmental indifference.

In any case,

real mili-

tary power resided with the Secretary of War
Baker and with
the senior army field commander, General
John Pershing.
The General Staff was reduced to windowdressing,

largely

impotent to effect the unfolding of events in Prance.

In

the end even the Secretary of War was relegated
to a

secondary role in regard to strategy and the employment of
troops:

Pershing made these decisions and was shrewd

enough to guide the Secretary of War's hand in matters
actually beyond a field commander's purview.

Wilson's

influence on Pershing was even less pronounced than Baker's,
and his interest in determining strategy or outlining

political considerations was apparently minimal,

"in his

only wartime meeting with the President, Pershing expected
that Wilson would say something about the part he wanted
the American Army to play, along with the Allies,

in the

war against Germany, but the President said nothing about
this."

12

Thus, Wilson remained aloof from military affairs

and decisions, the General Staff was unable strongly to

1:L

Ibid., p. 204.

12 Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson; War L eader
Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1939), p. "410.
(New York:

partake in such decision-making,
Baker was frequently
beguiled by Pershing, and the
Commander in the field became the single most important
decision-maker in the conduct of the American war effort.
Even so, there were no

decisions of great controversy, since
there were no issue s
of great controversy.
Nor were there any especially
delicate points in the alliance of the
United States with
Prance and Britain.
The decision-making roles of World
War One were
to prove temporary.

The emergence of technology and

political complexities reduced the authority of
field
commanders and proportionally increased the
responsibilities of politically-attuned civilian decision-makers.
It may also be true that the unprecedented carnage of
the

1914-1918 struggle irreparably damaged the public status
and trust accorded military figures.

Improved communica-

tions increased the participation of the General Staff,

along with some reforms in Army structure.

Strategy

now became an arena with vast political implications.
The alliance structure was fraught with difficulties and

not nearly as monolithic as the alliance of 1917.

In

addition, the United States had left the First World War
as a senior partner, with France and Britain lesser

members in the international concert.

As we have seen, the
creation of the General

Staff organization and the
Chief of Staff office
took
Place rather late in American
military history. E l ihu
Root promoted the concept
of the General Staff
ln 1903
and Congress assented
(though not without
misgivings)/
Nonetheless, the actual role
and powers of the Chief
and
Ms staff were never adequately
formalized, and
as a

result the new Staff organization
had little influence
upon the course of World War
One.

In an attempt to increase
the participation of
the General Staff ln military
affairs and to define its
role and function more precisely,
piecemeal organizational
revisions were effected from 1921
on.
These revisions
proved largely unsuccessful: the
role of the Chief of
Staff remained unclear, records
of his decisions and
activities were not regularly kept,
and large numbers of

civilian and military members of the War
Department
influenced the General Staff.
The disarray of the General Staff was due,
at

least in part, to governmental policy following
the First

World War.

After the cessation of hostilities in Europe

in 1918 the American military had been hastily
demobilized.

Throughout the twenties and early thirties the Regular

Army suffered constantly from

a lack of adequate approp-

17

nations.

Concurrently the necessity of

a

standing Army

was questioned by congressmen of an
isolationist persuasion. As a result, the state of the
General Staff was
not regarded as a crucial issue in most
governmental
circles. In addition, the internal failings
of the General
Staff were not overwhelmingly noticeable
to the political
community since the nation was not at war.
Perhaps the

only group aware of the need for sweeping
reorganization
of the General Staff was the General Staff
itself.
As

the likelihood of American participation
in a

large-scale war increased in the late thirties, the General

Staff became more aware of its own deficiencies.

The Staff

was not well equipped to operate in a time of national
emergency.

The Chief of Staff, General George Catlett

Marshall, believed numerous organizational changes were

needed if the General Staff were to cope with American

participation in

a

full-scale war.

There were a number

of factors supporting such an assessment:
1.

The General Staff itself was not
coordinated; various elements of
the Staff operated independently
of the others.
The Army as a
whole was unorganized, with various
troop commanders viewing their
divisions as almost personal armies.
Furthermore, troop commanders were
suspicious of the General Staff.
As a result, the General Staff had

only limited authority even within
Coordination of the overthe Army.
all military machine was thus
difficult to achieve.

18
2.

Because of this lack of coordination and the hostile attitudes
Congress and civilian members of
of
government, the General Staff had the
been reduced to a paper giant:
issuing reports and plans,
which
were frequently ignored.

3.

The General Staff operated
in an
of unreality. Seemingly ignored air
by
the government, given unclear

authority, and dealing with an Army
crippled by minimal appropriations,
the Staff was unable to conduct
al Stlc con tingency planning.
m?
The i
War Plans Division of the
General Staff was limited to planning counterof fensives with divisions that did not exist.
4.

The Chief of Staff was as a rule
not on close terms with the President.
This inhibited the creation of a
chain of command with the Commanderin-Chief at the helm, the Chief of
Staff in the middle, and various
field commanders below.

If the Chief of Staff and his subalterns per-

ceived these flaws, few others did.

The problem came to

a head in

early 1941 with the Army once again gearing up

for war.

If the General Staff did not coordinate and run

the Army, no one would.

Still, no governmental authority

had heeded the pleas for reorganization or
of authority.

The General Staff decided to

a

broader grant
act anyway.

The Staff,
In the interest of the rapidly expanding field units had to make swift and
binding decisions of a command nature,
(and) could not limit itself to
"planning, policy, and supervision"
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without serious sacrifice of efficiency in a time of national crisis.
Accordingly, the decisions were
made, with or without clearly stated
authority. 13

Frustrated by Congress, ignored by the War

Department and elements of the Army, victimized by dubious
formal powers, the General Staff nonetheless achieved the
role envisioned for it by Elihu Root.

Not having been

granted extensive powers, the General Staff and the Chief
of Staff assumed these powers in 1941.

Such a move

probably would not have been tolerated prior to 1941.
But the obviously chaotic state of the military in that
year, coupled with the inexorable approach of war, allowed
the General Staff to play its hand.

Also, the initiative

shown by the organization was due in large part to the
dynamic new Chief of Staff, George Marshall.
The more powerful role acquired by the General

Staff in 1941 was formalized in March of 1942.

Under the

aegis of "Army Reorganization" and with the endorsement
of the President and Secretary of War Stimson, General

Marshall expanded the role of the General Staff.
General Staff was now given
entire Army.

a

The

command function over the

The Army was divided into three branches

—

13 Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Po st: Ope raj:
tlons Divi sion (Washington, D.C.s Office of the Chief of
Military History, Department of Army, 1951), p. 74.
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Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces,
Services of Supply
each overseen by a deputy to the Chief
of Staff.

-

The

three deputies were in constant contact
with the Chief of
Staff and transmitted his orders to the
various Army commands.
Never before had such unity of command
existed in
the American military.
In addition, Marshall expanded the

Operations Division of the General Staff and gave
them

responsibility for strategic planning.
Perhaps even more important than the Army

reorganization was the creation of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff,

another development sponsored by Marshall.

The

creation of the Joint Chiefs made possible close contact

between the Army Chief of Staff and his Naval counterpart.
The commander of the Army Air Force, actually

a

deputy to

Marshall, was allowed to sit as an equal on the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

This organization served to minimize

inter-service rivalry and made possible the presentation
of "the military opinion" rather than "the Army opinion"

and the Navy Opinion."

General Marshall was selected to

head the Joint Chiefs as a first among equals.

He was

given the title "President's Chief" and became the spokes-

man for the triumvirate.
All of these developments strengthened the role of
the military, and especially the Army, at the expense of

the Secretary of War.

The reorganization of 1942 forced

Secretary of War Stimson into a rather
modest role.
the War Department Stimson "retained

In

direct control only

over the Bureau of Public Relations and
the administration
14
of his own office."
To his chagrin he became known
in

administration circles as "the Army's housekeeper."
War Department, initially a civilian-dominated

The

agency, was

by 1942 almost entirely a creature of the
armed forces.
In addition, military influence extended
far beyond

the War

Department.
war,

Faced with the complexities of a two-theatre

President Roosevelt frequently turned to his Chief
of

Staff for advice.

The problems of coordinating the huge

new American armed force made the General Staff invaluable.
The need for estimates of enemy capability and intentions

likewise underscored the important role to be played by
the General Staff.

The sometimes shaky alliance with

Britain and the Soviet Union made it imperative that

the

highest levels of American military authority be aware of

political considerations.

All of this served to increase

the role of the General Staff and to limit the power of

14 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge
Bundy, On Active
Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper Bros., 1948),
"Stimson, as Secretary of war, was neither a
p. 415"^
professional soldier nor the finally responsible political
leader, and the organization which made the Chiefs of Staff
directly responsible to the President left him with no
formal responsibility in matters of military strategy..."
p. 414.
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commanding generals in the field.

For the first time in

American military history, the armed
forces were run from
Washington; important decisions were no
longer made in

the field.

The importance of the General Staff
structure in
1942 was clearly formidable.

It was the ultimate authority

over the armed forces and virtually ran the
War Department
on its own.
Too, the nature of the war forced the President to listen to its advice. But the power of
the military
was not without limit.

We shall explore these limitations,

as well as areas of civilian-military friction, through
an

examination of the "Second Front" decisions made between
1942 and 1944.

With the American entrance into the war on
December

7,

1941, the need to develop a coherent military

strategy became evident.
commitment to be made?

Where was the main American
How could the U.S. military most

effectively carry on the war?
Russians

t o

be relieved?

How were the hard-pressed

These questions were given much

attention by the General Staff, but there were other
voices attempting to influence the Commander-in-Chief's

decisions as well.

A brief examination of civilian

decision-makers will be useful.

Cordell Hull, Roosevelt's Secretary of State,
did not play a significant role in designing overall

military strategy.

Roosevelt tended to ignore him after

the breakdown of negotiations
with Japan. 15

As a result>

by 1941 the Secretary and the
State Department
were not participants in the
making of i

as

a whole

mp orta„t m ilitary

decisions.

Thus, a potentially powerful
source of
civilian advice was stifled.

Secretary of War Stimson fared
somewhat better
than his counterpart in the State
Department. A personal
friend of the President, Stimson was
frequently
included

in discussions of military affairs.

Almost invariably,

however, Stimson echoed the sentiments
of General Marshall,
with whom he was in almost constant contact
in the War
Department. Their likeness of mind seems
due, at least

in part, to a rather curious sense of
loyalty to the

Army's interests, and to Stimson's perception
of the
duties of the Secretary of War. Stimson himself
noted
that "You back your subordinates

as

the Army's

chief it is (The Secretary of War's) duty to act as
the defender of the Army against its enemies and
detrac-

tors."

16

In addition, Stimson's biographer McGeorge

Bundy allowed that "It is not always easy to be sure

15 One

...

reason for the eclipse of Hull and the
State Department was the Secretary's volatile attitude.
Exasperated at the state of negotiations with the
Japanese, on November 27, 1941, Hull told Stimson, "I
have washed my hands of it
it is now in the hands of
you and Knox, the Array and the Navy." Ibid., p. 407.

—

16 Ibid.,

p. 409.
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whether an idea or

a

or in Marshall's." 17

decision started in Stimson's mind
This in effect meant that

^

Secpe _

tary of War was an advocate of Army
ideas, or even a public relations man acting on behalf
of the military elements
in the War Department. Stimson
became a sort
of cheer-

leader for Marshall and in so doing
became

a

subordinate

himself to the people who were supposedly
serving him.
Traditionally, the Congress had maintained an
active interest in the conduct of American
wars.

As noted

previously, the Congress had crippled the war effort
during the Revolution through an unwillingness to appropriate
funds.

Congress had also interfered with the conduct of

the Civil War by continually "investigating" and fre-

quently reprimanding generals.

Following the near-

unanimous Declaration of War in 1941, however, Congress
fell into

a

state of dormancy as regards participation

in military matters.

To insure that Congress would not

interfere with the war effort, Roosevelt originated the

War Powers Act of December 18, 1941.
The Chief of Staff thenceforth had an
administrative recourse for solving his
command and staff problems without
entering into the long and trying process
of getting legislation through Congress...
The executive order from Roosevelt...
clearly affirmed the paramount authority
of the Chief of Staff under the President

Ibid ., p. 414
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in the broad sphere of strategy
tacC
nd °P eratl °^, the moat
Importt
l'<?
tant functions of command. 18
In this manner the executive
prohibited Congress
from interfering with the military.
Accordingly, the most
effective Congressional avenue of
affecting the war effort
was abolished. Congress, in fact,
had been told to tend
to other chores.

This illustrates that three
important sources of
civilian political influence (Secretary
of State, War
Department, Congress) were, for various

reasons, unable to

equal the influence acquired by the
military.

That fact is

of itself significant as it again
illustrates the amount of
power the military had acquired. The military
dominance in

Washington is especially staggering when one considers
the
low ebb of military fortunes in the mid-thirties.
The Initial Military-Civilian Framework
It is clear that the American Army entering into

the Second World War was a vastly different structure from
the American Army of 1914-1918.

The General Staff, in

coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had replaced
the field commander as the primary source of military

authority.

"1

In addition, the alliance situation of 1941

Q

Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post,
(Washington, D.C;
Government Printing Office, 1951),
pp. 92-93.
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was sensitive and fragile,
at ti.es reminiscent
of the Holy
League of 1571; in both cases
political considerations
were needed to maintain a
cohesive military machine,
"m
a degree not true of an
earlier g^atwar, the Second
War,
above the field level, was not
fought; it was administered.
It was directed not by great
military geniuses but by
political leaders and staff planners." 19

Despite the political implications
of the alliance
structure, the American military
staff was not by nature
or training kindly disposed to
"political considerations."
This was due in part to the fact that
the Army had suffered
greatly from inadequate appropriations
ever since 1918.

Even the Roosevelt Administration could be
held accountable.
In 1933 Roosevelt urged Congress to cut the
Army budget
by $144,000,000 and reduce Army manpower by
16,000 men.
As late as 1938 Roosevelt was still working against
massive

expenditures to the Army.

As a result, senior officers

tended to regard politicians and civilian officials as

adversaries rather than as partners.
It is also crucial to understand that the officers

comprising the General and Joint Staffs were professional
military men.

Most were schooled in the spartan atmosphere

of West Point or other military academies and regarded the

-^Walter Mills, Introduction to Sir John Kennedy,
The Business of War (New York: William Morrow and Co.,
1953)7 p. vii.

service as a career, not as a
temporary occupation.
educational background and length
of duty

This

in the service

instilled an institutional loyalty
in the officers and
infected some with an exaggerated
xenophobia. Trained to
think in military terms such officers
could not be easily
persuaded to entertain non-military
considerations
in

their decision-making.
as

The term "political" was regarded

anathema in military circles.

Eisenhower was quoted

by a shocked British observer as
delivering "a dissertation about 'damned politicians.'" 20
Similarly,
General

Marshall baldly stated that "My thinking was
military
thinking. I would make a decision without
considering
the political consequence.

That was for the politicians." 2

Thus, the American military of 1941 regarded
itself as an

autonomous institution, set apart from the "political"

departments of the overall decision-making structure.

Shunned for years by Washington, the military, and most

particularly the Army, attempted to remain aloof from

a

political environment it regarded as reprehensible.
Interestingly, this Army distrust of civilian

officialdom did not extend to the civilian staff of the

War Department itself.

2

?bid.

!1

,

Secretary Stimson maintained an

p. 251

^-Trumball
Trumball Higgins,
Hig
Soft Underbelly (New York:
Macmillan and Co., 1968), p." 167.
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attitude of deference to the
military staff and held
General Marshall in particular
esteem. This in effect
made Stimson part of the Army
team (he had, in fact, been
a Brigadier General in the

Army Reserve in 1922).

Because

of this situation at the top
level of the War Department,

lower echelons of civilian workers
also cooperated with
their military counterparts, allowing
the military
planners to make all important decisions
regarding the
war. As a result, military-civilian
conflict within the
Department was avoided
because the civilian participants
refused to do battle, and because they were
able to win
Army confidence as "part of the team."

—

This happy cohabitation did not extend beyond
the

War Department.

Aware that any final military decisions

rested with the Commander-in-Chief, the General Staff was

suspicious of any non-military adviser who might influence
Roosevelt.
a

Secretary of State Cordell Hull, potentially

powerful countervailing force, did not prove to

great adversary of the military.

be a

This was due to Roose-

velt's apparent loss of confidence in Hull as well as

Hull's discomfort with military matters.

to

He declined

involvement in strategic planning, declaring it "beyond my

province," satisfied that such affairs were "being handled
op

exclusively by the President and his military assistants."^

Cordell Hull Memoirs of
Macmillan and Co., 1948), II, 1180.

C ordell

Hull (New York:
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But Hull's concept of a
decision-making clique

that was entirely composed of military
men was inaccurate.
The military did not hold exclusive
access to Roosevelt
for the purpose of deciding strategy.
Roosevelt frequently
listened to Harry Hopkins's opinions on
military matters,
and this able White House adviser was not
hesitant
to

state his views.

An even greater influence on Roosevelt

was another head of state, Winston Churchill,
with whose

involvement in the war effort we will deal later.

In any

event, the General Staff remained suspicious of
both of
these men,

jealously attempting to limit their influence

on Roosevelt and at times engaging in open conflict with
them.

What we have seen up to this point is an attempt
by the military leaders in Washington to maximize their

influence with President Roosevelt.

The military regarded

the waging of war as a task uniquely suited to warriors.
The nature of their profession and the historical experience

of the military at the hands of civilian politicians

prompted them to regard any civilian role in the war as
"interference."

Accordingly, the military acted to mini-

mize the civilian political role in the decision-making

process.

But despite vigorous efforts by the military,

civilians both domestic and foreign did influence the

Commander-in-Chief.

In addition, Roosevelt himself took
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an active part in military decisions
(unlike Wilson) and
did not passively receive advice from
various quarters.
As a result, tension between military
and civilian decisionmakers arose in 1941 and persisted for the
duration
of

the war.

With this background in mind, we will now
proceed
to examine the conflictual relationship which
developed
between military and civilian authorities over the
issue
of a Second Front in Europe.
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CHAPTER

Ii

THE MILITARY AND THE ARCADIA
DECISIONS
The iasue of a "Second Front"
was the first
major decision of the war which
involved the combined
military and civilian leadership
of the United States
and Britain. Both the American
and British military
staffs held firm opinions on the
matter and were intent
on "selling" their respective
strategies to the civilian
decision-makers. The civilian leaders
Roosevelt,

-

Churchill, Hopkins, Lord William
Beaverbrook

-

were willing

to listen to military advice but
realized that any decision

would have to be based on more than
strategic military considerations. Churchill, after two and a
half years of war-

time leadership, was especially able to
see implications

beyond the mere winning of battles, and probably
already
possessed a germinal postwar vision. Additionally,
the

British General Staff served the Prime Minister in

a

strictly advisory capacity, and did not act as a counter-

vailing decision-making force. 1

Roosevelt was the

neophyte in the business of war leadership, and at this
stage leaned heavily upon advice from his military staff.

Nonetheless, certain facts had to be faced by both men.

Forrest C. Pogue, George C . Marshall. Ordeal and
Hope (New York:
Viking Press, 1965), p. 262. The British
Chiefs "were always conscious of the Prime Minister's control of policy even when he was absent from the scene."
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In December of 1941 the only major
theatre
where the German armed forces were engaged
was on the
thousand-mile front of Soviet Russia. There

the Red Army,

despite a massive winter offensive of limited
success,

was hard-pressed.

This situation made it manifestly

clear to all Allied civilian and military planners
that
the Germans must be engaged on another front to
split

their forces.

A "Second Front" would allow the commit-

ment of large American and British armies and would

eventually cause the collapse of the German war machine.
The need for a Second Front was obvious and
thus the idea itself was never controversial.

There

was unanimity of Anglo-American opinion that the German

Wehrmacht must be engaged and defeated in the West,
The Soviets were most anxious that this be done with

celerity, since any delay necessarily put additional

strains on the exhausted Red Army.

The differences be-

tween the British and American military arose over the

location of the proposed Second Front,

This issue proved

to be an area of bitter disagreement between the British

and American military staffs, and threatened to cause

problems within the alliance at an early date.

British and American military representatives had
met to discuss joint strategy even before the United States
entered

ifre

war,

from

January 22

to

March 27,

1941. Anglo-ArErican
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intelligence estimates at this time
predicted Hitler's
"Operation Barbarossa," (the June 22,
1941 attack

on the

USSR) and the entrance of the Soviet
Union into the war. 2
It was evident that if Russia survived
the initial German

onslaught, the English-speaking Allies would
be able to
launch a Second Front against weakened enemy
resistance.

Beyond this general mutual conviction, the
British and
American military found themselves in serious
disagreement.

The Americans strongly endorsed invasion ideas,

favoring a quick amphibious assault on continental Europe,
perhaps in time to save a faltering Soviet Union.

The

British Staff, almost certainly influenced by the disasters
at Narvik and Dunkirk, were not anxious to launch such an

invasion on Europe itself.

They favored the reduction of

Germany through extensive airstrikes, and the engagement of
German forces in peripheral theatres such as Africa, Greece
or the Balkans.

2

The British military felt that this indirect

Stalin had been informed by Allied sources of
Hitler's intentions, but steadfastly refused to believe
the reports.
Stalin's suspicion of his allies is a good
measure of his xenophobia and also of his eagerness to
remain at peace with Germany. This subject will be further
discussed in the following Chapter. Liddell Hart states,
"Despite German precautions, the British Intelligence Service obtained remarkably good information of Hitler's
Intentions long in advance, and conveyed i t to the Russians. It even accurately predicted the date for the invasion.... But its repeated warnings were met with an attitude of disbelief..." Liddell Hart, History of the Sec ond
World War (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), p. 153.
A German decoding machine acquired in 1939 and code-named
"Ultra" was responsible for this windfall of intelligence
information.
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approach would critically weaken
Germany while causing the
Allies minimal troop losses. They
were convinced that an
invasion of Europe could only be
undertaken
once Germany

had her strength drained in secondary
theatres. In addition, great hope was placed in the
bomber offensive against
the German heartland. 3
The position of the American Joint
Chiefs a t
this early date tended toward offensive
action. They
regarded the British scheme of an "indirect
approach »
as timorous and insufficient to
pulverize the German
Army, the bulk of which was in Europe, and
not in

peripheral areas.

Because the Joint Chiefs believed

indirect attacks would never deal

a

death-blow to the

Germans, they regarded such attacks as wasteful, as

frittering away of manpower.

a

Further, the American mili-

tary, even the Army Air Staff led by General H. H. Arnold,

were not as optimistic as the British about the effect of
the bomber offensive.

While conceding that the air war

could deliver a devastating blow to German armaments and

5

Another Anglo-American dispute arose over bombing tactics. The British desired to restrict bombing missions to night hours, in this manner minimizing their losses
The American Air Staff under Arnold believed such a limited
undertaking was too modest and pressed for "around-theclock" raids. Eventually, the British bombed by night, and
the Americans by day.
This incident further indicates that
caution was the hallmark of the British strategists, while
the Americans were eager to adopt riskier forms of combat.
No derision of this British characteristic is intended here,
but simply the observation that the British military attitudinal structure differed markedly from the American.
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production, they were reluctant to believe
that the
German armed forces could be neutralized by

air strikes.

Thus, even prior to American entrance
into the

war, the British and American military staffs were
in

serious disagreement on the crucial strategic
question of
where the Second Front should be launched. At this
early
stage, strategic discussions were entirely a military
concern, and the disagreements between the British and Ameri-

can staffs did not yet influence their political superiors.

Although Churchill was not directly involved at this preliminary stage, he constantly criticized his own military
leaders for being strategically conservative and unimaginative.

It was evident that there were differences of

opinion on the British civilian-military team, as well as

between the British and Americans.
Because of the differences between American and

British strategic planning and the non-participation of

political decision-makers, further conferences were convened in Washington close on the heels of American

entrance into the war.

The initial round, code-named

"Arcadia," and held in Washington, was the first wartime

meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill, and their personal rapport was to play an important role in Second Front decisionmaking.
ters,
military

The first meeting, called to discuss strategic mat-

took place on December 23, 1941.
ard civilian

It was attended by

representatives of both countries.

Chief of the
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Joint Chiefs of Staff Marshall
headed the American mlll _
tary team, accompanied by
General Watson, General
Arnold
representing the air arm, and
Admirals Stark and King
speaking for the Navy. The British
Staff, cast as adversaries to the Joint Chiefs, had
three representatives:

Admiral of the Fleet Pound, Field
Marshal Dill, and
Brigadier Ho llla . Roo3evelt was
Con3tantly in the
of Harry Hopkins and Secretary of
War Stimson,

while Chur-

chill was accompanied by the politically
ambitious and
opinionated Lord Beaverbrook, who was to
resign from

government service within the year.
At this meeting, as at numerous other
meetings

during the following weeks, General Marshall
seemed to
dominate the floor, arguing incessantly that the
war

could

be won in two steps.

First, there should be a massive

build-up of American troops in England.

While in England,

the American and British forces would jointly train
for an

invasion of Europe.

The proposed build-up of Allied inva-

sion forces was given the code-name "Bolero."

Second,

a

cross-channel attack on the French coast would be launched
sometime in 1942, code-named "Sledgehammer."

Marshall

spoke of this plan as ensuring a short war, hoping thereby
to convince

both Roosevelt and Churchill of the desir-

ability of the American "direct approach."

We cannot know

if Marshall was purposefully. overestimating the effect of

an invasion in order to persuade his civilian superiors.
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Some incidents in Marshall^
World War One staff experience
suggest that this may have been
the case.* it la clear,
'
however, that he was motivated
solely by m ilitary considerations, and tiuly believed
in the efficacy of the
American plan. He also argued
that an investment of
Europe would in the long run
minimize Allied casualties
since the Allies would be taking
the shortest route to
the German heartland.
Secretary of War Stimson heartily
endorsed Marshall's plan, whereas
Roosevelt remained noncommittal, preferring to hear what the
British military
thought, particularly any suggestions
that might be

offered by Churchill.

Roosevelt, while relying heavily

on his military staff, evidently was not
in awe of them.
The President's eagerness to hear the Bri
tish s trategic

view was disturbing to Marshall, who saw the
British plan
as not only ineffective but as endangering
the Allied

military position. 5

4

Marshall, in his Memoirs of My Servic e in the
World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 44 relates
with relish how he had learned the art of double talk and
half-truth from French staff officers. "The lesson learned
was invaluable to me in my later dealings with our Allies."
Marshall relates an amusing anecdote concerning agreements
"
en principe ." By 1918 he himself was adept at such techniques.
Perhaps significantly, a number of his WW II
memoranda contain the phrase "in principle."
5

Marshall, more so than the other Joint Chiefs, regarded the British plan as doomed to catastrophic failure.
At a December 28, 1941, conference, "The President asked
about the possibility of landing under f i re a t Casablanca.
General Marshall stated that this would be a very dangerous
operation to attempt because of the hazards involved..."
Historical Office, U.S. Foreign Service, The Conferences
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The British Staff did not
begin by countering

Marshall's Second Front proposal,
but, li ke professional
debaters, first pointed up what
they
saw as shortcomings

in the plan.

Their main objection was that,
given the
strength of the German war machine, a
1942 invasion of
Europe was not realistic. Since any
invasion would

have
to contend with numerous experienced
German divisions,

active Luftwaffe intervention, and
possibly the German
Hochseeflotte off the French coast, the chance
of Allied
success would be slim. Moreover, the
Germans had
the

capability

to

rush reserve forces to the invasion front

from Italy and Germany.

All of this, the British empha-

sized, conspired to make an early invasion of the

at Washington 1941-1942 and Casabla nca^_JJM5. "Minutes
of
Major Sexton, Defense Files" (Washi'ngton7~D7c : United
States Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 130. In part
Marshall's anxiety was caused by fear that the Vichy French
would tenaciously defend their strongholds. Army Intelligence estimated that "the resistance of the French was certain and that it would be impossible to get supplies in
North Africa if the French in Morocco were hostile." Ibid.,
"Notes by Lt. General Arnold," p. 153. Moreover, Marshall'
apparently gave some credence to reports that the Germans
would strike through Spain if a Northvrest African landing
were made. Also, like Roosevelt, Marshall sew the first
contest of American arms as critical. He stated on
December 27 that "A failure in this first venture would
have an extremely adverse effect on the morale of the
American people." Ibid., "U. S. Minutes of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, December 27, 1941, p. 114. Marshall's fears were
largely unfounded. For further information see Arthur Funk,
The Politics of T ORCH (Wichita, Kansas
University Press
.

:

of Kansas, 197477 p. 72.
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continent appear

military

unreallstlc .

to the, that no invasion
could be launohed

„

^

mtll

^

armed forces h ad been weakened,
and the Oer^ns could
only
he weakened if they were
engaged piecemeal in
theatres
other than Europe proper,
while German war
production was
substantially reduced by Allied
bombing. In short the
British Staff objected on purely
military grounds [ o
broad strategic possibilities
envisioned by the African
Joint Chiefs.

^

In particular the British
Staff representatives
pointed out that the Germans were
already engaged in a

non-European theatre

~

North

Africa, and that the objec-

tive of the British Eighth Army
in Egypt was the destruction of all German and Italian forces
on that continent.
As an alternative to Marshall's
plan, American forces

might be employed in

a

support capacity in North Africa

and the Middle East, releasing British
troops for actual
combat duty. The American Joint Chiefs were
not taken with
this plan, objecting as they did to the
use of American

troops merely as back-up forces for the British
Army.
This apparent slight to the fighting abilities

of the U. S.

Army put further strain on the already tense Joint
ChiefsBritish Staff relationship. Anxious to avoid animosity
between the two military staffs, Churchill offered
active role for American forces:

a

more

a joint Anglo-American

40

landing somewhere in French
Northwest Africa, perhaps in
Morocco or on the
i;ne Tunisian
ih*
i
lumsian littoral.
The always ambitious
Churchill also pressed for an
invasion of Norway
but

abandoned the scheme when
informed by his military
advisers
of the logistics of the
undertaking. The Prime Minister
then pressed with renewed
vigor for a massive invasion
of
North Africa.

Despite Churchill's suggestion,
Marshall and his
subordinates still favored an
invasion of Western Europe,
inasmuch as Marshall felt that
the way to win the war was
to fight toward Berlin, not
away from it. He also ignored
the British assessment of German
strength in Europe.
Further, the American Naval
representatives, Admirals Stark
and King, were disturbed by the
prospect of shepherding an

invasion force through the Straits
of Gibraltar and into
the Mediterranean because of the
presence of U-boat wolfpacks in such restricted waters.
Roosevelt had now heard all the major
strategic
arguments, but had yet to suggest a
course of action or
to endorse one.

He was no doubt impressed with the elo-

quent arguments of the always persuasive
Churchill, who
saw many advantages in the North African
venture,

the

destruction of strong Axis forces, the preservation
of
British control in the Middle-East and India, and
the

possibility of a major Allied victory after a long run
of defeat.

According to one historian:

4

To Churchill, and to
most British
What England had been
bleedW for
what the embattled garrison
S2
Malta was tenaciously
sufferW
for
was to hold the traditional
life-'
6
he GaSt - And P^sident
RnU «
it
Roosevelt,
unlike his military
advisors, sympathized with
this
positi on. D
The American Joint Chiefs
did not find these

goals particularly salient.

Churchill had, they believed

succeeded in introducing "political"
issues (the preserva
tion of British colonies and areas
of
influence) into a

military discussion.

To Marshall, the only valid aim
of

the war was the destruction of
Germany, which could be

accomplished solely through an invasion
of Europe. The
Middle East, India, and other areas
of concern to the
British, did not interest him, since
they were not crucial to the waging of the war against
Germany. The pos-

sible use of American troops for the
protection of nonstrategic British possessions was reprehensible
to him as

well as to the other members of the Joint Chiefs.
war, as they saw it, was

a

The

military matter and should be

stripped of all political considerations.
Despite Marshall's vigorous arguments and the

unanimous advocacy of

g

(Wichita
p.

31.

a

European invasion by the Joint

Arthur Layton Fund, The P olitics of TORCH
Kansas: University Press of Kansas. 1974)
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Chiefs, Roosevelt expressed
interest in Churchill.
African proposal. By the end
of the Arcadia conferences
in mid-January, 1942,
Roosevelt backed the British
plan
for an Anglo-American landing,
ideally against positions
held by Vichy French forces
of dubious loyalty.
This

placed the Joint Chiefs in the
awkward position of arguing
against their own Commander-in-Chief
as well as their
British allies.

Roosevelt did not elaborate on the
basis for his
decision, and the reasons behind
it are not readily
apparent. We do know, however, that

from 1940 on, he had

exhibited great confidence in his own
military team, and
regarded Marshall as an especially able
adviser. Accordingly, it appears unlikely that he
endorsed the British
plan because he regarded American military
advice
as

unreliable.

A number of more convincing possibilities

merit attention:

S ° me authors (notably Arthur Funk in Politics
of
mADmr and3 Robert
TORCH
Sherwood in Roosevelt and Ho pkins') h^T
postulated that Roosevelt viewed North Africa with romantic
attachment and, hence, favored operations in that area.
Funk writes that for Roosevelt, North Africa was "the magnet whose attraction never failed," p. 72. This explanation tells us little and is not convincing. Roosevelt was
also fond of France, having traveled there, but he did not
allow this sentiment to become a factor in his decisionmaking.
It is unlikely that he treated North Africa
differently.
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Roosevelt had some appreciation
of Churchill.
pride and the shared responsibilities
of wartime
(1)

coalition.

Despite its actual and potential
military superiority, the
United States could not dictate
strategy unilaterally.
This may partially explain his
open-mindedness during
Arcadia.
Roosevelt was, after all, a
politician by profession and thus in a position to
regard flexibility and
compromise as the cardinal virtues of
an alliance.
Acceptance of a major British proposal
at an early date
would effectively "seal" the alliance,
and facilitate
future teamwork.
(2)

Despite his respect for American military

opinion, the President had reason to regard
the British

military as more experienced in the realities
of the war.
His acceptance of the British scheme probably
was a

simple

reflection of that conviction.
(3)

The African plan had another attraction.

American participation in this theatre could be accomplished
quickly, far more quickly than the launching of an attack
on Fes tun g Euro pa .

American popular opinion was already

clamoring for a visible American war effort, and the

African invasion "might give the American people the feeling of being in the war." 8

Thus, Roosevelt favored

Herbert Feis Roosevelt (Princeton:
University Press, 1957), p. 47.

Princeton
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joining the fight already underway
ln North Africa for
his own political reasons.
Unlike the military, the
President was not immune to popular
sentiment.
(4)

The proposed African invasion
was also a

low risk enterprise.

A newcomer to wartime
leadership,

Roosevelt had no desire to preside
over

a

military disaster

in 1942.

Despite his regard for the Joint
Chiefs, he was
disturbed by the British account of
overwhelming German
strength in Europe. Given the extent of
British military
experience, he was not willing contemptuously
to discount
their warnings. An invasion of North Africa
was unlikely
to fail, even though the yield of military
benefits would
be more modest than that of a successful
invasion
of the

Continent.

9

(5)

Hopkins and various British observers noted

that Roosevelt and Churchill took an instant liking to

each other and worked well together.

Churchill was an

eloquent and persuasive orator.

Roosevelt was much

Too,

impressed by the strength and determination the Prime

9

The domestic political trouble which might be
expected to occur after a failed military expedition was
brought home to Roosevelt by Churchill's predicament.
British criticism of Churchill intensified during times
of crisis, and he had to face a vote of "no confidence"
twice; with the debacle at Singapore in February, 1942, and
the surrender of Tobruk in June, 1942.
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Minister had shown throughout
England's darkest hours.
a result, Churchill's
suggestions were

As

given careful con-

sideration by the President.

The North African plan was

initially proposed by Churchill.
This combination of factors
probably determined

Roosevelt's decision to back the
British plan, which became
known as "Super-Gymnast." The
President was not overly conconcerned with preserving the
"traditional life-line" of the
British Empire, but was willing to
assent to the plan for
a number of other reasons.
Some of these, such
as the

deference to public opinion, were clearly
political,
any event, Roosevelt had not ruled out
the establishment
of a Second Front in Europe, he had
merely postponed it.
And further, by doing so, he retained his
option for action
at a later date.

m

The reasons for Roosevelt's decision were
not

convincing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The North African

operation would contribute little to the defeat of Germany.
Once again the American military leaders demonstrated that

caution was not their hallmark.

Caution, in their eyes,

was the equivalent of timidity.

More importantly, the

American military was not comfortable in the atmosphere of
flexibility and compromise necessary for an alliance.
Considerations of coalition warfare meant little to
Marshall or to the rest of the American staff, at least

during this stage of the war.

Further, the American
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military tea m did not 3eem
to share
for the British General
Staff, for reasona
examine later.

wMch

^

we

With the Commander-in-Chief
having decided in
favor of a course of action,
the American Joint
Chiefs of
Staff had no choice but to
they doubted its wisdom.

accept his decision, even
if
Though resentful of what
in

effect was a vote of no confidence,
there was nothing
left to do during the final
days of Arcadia but discuss
operations plans with the permanent
British liason officer,
Marshal John Dill. It was decided
that the best place Tor
a seaborne invasion of
North Africa was the
area around

Casablanca.

To facilitate American planning
of this and

future military operations, the
Chiefs of Staff of both
nations were fused into a "Combined
Chiefs of Staff,"

although each would still retain its
discrete identity.
Reports could only be issued under the

aegis of the Com-

bined Chiefs when there existed unanimity
of military
opinion. And even then, there was frequent
behind-thescenes special pleading by one side or the
other.

The

Janus-faced nature of the arrangement became evident
during
the closing days of the Arcadia conference.
It was clear
that Roosevelt had endorsed "Super- Gymnast" and
the Joint

Chiefs,

after having registered their dissenting opinions

on military grounds, were obliged to obey their Commander-

in-Chief.

Accordingly, they assented to a memorandum
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drafted by the British which in
part declared
S
Zi
N ° rth Afrlcan coast
**7
open
QDen the Mediterranean
M?,?f
to convoys thus
U ly 3h0 tenlnS the route to
the
4.
r saving
Middle S
East
and
considerable tonem
in the long haul around
thf Cane *l°?*
063 not Seem like ly that in
iq2p
o
1942 any
large scale land offensive
against Germany. . .will be possible. 10

S?^

T

Thus, the Joint Chiefs, nominally
accepting the
British plan for North Africa, formally
abandoned the idea
of launching an early cross-channel
strike at Prance.

Nevertheless, they (as well as Secretary
of War Stimson)
still felt allegiance to their own plan and
attempted to

sabotage "Super-Gymnast."

This was partially effected by

sending unsolicited private memoranda to the
President.
In a series of communications, General Marshall and

Rear

Admiral Turner persistently described the proposed African
invasion in pessimistic terms. Marshall was particularly
determined to sway the President.

Knowing that Roosevelt

was enamored of garrisoning Northern Ireland with American
troops, and of quickly building up forces in England, he

wrote of Super- Gymnast, "if the above operation is ordered,

shipping will not be available for other overseas movements in the Atlantic." 11

He hoped that such "either/or"

Historical Office, U. S. Foreign Service, The
Conferences at Washington 1941-1942 and Casablanca, 1945
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1968), "Memorandum by Joint British and American
Chiefs of Staff," p. 213.
11 Ibid_.

George C. Marshall, "Memorandum to the
,
President," Dec. 26, 1941, p. 239.
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statements would cause Roosevelt
to abandon the North
African venture in favor of other
pet projects
at which
time Roosevelt might be
persuaded to allow an invasion
of
France. 12 The President, probably
sensing Marshall's
intention, refused to reconsider
his decision.

~

Aware that Roosevelt was influenced
by British
opinion, the Joint Chiefs also
attempted to dissuade Churchill
from carrying out the proposed
operation. On January
4,

1942, in a session with Roosevelt and
Churchill, Admiral
Turner, while expressing agreement with
the invasion plan,
noted that such an operation would take
at least four
months before any complete occupation of
the Casablanca
area could be secured. This prediction was
purposefully

bleak and made to frighten the British, who feared
that
their capital ships would be endangered by any
extended
stay off the African coast.

Churchill, evidently as sensi-

tive as Roosevelt to such ploys, stated that "it had
not

required the Japs four months to get ashore in Luzon." 13

12

The Joint Chiefs regarded North Africa as a hotbed of political activity and intrigue. An OSS team was
sounding out Admiral Darlan and other Vichy officials as
to their loyalties.
Roosevelt and Churchill were engaged
in negotiations with the Free French forces of Generals
Henri Giraud and Charles DeGaulle.
13 Ibid

Minutes January

.,

4,

Conferences at Washington. . . "U. S.
1942, Meeting atfthe White House," p. 164.
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Marshall, undeterred,
continued to produce
lntell lgenoe
estates indicating that any
Invasion atte.pt In the
area
was doomed to failure
tilure.
He dld
ln fact , have doubts
'
about
the operation's probability
of success, but his
m ain objection was still the concept
of an indirect
approach to
Germany. Churchill and
Roosevelt continued to
dismiss
Marshall. 3 dlre warnings> but
Kapsh&11 did succeed
worrying his British military
counteroart^ who grew more
j ouuuoeipartSj
anxious about Super-Gymnast as
time went on. Despite
their initial optimism, they
began to entertain

^

doubts

concerning the likelihood of

a

successful invasion.

Whereas they had at first believed
that French forces would
not resist, they now thought
otherwise. Even an attack by
a Vichy surface fleet was
not ruled out. Too, American
intelligence information about a
possible German thrust
through Spain to Gibraltar worried
them.

In addition,

the German expeditionary force in
North Africa had been

reinforced; the invasion might be repulsed
on the beaches.
The British military was no longer inclined
to regard a

seaborne North African assault as a "sure
thing."

Only the

civilian leadership, British and American, believed
in the
probable success of Super-Gymnast. But that alone was

enough to keep the plan operational.
The special pleading of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

indicates the commitment that they felt toward "their plan."
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Convinced that the "indirect
approach w*.
approach"
was a monumental
folly they found it
difficult- *•« on
aiincult

to accept Roosevelt's
deci-

3io„ as flnal .

P-osing for

perhaps

a

M

Qccur

^

t

"

^

_^
^

pure iy mil ita ry strategy"
they
ing in political subterfuge
themselves. Their one .
slded
situation estimates and
duplicity attest to a
tension
between their oath of allegiance
J-J-egiance, on the
f-w, one
hand, and their
professional military convictions,
on the other.

m

As a

result, the American military
in Washington obeyed
the
Commander-in-Chief i„ le tter, but
their continued reservations affected the perforce
of their duty. The Joint
Chiefs "dragged their feet"
on Super-Gymnast while appearing to comply." The dellberate
Amerlcan pe3sim 3m had
.

through

the^velopme^K^

the time and ma te rial that ^could
to Super-Gymnast.
Thus, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff decided to utilize transports
to withdraw
oe Allocated
bYaTlocatel

tTsT^

?

Marines
from Iceland, to use cargo vessels
to garrison Ire^anT
1
the ?aCifi " theat e
.
tion, the Joint Chiefs maintained
?°t
that they were not vet
r
Ut
e
/' rlCan -*™turJ since "adf-"
quate U S.
quatTu
S° antiaircraft
ant 'L°
defense cannot be provided prior
n
ther lm lements
7
war were in s nor?
^-°
su'll7
a?1 nf
h
S
WaS a ?
disc
°
^te
form
of sabotage. Too '
}
tS
i
the ncontinuing
distaste
of the Chiefs for the British
} an Sua S e of some of their memos.
ff^ 3 /f r J in a3t) is
ordered, shipping will not be
?°
Jnn
h
available
for other operatioRTlLn the Atlantic." Conferences a t Washington ..." Memorandum to the
President
December 26, 194TTp. 239. The Joint Chiefs made
it
clear that their work on Super-Gymnast was not voluntary
'
but in deference to orders.

WonVhJloWf "
^

V

^

r

"

Edi-

^

^

^

^
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unnerve* the British
mllltary , but

^

velt.

The two statesmen,
i„ concert with the
ubiquitous
Harry Hopkins, could not
be persuaded Qr
Military subalterns. Yet
despite civilian
Anglo-^erican
solidarity, subsequent
events were to destroy
By mid-January, 1942,
the situation in the
Pacific
theatre had become ominous.
The Japanes e had conducted
a
naval blitzkrieg and inflicted
serious losses on the Allied
forces.
Generals MacArthur and Wavell
pleaded for more
supplies to cope with an
ever-darkening situation.
Although it had long been decided
to treat the Pacific as
a secondary theatre, it
became obvious that something
had
to be done there to prevent
disastrous reverses. Aid was
sent to the Pacific,
addition, it was becoming evident that Axis resistance in North
Africa was stiffening,
and the name of a new nemesis
entered military conversation, German General Erwin Rommel.

m

Both these developments caused the
postponement
of Super-Gymnast.
Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed to
free forces to defend the garrisons
in the Pacific, and
both were worried at the German build-up
opposite the

Eighth Army on the Egyptian frontier.

It became apparent

that a major invasion of Africa would have
to wait until
at least May.

This meant that one of Roosevelt's prime

reasons for supporting the operation -- a quick entrance
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of American forces into the
war

~

had evaporated.

Ro,
>ose-

velt and Churchill both pledged
to see the invasion
through
but began to doubt that it
would succeed. The uncertainties of war had worked in
favor of General Marshall.
With
Super-Gymnast temporarily abandoned,
it was possible once
again to argue for a frontal assault
on Europe. Further,
the British delegation returned
to England in mid-January,
removing that source of influence from
direct contact with
Roosevelt. Most importantly, the
United States and Britain
were faced with military reverses,
and political considerations necessarily faded into insignificance.
Even so, the

Super-Gymnast operation had only been delayed,
not abandoned. The American military staff still

feared that they

would become entangled in a war partially dictated
by
political concerns, and, even worse, political concerns

of

a foreign nation.

The Allied war effort went badly during the first

half of 1942.
April.

Malaya fell in February, the Philippines in

The Battle of the Atlantic was being won by the

U-boat tactics of Admiral Doenitz.

The garrison at Malta

had been nearly neutralized from the air.

The German

front in Russia had stabilized, and the Germans were

clearly gearing up for a spring offensive aimed at capturing the Caucasus and Moscow.

These events cast a

shadow of unreality on the decisions reached during the

.
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Arcadia conference.

ans

i„ N orth Afrioa

The unexpected strength
of the Gor-

_

mo3t

there were always promptly
brought to Roosevelt,
attention
by a persistent General
Marshall, and Roosevelt's
hopes of
launching Super-Gymnast, even
in May, beg an to fade.
More
carefully than hefore, he
considered the advice offered
by
15
the American military
staff,

Paced with a crisis, the
British military staff
also began to urge on
Churchill the indefinite
postponement
of Super-Gymnast.
An invasion of North Africa
in 1942 was

likely to end in disaster (as
was any offensive action),
that the British could ill
afford. The troops and transports needed for the invasion
would be better used shoring
up defenses in the Pacific and
at Malta.
Churchill,

although desiring to see his African
project through, began
to see the grave risks it now
entailed. It was apparent
that the situation called not for
offensive action but for
desperate defense of areas under Allied
control.

The British

15 Following

the reverses of early 1942 th<* TMnf
Chiefs used their frequent situations
reports to the P?esi° advantage
"...to no small degree they could help
in determination of a policy by merely
indicating their
own powers and limitations in implementing
such a policy,
^"unrecorded personal influence by the Chiefs
of Staff
is difficult to trace and impossible
to measure, but its
existence is a certainty." Mark Wat 3 on, Chief of
Staff
(Washington, D.C.:
Historical Division, De~pt. of Army,
,

t

i.y4o

)

,

p. 6

•
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military staff, llke their
American counterparts, convinced their civilian leader

to drop the North African
ven-

ture, at least for a matter
of months.

From January until at least
April, the Allies were
forced into a period of waiting,
assessing the changing
situation and speculating on future
enemy activities. The
American Joint Chiefs, as well as
Stimson, utilized this
time to renew plans for an invasion
of Europe in late 1942.
Admiral King suggested that the transport
vessels and
escorts of the invasion fleet could be
used in the Pacific
operations, but Marshall convinced him
that the bulk

should remain on assignment in the European
theatre.

With

the exception of such minor disagreements,
the Joint Chiefs
as a whole still endorsed the idea of
European invasion.

Marshall became increasingly determined that
channel attack be mounted.

a cross-

At every meeting with Roose-

velt, Marshall, flanked by one or another of his
sub-

ordinates, maintained that an invasion of France could
be

launched before 1942 was out.

This rekindled Roosevelt's

hope that the United States could soon get into the war

against Germany.

In any case, Marshall declared, it was

evident that Super-Gymnast was doomed to failure.
The selection of a better course had
been urgently argued in a series of
discussion at the White House during
March. Vigorous Stimson, with impressive Marshall, in accord with the
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staff planners headed by
nersuasive Eisenhower, explained
over
and over why it was
essential to
"dispersion" and to concen\°
p
e build ~uP of forces
in the
tt
United Kingdom for a cross-chapel
assault. The supporting
reason^
were impressive .16

V£

Roosevelt was impressed by the
fact that Marshall
had earlier predicted that
Super-Cy^st was ill-convei ved.
His predictions had, apparently,
been borne out. This
increased Marshall's influence
with the Commander-in-Chief,
and, by April, Roosevelt
tentatively endorsed a shift in
grand strategy. Super-Gymnast
could not be launched in
May or June, and probably not soon
thereafter.
Nonethe-

less,

Roosevelt was still convinced that
American participation in the war against Hitler must
take place in
1942.

Public pressure for a visible American
role mounted
steadily. Partially as a result, and
partially because he
saw few alternatives, Roosevelt allowed
the Joint Chiefs
to begin contingency planning for a European
operation.
He now endorsed the plan of his military
staff, although

not for military reasons.

He was greatly concerned with

domestic political opinion, an important fact which

apparently had escaped the Joint Chiefs, who were happy
to have finally secured the approval of their Commander.

^Herbert Feis, Roosevelt (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1957J7 pp. 48-49.
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Roosevelt now asked Marshall to
consult the British military and to win their approval
of a European operation,
a task which Marshall accepted
with relish. The President
would attempt to persuade Churchill
to approve the previously rejected American plan. 17
The Joint Chiefs had achieved
a good deal during
the early months of the war.
First, their fledgling

organization had proved to be

a

workable unit.

With only

minor points of disagreement, the Chiefs
of the military
services had acted in unison, presenting
a
cohesive

American "military position."

The traditional inter-

service rivalry was virtually eliminated,
and this in turn
increased the value of military advice.
Secondly, in

tG Roose velt's

message to Churchill, April 1.
completed survey of the immediate and
long-range problems of the military situation facing the
United Nations, I have come to certain conclusions which
are so vital that I want you to know the whole
picture and
ask your approval. The whole of it is so dependent on
complete cooperation by the United Kingdom and the United
States that Harry and Marshall will leave for London in a
few days to present first of all to you the salient points.
It is a plan which I hope Russia will greet with enthusiasm
....I think it will work out in full accord with trend of
public opinion here and in Britain. And, finally, I would
like to be able to label it the plan of the United Nations."
Francis Loewenheim, ed., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their
Secret Correspondence (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.,
1975), p. 200. As if to clarify matters, Roosevelt noted
in his next missive that "What Harry and George Marshall
will tell you all about has my heart and mind in it."
tq/io
1942:

n*
As

?°,
I have

Ibid., p. 202.
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presenting a united front, the
mllltary wa3 able to galn
control of the War Department
and reduce the Secretary
of
War to supporting status,

further, their obvious
expertise

coupled with other factors,
eclipsed the power of Cordell
Hull's State Department. 18
The sometimes bitter
disagreements that arose during the Arcadia discussions
made the American military
staff aware that they could not
survive by insulating
themselves from "politics." Strategic
plans, if they were
to be adopted, had to be
presented vigorously. Military
18
De P a rtment representatives
were absent
from all of the important Arcadia
irom
meetings.
"There were
at least eight major White House
meeting? of tne ?res?dent
Prime Minister Secretaries of War
'
and
Hopkins, and the British and American Navy, Beaverbrook
Chiefs of Staf? and
twelve meetings of the Chiefs of Staff by
themselves in
1
Robert sLrwood Roosevelt
and Sokfns
Hopkins (New York:
Harper & Bros., 1948) d d 444-44S
Note the absence of the Secretary of state?
^Setery t£li
was in part responsible for his modest
decision-making
status. He had drafted the M^mo_oji_tte_Proposed
Standing
^
Maso n Committee o f the StateTWaTTT
n
Departments"
(State Department: Government Printin Office
April 8
g
1938), which increased the accessibility of the Executive
to the military staff.
During World War Two the State
Department was largely ignored by Roosevelt who worked
mainly with Stimson and Marshall. Hull himself stated
The question of the second front was outside my province
being handled exclusively by the President and his mili- '
tary assistants." Cordell Hull Memoirs of Cordell Hull
(New York:
MacMillan Co., 1948), ~II, p. li80T "Other
sources confirm that the State Department was relegated to
a secondary role during the war.
"Military and personal
advisers like Harry Hopkins overshadowed the State Department.
Russell Buchanan, ed., The U nited States and World
War Two (Columbia, S. C.s University of South Carolina
Press, 1972), p. 87.

nf^^

^"T
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logic alone did not guarantee
the approval of a strategic
scheme. Thus, it was necessary
to beguile the civilian
leaders, to cater to their
personal wishes, and to
approach
them with selected facts.
Marshall demonstrated considerable cunning in this technique,
probably as a result
of

his World War One dealings
with Marshal Ferdinand Foch
and
General Douglas Haig. Whatever
the reasons. Marshall had
been able to see American
Second Front plans adopted
and
British strategy eventually
rejected. To be sure, he was
assisted in this task by the
exigencies of war.

Perhaps the most important, and
troubling, point
in the Joint Chiefs' attitude
during the early months of
the war was the apparent fact
that their fidelity belonged
less to their Commander-in-Chief
than to a military plan
they viewed as indispensable.
Throughout
1942 the Joint

Chiefs retained the strategic view
they had presented during Arcadia. For a clique of
men trained to think in military terms, this inflexibility is
understandable. This is
not to say that they were guilty of
refusing subordination
to the Commander-in-Chief. Their
obligation required
obedience, not approval. During Arcadia, and
in the months
following the conference, the military staff
did not

attempt to ignore Roosevelt, but to convince
him that his
initial judgment on a Second Front was faulty.
In doing
this they were legitimately acting within their
assigned
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roles as advisors to the
Commander-in-Chief. The point
on which they can be faulted
is the
in which they
tried to win Roosevelt's
endorsement of their operations
plan. There was an element of
deceit, quite probably
unconscious, in the deliberate pessi
ml sm of Marshall and
King. The military predictions
of the dangers of North
Africa were certainly more fatalistic
than an objective
reading of the facts warranted. But
this,

_r

of course,

the crux of the problem.

is

The Joint Chiefs were not objec-

tive.

They had developed a single-minded
obsession with
launching a Second Front in Europe.
Similarly,

they were

unduly suspicious of the British and were
more willing to
tolerate their Allies than to work in
true concert with
them.

Roosevelt and Hopkins did not have this difficulty.

They might disagree, sometimes strongly, with
the

British, but they were not ill at ease in their presence.
The attitude of the Joint Chiefs toward the
British, as well
as

their fear that Roosevelt might be swayed by what they

regarded as non-military vectors of influence was cer-

tainly due in part to the peculiar nature of their military training and insulated careers.

As Marshall time and

again stated, the thinking of the military staff was

strictly military thinking.

Those who seemed to entertain

other considerations were automatically suspect.

Con-

vinced by training and education that their own military
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doctrines were sacred
anl ln the best
United Sta t 6a , the Jolnt
CMe fs regaixJed

-

a

fo™

A Military

of heresy from

havlng

wMch

RoQsevelt

. mQre

^
^ ^
^
^

the

any Qther

^
^

^

not dedicated to an
y single strat e g ic plan,
might have
served Roosevelt better.
Thi s la especially
true when we
consider the lack of advice
that Roosevelt received
fro.
other sectors of the
Government.

Up to this point we have
seen the attempt by the
African military General Staff
to "sell" their Second
Front
strategy to the Commander-in-Chief.
We have also noted
the Joint Chiefs- mistrust
of the British authorities,
both civilian and military.
It is necessary to
understand
this relationship, since it
will affect the later
course

of Second Front decisions.

Accordingly, we shall briefly

examine some additional details
of the Joint Chiefs' dealings with the British decision-makers
at the Arcadia
Conference

During the Arcadia Conference the Joint
Chiefs of
Staff had directed their efforts at
persuading
Roosevelt

to adopt their strategic plan for
the Second Front.

How-

ever, they found themselves faced with
competition from
their British allies. The British had
achieved a notable
(and to the American Chiefs, an unexpected)
victory during
the Washington meetings when they converted
Roosevelt to

their view of a North African expedition.

This situation

produced tension between the American and British General
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Staffs, and heightened the
competitive atmosphere. This
atmosphere permeated the Arcadia
meetings, not only on the
issue of a Second Front but in
other respects as well. A
review of some of the additional
issues is helpful in explaining why the American military
felt the way they did
toward the British.
The pre-eminent British
decision-maker was Prime
Minister Churchill, and the American
military staff was
especially suspicious of him. Their
mistrust essentially
stemmed from two factors. First, it was
widely known that
Churchill, though a civilian head of state,
was interested
in all military matters from strategy
to tactics. This

predilection

is not

surprising.

Churchill had been

gazetted a Second Lieutenant in 1895, after
graduating
from Sandhurst.

For years thereafter he drifted from

military to political post, and back again.
statement of his

is

revealing:

"The more I see of soldier-

ing the more I like it, but the more
it is not my metier."

19

An early

I

feel convinced that

As First Lord of the Admiralty

during World War One, he had been responsible for the
attack on Gallipoli, a Turkish peninsula. 20 This 1915

19

Martin Gilbert, Church ill (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1974), p. 14. Churchill resigned his commission
four years later, in May 1899.
20

For an authoritative account of Churchill's
role in the Gallipoli fiasco, see Brig. Gen. C. F. AspinallOglander s Military Operations, Gal lipoli (London: Heinemann Ltd., 1929), II, pp. 40-45\
T
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invasion failed miserably and was a
charnel house for the
British Army. The Gallipoli affair
also pointed up another
penchant of Churchill's
his fondness for indirect attacks
on an enemy. During the 1914-1918 war,
he ceaselessly
advocated the defeat of Germany through
efforts aimed at
Turkey. During the Second World War he
favored an invasion
of North Africa, Greece, and the "soft
underbelly"

~

0f

Europe.

The Joint Chiefs thus perceived Churchill as
a

military dilettante.

Secondly, the American military staff

feared Churchill's persuasive abilities.

General Marshall

and Admiral King even hesitated to let Roosevelt alone
with

him and always worked frantically to head off such private
meetings.

Marshall believed that Churchill would beguile

Roosevelt into accepting British schemes that would pri-

marily benefit Britain, and not the United States.

Mar-

shall was not entirely mistaken in this conviction.

Churchill was an imperialist to the core, and declared
more than once that he had not become Prime Minister to

preside over the dissolution of the British Empire.
The suspicions the American military felt toward

Churchill were not without substance, as became evident

during an incident which occurred during the Arcadia Conference.

On the evening of December 25, 1941, Marshall was

handed a memorandum of British origin detailing a private

discussion just concluded between the President and the Prime
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Minister.

The memorandum purported
that Churchill had
persuaded Roosevelt to turn
over to the British
large African units previously allocated
to MacArthur at Bataan.
The
British desired to use the
American troops to shore
up the
defense of Singapore. Marshall
was scandalised that
African lives would be squandered
to defend a British
colony
and one of no strategic value,
in preference to reinforcing
MacArthur. Even more, Marshall was
crestfallen that Roosevelt had not conferred with his
military advisors before
making such a decision. He asked
Stimson to bring the
matter directly to the President.
Stimson agreed, equally
angered at what he regarded as a
Presidential blunder
of

the first order.

He records that on meeting
Roosevelt the

following day,
Incidentally and as if by aside he
(Roosevelt) flung out the remark that
a paper had been going around
which
was nonsense and which entirely
misrepresented a conference between him
and Churchill. I made no reply of
course as he had given up, if he had
ever entertained, the idea of discussing the surrender of MacArthur 's
reinforcements . 1

Stimson concluded that the incident demonstrated "the
danger of talking too freely in international matters
of
such keen import without the President carefully having

Historical Office, U. s. Foreign Service The
Conferences at Washington... "Proceedings of the Con.

fe re nee,

"

p.

95
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his military and naval
advisors present."

"

is still impossible
to determine if the
memorandum was misinformed, or if
Ro03 evelt simply
a Pledge made to
Churchill.

hacked down on

Whatever the faue story

the

incident served to confirm
the Joint Chiefssuspicions of
Churchill as a politician to
watch, and as an orator
who
might mesmerize the President.
The American Joint Chiefs'
reservations about
Churchill extended to his military
staff at Arcadia. Their
objection was a belief that the
British Army leadership was
considerably eras tianized; that
they thought in political
as well as military terms,
and were as concerned with
preserving the British Empire as with
defeating Germany.

This trait was vexing enough in
a politician such as
Churchill, it was intolerable in
professional soldiers.
A number of incidents substantiate
the claim that the
British staff was not an a-political
organization. By way
of example, a few of these incidents
are included here.

Toward the end of the Arcadia sessions
Field
Marshall Sir John Dill was named first-ranking

British

officer for the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
There was some difficulty about
this appointment at first, as Dill
was designated personal representative to the Prime Minister, Marshall protested that this would
give Dill a special, detached, and
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therefore anamalous
exercising political po3ition
aa well'
as military authority.

^

Marshall.a

ardent

made an

Dill was given the
appointmentj

i mpreaslon .

,
t

understanding that he would
act purely

as

^

a mllltary

^nctionary.

Nonetheless, oespite this
tacit understanding, the incident
convinced Marshall that
the British staff
was as much a political
creature as a m ilitary
one.
Other
events during Arcadia served
to confirm this.
On several
issues, the British „il
ita ry took stands
dictated as ™ch
by political mo tives as
by a milltary asaes
Qf
aituation. The British, for e
xamp le, deslred that the
headquarters of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff should be
located in London. This was
military nonsense to the
American Joint Chiefs. London
was nearly a combat zone,
subject to aerial attack and
possible invasion. To place
the Allied military nerve
center in such an area flew in
the face of military logic.
The American staff insisted
that Washington, D.C., was the
only reasonable

„

.

^

base.

The

American capital was halfway between
the two theatres of
war and due to its location unlikely
to
be subject to

enemy attack.

When the British military continued to
press for the London site, it became
evident to General
22

470.

Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins

,

pp. 469-
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than of

convenience.

^^

The Amerlcan team

military men to thil* in
atrlotly
British were eventual ly
forced

to aocept the
Washington

site, after Marshal!
and Sti ra3 on had rather
tactlessly

hinted that the Unite*
States was contributing
the bul k of
men and materiel to the
the* wa»
war, and thus was
entitled to choos
a site that was to
American liking.
A final area of
Anglo-American tension at
Arcadia
revolved around the
4-tne issue of munitions
and supply. Roosevelt and Chnrchill had co me
to the conclusion that
a
Munitions Board should be
established to coordinate the
allocation of munitions to
Allied forces in the field.
The American military had
no objection and endorsed
the
idea.
But Churchill, in league
with his military advisors,
made two proposals which the
Americans could not accept.
He urged that the distribution
of munitions be bandied by
two offices, one in Washington
and the other in London.
Since London was closest to the
European battlefields
this meant that London would largely
determine how ammunition would be distributed in that
theatre. Marshall

countered that such an arrangement would
be unsatisfactory,
that munitions concerns should be merged
and handled by
one office, a sub-section of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

Churchill in turn believed that the Munitions
Board should
not be dependent on the Combined Chiefs and
should
be run

^

civilians.

"ons were
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demonstrate the
importance he
att
b „ to the
attached
issue of military
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Marshall
threatened to resign
a3 chief of Staff
lf th BmiSh
R
was accepted.
Paoed wlth
faced
'
with this threat
mi eat Roosevelt
p «
inter-

Combined chiefs

"
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Churchill insisted
that the munitions
unit ions field
fi*i„ was
beyond
the
*
purview of military
CQ
allocation of munitions,
said, demanded
decisions of

^

a P
politic
,
olitl cal nature

(which
A11
Allies
and which Neutrals
were
ePe to
t0 ^ et su PPly
Priority, and
exchange
for
whaM
-Lurwnat;.
6
The military n 0 HHp 0 n
Politically insensitive, wa3 not qualified
to run the Munitions
„
Board.
The
Pl,iDie MlnlSter
***
thought the military
representatives would take
the purely strategic
view
This was, of course,
the only view that
the American military representatives
believed it was proper
.

^

m

•

^

to take.

Churchill lost the debate,
and the American Chief
of Staff
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had once again assented his
power.
The various incidents
described, while quite pessibly unimportant as separate
cases, collectively demonstrate (1) the notable tensions
between the Joint Chiefs
and the British (both civilian
and military), and (2) the

power possessed by the Joint
Chiefs even at this stage of
the war. Marshall, especially,
as senior
member of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, was more
an active decision-maker
than a mere advisor to the President.
He did not restrict
himself to offering advice of a
technical nature (as did
King and Arnold), but became involved
in all aspects of
wartime decision-making. This is clearly
illustrated by
his fight to keep the Munitions Board
part of the military
structure. Further, he did not merely
offer opinion, but
"would shape the discussion by the nature
of his
ques-

tions." 24

Marshall presented his recommendations strongly
and defended them stubbornly against opposition

from Roose-

velt and Churchill.

Too, when some proposal struck him as

particularly injurious to either the Army's or the nation's

war effort, he was not adverse to threatening resignation.
24

One author points out, "After the war General
Marshall conceded that there 'was too much anti-British
feeling on our side; more than we should have had. Our
people were always ready to find Albion perfidious.'"
Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marsh all: Ordeal an d Hope
(New Yorki
Viking Press, 1965 , ~pT~264.
)
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This indicates that
Marshall did not serve
in a passive
advisor capacity. Hi 3 power
was such that, after
Aneadia
Churchill
the leader of a foreign
power
always
insisted on knowing Marshall's
"view" of strategic
issues
This position of power,
coupled with his hostility
toward'
the British, ensured
that the tensions evidenced

-

-

at

Arcadia would be a permanent
feature of the alliance.
Marshall- s suspicions were not
illusory. British military
leaders were, as we have seen,
more inclined to entertain
political considerations than
their American counterparts.
This is not to say that the
British General Staff was a
political creature, only that it
was in the nature of
this establishment to go beyond
purely military considerations, as the military had never
been entirely divorced
from the rest of the governmental
structure. The British

military staff, for their part, viewed
their American
counterparts as unskilled provincials
playing at war.
The American Army, after all, had
not been
tested in

battle since 1918.

Accordingly, the capabilities of the

Army were an unknown commodity.
was thus one of

"

caveat emptor ."

British officers were infected by

The British attitude
In addition, the
a certain arrogance,

and this was quickly felt by the Americans at
Arcadia.

Although we cannot know to what degree this contributed to
Anglo-American tension, its influence should not be summarily dismissed.,

In blunt terms, and allowing for some

exceptions p the British and American staff officers did
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not like each other.
for coalition warfare.

This was a curious state
of affairs

R^her,

Marshall was not incorrect

in his belief that Churchill
intended to protect British
interests through the conduct
of the war. The British
were,
in Churchill's view, equal
partners with the United States/

Yet Marshall bluntly informed
him that the British were not
equal but junior partners in the
alliance.

Marshall was
correct in this assertion, but his
constant reminders of
the fact did not ease
Anglo-American tensions. As the war
progressed, the American role became
increasingly greater,
and the British found themselves
forced to assent more and
more to American decisions.

If nothing else, the Washington meetings
of 1941-42

had made it plain to the participants
that the Anglo-

American alliance was not as cohesive as the
world was led
to believe.
Despite Churchill's flippant remark, the
British and American leaders were separated by more
than

common language.

a

Grave differences existed between the

American and British teams.

Roosevelt, although willing

to agree with the British on a number of issues, was

deterred by his forceful military advisors.

The Joint

Chiefs made it plain that they were not concerned with the

interstices of maintaining an alliance, but solely with

fighting Germany.

Ironically,

in pursuit of this goal,

the Joint Chiefs found themselves engaged in running
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battles with the British
decision-makers.

With the exception of his
role in approving
British Second Front decision,

a

Roosevelt remained fairly

P-sive throughout the Arcadia
conferences.

He only became
involved in Anglo-American
squabbles when forced to
do so
as he was by General
Marshall's threatened
resignation
Roosevelt.
lac k of involvement in
s
Anglo-American problems
-y be telling in itself. Had he wanted to exercise
his
authority, he could probably
have caused

the Joint Chiefs

to be more courteous in
their relations with the
British.
His failure to do so seems
to indicate that he also was

concerned about the British
proposals, and that Marshall
had succeeded in planting some
seeds of doubt in him as
regards British intentions.

Churchill and his advisors were
generally satisfied with the results of the Arcadia
Conference.

Nonethe-

less, there were some reasons for
disquiet.
the Washington meetings,

By the end of

it was apparent that England was

not the senior partner in the alliance,
and would have

difficulty even in maintaining
United States.

a

role as an equal of the

Neither Churchill nor the "experienced"

British military staff could dictate policy to Roosevelt,

though their influence was considerable.

although still inexperienced as

a

war leader, was not pre-

pared blindly to follow British advice.
attitude could

be ve

The President,

But

i

f

Roosevelt's

been anticipated, the attitudes of the

American Joint Chiefs of Staff could not.

The American
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British military, the most
troubling a3p ect of the
Joint Chiefs- behavior
was their
determination to launch a
Second Front in 1942.
This
appeared (in terms difficult
to overstate, absolute
madness
to the British.
In their eyes it revealed
the American
staff as rank amateurs
with a minimal grasp of the
difficulties involved in fighting
a powerful Germany.
of eo a lition warfare.

Thus,

the Anglo-American
Staff antagonism was mutual.

If nothing else, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff had
assumed an import.nt
decision-making status as members
of
the Anglo-American
alliance.

Highly professional, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff acted
to defend their military estimates against "political"
interference. This parochial
bent, combined with an active
decision-making inclination,
necessarily led to conflicts with
the Commanier-in-Chie f
and the British Allies. The
Joint Chiefs were prepared to
go to great lengths to see
that their Second Front concept
was realized. In thus acting
to block political considerations from contaminating wartime
decision-making, the Ameri-

can military itself became a powerful
political force.
We have noted the anxiety and indignation with

which the American military leadership regarded "political"
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motives and considerations
during the Arcadia
discussions
For Marshall and others
who had held staff positions
during World War One,
political interests were
something new
luring 1917-1918, General
John Pershing had made
virtually
all of the decisions governing
American conduct of the war.
Further, he saw to it that the
American Expeditionary

Force

operated as a free and independent
organization, despite
the supposed alliance with
Prance and Britain, and nominal
subordination to Marshal Foch. As
a result,
Marshall and

others who shared his experiences
were unprepared for
decision-making by non-military sources.
At best, politicians and "allies" were suspect in
the minds of American
military leaders. Earlier we suggested
that the genesis of
this attitude could be traced to
the abuse historically
(1)
suffered by the U. S. military at the
hands of politicians,
and (2) the peculiar insulation of the
military profession.
In some sense, it can be said that American
military

leadership during World War Two subscribed to the
Ludendorff notion that politics ends where war begins.
Marshall and his compatriots clearly regarded war as their
realm and tended to view non-military figures as outsiders,
and even intruders.

exclusively as

a

The waging of war was regarded

contest of arms; as a remorseless exchange

of blows to determine which combatant was victor and which

was vanquished.

Thus,

a political referee.

there seemed to be little need for
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Such an attitude may
be easily dismissed
as
naive, out we cannot
dismiss its very real
impaot Qn
wartime decision-making
process. Thia parochialism
set the
Joint Chiefs apart fron
all other m embers of
the Allied
tea M .
The African Mlitary
staff was an outsider
fro m the
•tart, a burr in the side
of the Allied

^

body.

It l8 note .

worthy that the difficulties
that arose during Arcadia
were a l raoa t exclusively due

to objections from the
Joint

Chiefs.

As we have demonstrated,

the Joint Chiefs not

only advocated various wartime
plans, but were also quick
to condemn the introduction
of any consideration they
perceived as non-military.
The question must be raised
as to whether the

military versus political dichotomy
made any sense at all.
Could the war actually be divorced
from
politics?

Did

clear-cut distinctions between military
and political considerations actually exist? Is it
possible that the
American military team was arguing
against a spectre?
To answer these questions we must
first note

that the term "political," as used by
the Joint Chiefs, is

general and imprecise.

The U. S. Chiefs apparently

regarded as "political" any course of action
other than
their own formulations. According to American
military
opinion, the defeat of Germany was the prime
goal of the

warr.

If Germany were defeated,

Italy would collapse .

wa r against Japan was considered a secondary operation,

The
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almost a diversion (though
never by MacArthur),
with the
ultimate outcome never in
doubt .
Accordingly> military
operations were judged
meritorious to the extent
that they
contributed directly, to the
defeat of Germany. Significantly, the rest of the Allied
team tacitly accepted this
assessment, but occasionally
lost sight of
blinded
the day to day flow of events.
During the opening months
of the war the Joint Chiefs
were placed in the position
of
reminding Roosevelt and Hopkins
time and again that "Japan
First" was not a strategically
valid plan. Defeating

^

Germany was the key to winning the
war.
were also anxious to defeat Germany

^

The Joint Chiefs

quickly, before her

hold on the continent became
unbreakable.

This was the

"military view," a strategy dedicated
to achieving direct
and immediate military results.

m

this respect the

American military perceived the war in
nationalist terms,
excluding or ignoring the perceptions and
interests

of the

British, Russians, and Free French.
As we have seen, the Joint Chiefs were
convinced

that combat in North Africa would do little to defeat
Germany.

such

The fact that the British continued to press for
a

commitment convinced the U. S. military, in words

best expressed by General Stanley Embick, that "The British

view on operations in the Mediterranean was 'persuasive
rather than rational' and was

'motivated more largely by
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political than by sound strategic purposes.'" 25

actually the case?

To some extent it was.

Was this

Churchill

especially had not abandoned the idea
of maintaining the
threatened colonial possessions.
Indeed, the most heated
exchanges between the Prime Minister and
Roosevelt were
sparked by the President's criticism of British
colonial

policy.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude that

such "political" interests were the main reason
for British
advocacy of a Northwest African invasion. The British

military staff held a strategic view which differed
from
their American counterparts.

In military terms, for mili-

tary reasons, the British favored peripheral theatres of

war.

This had been the case when the British Invaded

Norway in 1940, and when they confronted the Germans in
Greece and Crete in 1941.

The Middle East proposals are

thus a combination of Churchill's concern for the Empire,

and a military disinclination to attack Fortress Europe

directly as well.

American Joint Chiefs were

Y/here the

audacious, the British military was cautious.

In this

sense the British Second Front contributions were not moti-

vated solely, or even essentially, by political ambitions

unconnected with the war.
Beyond the area of

a

Second Front there were

Trumball Higgins, Soft Underbe lly (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 24.

77

other issues regarded by the Joint
Chiefs as having sinister "political" content. This was
certainly
true of the

decision to render assistance to the
Soviet Union. The
Joint Chiefs, while agreeing that
this was a concern of
some importance, did not regard it
as critical.

Roosevelt

and Churchill, apparently thinking
in a larger strategic
context, were convinced that aiding Russia
was crucial to

winning the war.

This issue, and the Soviet role in it,

were to have an important impact on Second
Front decisions
in 1942.
For the moment, however, it suffices to
observe
that the Joint Chiefs feared that this issue was
a Pandora'

box of political interests and intrigue.
It is clear from the preceding statements that

"political" versus "military" considerations can become

a

largely semantic exercise.

of

For example, the retention

India within the British Empire was

a

manifestly political

concern, but it was not without military significance as
well.

India provided a base for British operations, acted

as a block to Japanese incursions in the area,

port-of-call, etc.

During total war

(a

served as

state of bellicosit;

that WW II closely approximated; Goebbels was Plenipo-

tentiary for Total War, 1944),

(New York:

a

a nation's international

Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War
Random House, 1972), p. 481.
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policy and military strategy
tend to merge. Where
differences of opinion arise, it is
usually between Grand
Strategy and particular strategic
exercises to effect

Grand Strategy.

Roosevelt agreed with the Grand
Strategy
enunciated by Marshall: the
destruction of Nazi Germany.
He also agreed that an eventual
investment of Europe would
be needed.
Roosevelt rejected the notion that
a Second
Front in Europe was immediately
necessary.
This, however,

not to say that Roosevelt acted
politically instead of
militarily (as Marshall understood it),
but that his strategic view differed in detail from the
Joint Chiefs. The
is

destruction of Germany remained the primary
goal of American foreign policy, and, accordingly, of
American

military

strategy.
Too,

Roosevelt was more apt to entertain postwar

considerations than his military technicians.

Consequently,

he would be inclined to inquire into the general as
well
as the immediate effects of a strategic move.

Would an

American victory in North Africa ultimately benefit the
United States (through a presence in Africa, a demonstration of might, a show of solidarity with Britain), even

though it did not cripple Germany?

Roosevelt was more

apt to think in such terns than Marshall, though much less

than Churchill.

To state that such a view marks Roosevelt

(or Hopkins, or Harriman) as a "politician" and not a
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Vision of nations! security
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Roosevelt's concerns about
the British, the Free
French '
ana the Soviets, were
a sort of meta-military
concern . The
difference between military
strategy

-re

and the political is

quantitative than qualitative.

Put yet another way

in the Clausewitsian
formula, diplomacy is one
side of the
fist, military force (Macht)
the other.
There is a dis-

tinction without

a

precise separation.

We might also add that
any sacrifice of British
or American national interest
made to benefit the coalition is best understood in a
similar way. National

interests temporarily submerged
would ultimately be established, or compensated for by
equivalent gains, through
the triumph of the coalition.
The "sacrifice"
of, say,

American national interest in
fighting in North Africa
(essentially of interest to the British)
had the effect of
strengthening the coalition (e.g., making
it a more effective fighting machine) and thus of
expediting the war.

Again, military ends are not really
"sacrificed" to
political considerations; the military ends are
accomplished
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through the application of
different means. Certainly
Roosevelt and Churchill
understood this, at least
intuitively if not expressly. The
American Joint Chiefs of
Staff simply did not.
There is, however, one sense
in which "the political" can be understood to
stand against "the military,"
and

which would appear to vindicate
the suspicions of the Joint
Chiefs. When domestic political
pressures
dictate mill-

tary policy, military concerns
have clearly become subject
to politics.
Hence, to the extent that
domestic pressure
for an active war role influenced
Roosevelt, the President
was ignoring military strategy
as well as international
policy. As we have seen, domestic
politics did influence
Roosevelt's Arcadia decision regarding
a Second Front, but
it was not a sole or main determinant
of his choice of
action.
It is doubtful that Roosevelt ever
ignored military advice in favor of domestic political
expediency.

~

Within the context of the Arcadia Conference, the
Joint Chiefs' complaint of "political interference"
was

largely an inveighing against a straw man.

"in the making

of decisions military wisdom was not always enough,
for

there were non-military considerations which at times outweighed the military." 27 For the Joint Chiefs,

27
General Mark Watson, Chief of Staff (Washington, D.C.j
Historical Division, Dept. of the Array, 1945),

p. 11.
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CHAPTER

in

ALLIANCE POLITICS AND THE
SECOND FRONT THE SOVIET CONNECTION
The importance of the
Anglo-American decisions

of Arcadia should not be
minimized, but at the same time
it would be inaccurate to
suggest that they were the sole

determinant of initial Second Front
policy. Although
not a party to the Washington
talks, the Soviet Union had
a substantial influence on
them despite

the absence of its

representatives.

For the English-speaking Allies the
role
of the Soviet Union in the war
was clearly impossible
to

ignore.

Aside from the rather modestly scaled
Anglo-German
contest in Libya, the Red Army was the
only armed
force

directly confronting the Wehrmacht .
noted,

1

As Adam Ulam has

Soviet casualties for any given week in 1942

numerically exceeded the entire Axis fighting
strength in
North Africa. The scope of the Russian war effort
made

British and American contributions fade into insignificance

by comparison.

Indeed, any reference to the creation of

a Second Front was an indirect admission that Russia alone

was maintaining the "First Front" against Germany.

These

facts were not lost on Roosevelt or Churchill, or on the

British and American publics,.

Adam Ulam, Stalin (New York:

Viking Press, 1973).
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The Soviet Union was a
partner in the anti-Axis
alliance, hut there was
nonetheless a wide gulf
separating
it fro m the other
members of the team.
This was partly
to geographical factors
(Moscow was in an isolated
Position), and partly
attributable to the uneasy
history
of international
relations between Russia and
the rest of
the world. Another imp0
rtant factor, however,
was the complex personality of the
Soviet Generalissimo, Josef
Stalin.
To an extent not true
in wartime Britain and
the United
States, political power
in the USSR remained
in the hands
of one person.
For the purposes of this
paper
it is

necessary to make a slight
digression, and to consider
the enigmatic "Man of Steel"
and his role in Second
Front
decisions. We shall briefly
examine Stalin's role in the
war years preceding 1942.
With the approach of European
war in 1939,
Stalin had jealously guarded
the neutrality of the Soviet
Union.
Despite the militarization of German
society, he
avoided massive Russian mobilization,
probably aware of
the effects of such action on
1 9 14 Russia.

He maintained

that the approaching war would
be a struggle "among the
Imperialists," for which Britain as well
as the Third
Reich was culpable. On a less
theoretical plane, Stalin
found it expedient to make distinctions
between the warring "Imperialists" and sign a non-aggression
pact with

Hitler in 1939.

With the unexpected rush of German
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victories in 1940, Stalin went a step
father and found
it politic to inveigh against
the British. As Churchill
somewhat irritably recalled in his
postwar memoirs, "Their
radio diffused its abuse and slanders
against us. They
were at any time ready to reach a
permanent settlement

with Nazi Germany... and to accept with
complacency the
final destruction of the British power." 2
In any

event,

Stalin was anxious to remain at peace with his
National
Socialist neighbor. This desire apparently
colored his
perception of reality, since throughout 1941 he
continued
to reject British and American intelligence
warnings

of an

imminent German attack on the USSR.

These warnings were,

in Stalin's eyes, cunning attempts to get Russia into
the

war against Hitler.

Only with the June twenty-second

German assault on the Soviet frontier did Stalin actually
grasp what was happening.

Only the necessities of war

had forged an alliance between Stalin's Russia and the

British Empire.

But the alliance was not an easy one

and proved to be fraught with difficulties.
The disasters which befell the Soviet Union
in the early months of the war have become conventional

knowledge.

For our purposes, we have noted that the

situation on the Russian front was ominous at the time of

Winston Churchill, Their Finest Hour (New York:
Bantam Books, 1962), p. 492.
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the Arcadia meetings.

This fact was

Stalin and the Anglo-American
team.
after Asia's entry into

dually

apparent to

Almost immediately

the war, Soviet diplomats
urged

Britain to open a Second Front
in France.
unrealistic in the 1941 timeframe.

Such pleas were

Too, the British still

did not regard Soviet Russia
as a reliable ally.
Churchill's
message to Ambassador Maisky's
demand for a Second Front is
typical.
"Remember that only four months
ago we in this

island did not know whether you
were not coming in against
us on the German side .. .Indeed,
we thought it quite likely
that you would." 5 Despite such
British reproaches, the
Soviets persistently urged the immediate
formation of a
Second Front. The Soviet position was
vocalized with
additional intensity after America's
entrance into the war.
In arguing for a Second Front during
the Arcadia
Conference, General Marshall had stated that
such a move

would take pressure off the Russian Front.

Although assist-

ing Russia was never the primary reason for
Marshall's

Second Front advocacy, the General certainly saw it
important side-effect.

as an

Stalin, on the other hand, saw a

Second Front solely in terms of relieving the USSR, and
not in any broader strategic context.

An understanding of

this attitude goes a long way toward explaining why Stalin

H/V. Averell Harriman, Special Envoy to Churchill
and Stalin (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 81.
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Pleaded for a cross-channel attack
even when such an expedition was likely to meet with
probable
failure.

Stalin was
not concerned with the fate
of Western Allied armies
but
only with the effect that an
invasion would have on draining German strength in Russia.
This exclusively nationalistic bent also explains Stalin's
attitude toward the LendLease program: America should fill
every Russian order,
even to the detriment of the American
war effort. Similarly,
the Arcadia decision to invade
Northwest Africa was not
viewed by Stalin as a significant Allied
commitment to
assist Russia. Only a frontal assault
on Europe would
relax the German death-grip on the Eastern
Front.

Stalin did not regard the Arcadia decision
in

favor of Super-Gymnast as final.

Convinced that the

Soviet military position was tenuous, he hastened
to persuade the British and Americans to launch a Second
Front
in Europe and to abandon their North African scheme.

accomplish this Stalin relied upon two devices.

To

First,

Foreign Commissar Molotov journeyed to London and Washington
during May of 1942 to press for the Continental attack.
Secondly, at the same time, domestic Communist elements in
the United States and Britain began a well-orchestrated

campaign "demanding" an immediate Second Front.
The motives behind Molotov's London trip continue
to be controversial.

The alleged purpose was the finaliza-

tion of the Anglo-Soviet alliance.

But it is clear that
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MoXotov had also been
lngtmctea
ment to a Second Pront

^

"

- Ce

cootie

a British

^

™

operatlon>

alli

fco

^

^

have been

a

affall, tea lt not faeen
for Soyiet ingigtence
^
on
one point. Stalin
had o rtere4 Moiotov
to bring up terril

torial .natters and try to
obtain Britain's assent
to a
postwar scheme which would
ma ke Poland and
the Baltic

states Soviet "protectorates."

A„ y Anglo-Soviet treaty

would depend on the fulfillment
uxiiument n-p
of +->>•
this request. The
British were baffled by this
farsighted issue, given the
uncertainty of Asia's day-to-day
survival.

In any case
the British refused to
assent to the plan, even
though

Moiotov described it as a
coMcj^anitaire against future
German aggression.
Only Lord Beaverbrook viewed
the request sympathetically. According to him the
Soviet territorial request
has to be seen within the context
of their Second Front
anxieties. It is possible, of course,
to accept the territorial proposal at face value as
an attempt to legitimize
hegemony in the East. If the Allied
team was victorious,
certain territorial spoils of war would
certainly be

annexed by the victors.

If Britain agreed in advance to

Soviet spheres of influence, postwar
problems would be
enormously simplified, he concluded.
However,
ing.

this explanation is not entirely convinc-

Both Stalin and Moiotov were aware that

the

British,

more so than the Americans, were hesitant to.
endorse

Plans for a

^ rop ean

a3sault .

Again

^

^^

that the launching of a
Second Front was the
Issue of
paramount importance for the
Soviets. Given this,
Stalin
and Molotov may have
formulated a sophisticated
pl oy to
gain British approval for
a Second Front. The
issue of
Soviet territorial demands
very likely served as

a red her-

ring of sorts.

British resistance to the
territorial issue
was no douht anticipated by
the Soviets. It is
conceivable

that Molotov insisted on these
demands even though he was
aware that the British did not
intend to approve them. And
if the British rejected the
territorial solution, he could
argue for a Second Front on an
either/or basis. The Soviet
Union would drop the territorial
issue in the interest of
preserving a cohesive alliance.
Molotov could
then argue

that,

in recompense, Britain should
throw its weight behind

a Second Front endeavor.

If Britain refused this second

request, she would be placed in the
position of appearing
unreasonable. Thus, the territorial question
was a straw
man, utilized to negate British Second
Front hesitancy.

Such

a

view of Molotov'

s

visit is by no means

farfetched given (1) the tremendous importance of

Front

to the Soviet

a

Second

Union and (2) Stalin's devious nature

and the diplomatic skills of his Foreign Commissar.

It

would be absurd to suggest that postwar territorial matters
were more important to Stalin than a Second Front at a
time when the fate of the Soviet state was in the balance.
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It is our contention
that this sophisticated
diplomatic ploy was at the
heart of MolotoVs
London

visit.

^

Since BrlU3h oppQsltion
tQ fi SecQnd
wen known, Molotov simply
tried a new taok fcQ
them from their position.
The scheme failed.
Beaverbrook
was amenable to the Soviet
territorial issue and also
eager to see a cross-channel
invasion. Sir Stafford
Cripps, British Ambassador
to Moscow,

proved with

likewise was im-

the need for a Second
Front.

But Churchill
and his personal staff
were the ultimate source
of
political decision in London.
Churchill and his ministers reused to accept the
territorial demands (as
Molotov
probably expected), and also
remained hesitant to pledge
themselves to a Second Front
in 194S (an unexpected
development for Molotov). Churohill
continued to rely on
infomation from his military staff,
who were unanimously
convinced that a large-scale assault
on Europe would be
folly. This conviction was as
firm in May as it had been
in April when Marshall had visited
London (this episode
will be dealt with in the following
chapter). For
Churchill, Molotov's insistence on an
invasion was fanciful imagining. Despite this intransigence,
other sources
were to assist Molotov and Stalin in
their quest for a

Second Front commitment.
The difficulties in the Anglo-Soviet alliance
were known in Washington, and Roosevelt found the
problem
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vexing.

Prlraal, lly

conoepned

winn ng
.

viewed any internal
bickerlng as
the ha rd -pre33ed
Amea could

m

^^

^
^
^

afforf>

^

^
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'
Roosevelt was personally
opposed to granting
the Soviet
territorial requests.
reauest-e,
But, as noted in the
previous
Chapter, Roosevelt was hy
this time agreeable
to MarshallSecond Front operation.
He was thus
.

inclined to placate

Molotov and act against
British intractability.
The
President played his hand
during Moletov-s secret
visit
of May twenty-ninth.
Molotov arrived
in Washington

gravely displeased with the
course of the London
discussions.
His territorial scheme
had failed, and he had
been
forced to withdraw the issue
"temporarily." He had also
failed to accomplish his primary
goal
drawing a Second
Front commitment from the
British. Despite this

-

setback,'

Molotov was aware that the United
states was the senior
partner in the Anglo-American team,
an d

that Roosevelt had

doubts about the advisability of
Super-Gymnast. If the
United States formally agreed to
launch a Second Front it
seemed likely that Britain would
be forced to go along
with the plan. With this in mind,
Molotov sought to
impress Roosevelt with the critical
nature of the Eastern
Front situation. It was entirely possible,
he informed
Roosevelt, that the Red Army would suffer serious
defeats

from German spring offensives.

The Soviet drive at

Kharkov had been foiled and was in danger of becoming

a
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German position ln the
West wQuld be greatiy
strengt ; ened>
The German Reich
might indeed last ,
thousand
entrenched i n Portres3 Europe
.

„

_

^^ ^
^

fit of the West to keep
Russia in the war.
Molotov urged
that the Anglo-Americans
should draw off forty
German

divisions from Russia.

Roosevelt fully realized that
the situation in
Russia was critical. Army
intelligence

had informed him
that the Soviets could not
be expected to hold
out
indefinitely. Roosevelt was
also anxious to ^ai n
Stalin's
trust as he had gained Churchill's
and desired
to end the

Anglo-Soviet rift endangering the
alliance. As a result,
he was prepared to indicate
to Molotov his approval of
Marshall's Second Front proposal.
tary leaders

-

Even so, American mili-

the initial advocates of a
Second Front

-

cautioned Roosevelt that any pledge
should be tentative.
Marshall favored the invasion plan,
but realized that
events could force its postponement.
He pointed out
that it was one thing to intend to
launch a Second Front,
and another thing to promise that such
an operation would
be carried out.

tary:

As usual, Marshall's reasoning was mili-

he would not have an American Army sacrificed
simply

to meet the Russian timetable.

The evidence suggests that

Marshall personally believed that

a

Second Front could be

opened in 1942 or early 1943, but that he realized the
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uncertainties of war.
war

If
If,

for example, the
Battle of the

Atlantic was decided in
favor of
01 the rvr,
Germans, a seaborne
invasion wouia
would knm
nave -»-^
to be postponed,
still and all
Marshall, and the War
plang

^

stated that an invasion
could probably be launched
within
the year.
This was enough for
Roosevelt.
0t

r de

lared

"La government
?
wanted to know in
wan£ed°Jn
frank terms what nos1
tion we take on the question
of a
second front, and whether
we were prepared to establish one,"
Roosevelt?s
P ter n ° ted HS ^quested a
"
lft^
Zt answer.
straight
The President turned
to General Marshall and
if to
could assure Stalin that asked
the Unite!
States was preparing a second
When Marshall replied .yes,. front.
told Molotov to inform Stalin Roosevelt
that 'We
mati0n ° f
f ™ nt

tSryear:.^
velt.

*

Marshall's hesitancy had not been
lost on RooseHis answer to Molotov was
sympathetic

but ambiguous

The President had stopped short
of promising that the
Second Front would be opened in
1942. This ambiguity was

again revealed in the official communique
released to the
world on June 11, 1942. The communique
stated
that dur-

ing the Soviet-American discussions
"full understanding
was reached with regard to the urgent
tasks of creating a

Robert Divine, Roosev elt and V/orld War Two
(Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Pres 3 , 1969, 1969), p. 90.

93

^

second front la Europe
n5
ln lg
this ca refully worded
mes3age may
proraise
a Second
Fronthif
^ x-xvini:
out it was evident
vj.uenr tn
to H-t*^
diplomats what the
-sage meant, and what lt d

u

^

^

^^^
„ ^^ ^ ^

ment had i„ effect been
made to Molotov.

Molotov had gained more
from Roosevelt than
from
the British. Roosevelt
and the American milltai7
were at
least pressing for a
Seoond Front.

In addltlorlj Roo3evolt

promised that the Amerioan
Joint Chiefs would attempt
to
gain British aoceptanoe
of the operation during
the next
meeting of the Combined Chiefs
of Staff.

Too , Molotov

and Stalin could expect
that the official communique
would have some effect upon
the Germans, who might
feel
it wise to build up their
Western defenses, perhaps at
the expense of their Eastern
designs. Despite these
positive developments, Molotov was
certainly
aware that

Roosevelt had not absolutely
committed the United States
to a 1942 cross-channel attack.
The ambiguous
implica-

tions of Roosevelt's statements did
not escape him.
Nonetheless, Molotov was a consummate
political actor and

everywhere gave the impression that Roosevelt
had made
pledge, thereby further increasing pressure
on the

(New York:

Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Co rdell Hull
~
MacMillan, 1948), II, p. 1174.

a
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President to open up a Second
Front. Stalln was
fied that he had the
Africans boxed into a
corner-'
Roosevelt would reel obliged
to go through wlth
a 0VQSa _
channel attack.
Stalin-

second device to secure
Allied conmitment to a Second *ront
wsq Da ,«,vk
Front was
public campaign organized
by
pro-Soviet elements within the
United States
s

and Great
The vocal campaign served
to keep pressure for
an invasion at fever pitch,
and, later, to underscore
the

Britain.

"promise" made to Molotov in
Washington. This organized
campaign promoted the image of
"spontaneous" demonstrations and generated considerable
attention in the press,
to which the campaign appeared
as a groundswell of popular
sentiment. As one contemporary
source noted, "The British

and American people are becoming
daily more restive about
the relative state of inactivity
on all fronts." 6 This

affair had political impact as well.

Time magazine

accurately observed that "Not only have
common people
jammed Trafalgar Square to demand a Second

Front in 1942,

but the old guard in the House of Lords have
paid glowing
tribute to Russia." 7 Both Roosevelt and Churchill
came

6

Foreign Policy Bulletin (Aug.

7 Time

7,

1942): p.

1.

(June 15, 1942): p . 25.
Also the June eigth
issue of Time carried the cogent observation that "The war's
developments called for the second front. Russia needed it
badly, but the establishment of a western European front
also needed Russia badly: if Russia were first allowed to
fall, the problem of landing in Europe would be collossal."
p. 23.
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under puWio fire for

lining

^

a Second Front.

^

Roosevelt was an
especially ea3y
target since he had decided
upon a "Europe First"
policy '
while midway into 1942
American troops in that
theatre
had done nothing more
than to garrison Iceland
a*
Northern Ireland. It was
clear to Roosevelt that
a more
forceful American participation
in the war was

needed and
that it would now be
oe politically
nnUhVoiiv advantageous
for him to
preside over a Second Front
operation.

Despite these pressures on
the Anglo-American
leaders, and the apparent
triumph of Molotov

in Washington,
'

Stalin never entirely trusted
the British or Americans
to
open a Second Front. Again,

the reasons for his
suspicion

are deep-rooted in his personality,
in the nature of Soviet
politics, and in the assumptions
of the Marxist-Leninist
ideology. Whatever the multiplicity
of reasons governing
Stalin's behavior, it is evident
that he regarded the

alliance with Britain and the United
States as a necessary
evil, and not as a true partnership.
Conversely, Churchill
was not overly enamored of the Soviet
regime, in view of
the pro-German stance of Stalin until
1941.

The mutual

antagonism, concealed under a veneer of pleasant
insincerity, placed the United States in a unique
position.
The United States managed to remain somewhat
aloof from
the problems plaguing the Anglo-Soviet relationship.
a result,

As

disputes frequently ended up in Washington, with

British ana Soviet advocateg
respective ideas to Rooseveit.
Molotov had attempted to

^

^^
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This ia e ssenti ally
what

^

aooomplighwlth

Second
It may appear that
Molotov succeeded in
this effort
and that Roosevelt offered
his Second Front
"expectations"'
to appease Russia, and
to strengthen the
uneasy all lanoe
with Stalin. Herbert Peis
ard other historlans
have
that Roosevelt was attempting
to placate Russia, and
probably trying to convince
Stalin to drop his territorial
demands. Feis in effect states
that Roosevelt in offering
a Second Front was
operating from a political
perspective.
Thus, the inclination to launch
an invasion was net mainly

Plea.

^

prompted by military considerations
but by political ones.
The Feis thesis is not convincing,
however.

To be

sure, Roosevelt made his Second
Front statements and equi-

vocal pledges appear to be a
concession to the persuasiveness of Molotov.
Nonetheless, the evidence suggests
that
he had decided in favor of a
Second Front prior to Molotov'

visit in May of 1942.

It is difficult to deny that the

Presidential decision to pursue a Second Front
resulted
from the persistent advice of Marshall and

the Joint Chiefs

of Staff.

As previously noted, the Joint Chiefs and the

Secretary of War had urged the formation of a European
front even prior to the Arcadia meetings, and they did
not
abandon this position in 1942.

There is no reliable evi-

dence that Roosevelt's decision was prompted mainly by

a
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desire to app ease the
Soviets.

Molotov may have
relnforced
Roosevelfs conviction to
enoo.se a cross-chennel
operation '
but the P0TOign Co^isser
wa3 not the prlmry
innuence
the President. Thl s
position is further
substantiated by
the fact that Roosevelt's
f allure ao tual ly
to promise a
Second Front wes also due
to a dvice fro m African
mllit ar y
quarters. Peis-s contention
that Roosevelt m ade a
political
and not a miliary decision
ignores a series of facts:
The Second Front pl an was
1.
creation of Roosevelt but not the
of tL
r
n ""itwy »taff, meinly
the
p?oan s division
W»r pi
Vfar
of the Armv
y
General Staff.

^

2.

Roosevelt was persuaded of
the
utility of a cross-channel a
k
in i a te Kerch or early Anril tt ac
104.?
while MoloWs visi
to London
Washington, and the territorial and
proposals, did not take place until
May
Thus, it is clear that Roosevelt had endorsed the Second Front
plan before he was approached bv
Molotov.

J

3.

Roosevelt never actually promised
Second Front, but simply asserted
that he "expected" one in 1942.
This ambiguous stand was prompted
by Marshall's advice.

4.

Since the Soviet territorial demands
had been "temporarily" dropped during the London talks, there was no
longer any need to offer the Soviets
a Second Front as a trade-off.

a

In view of these facts it appears likely that

Roosevelt subscribed to the Second Front idea not as a

political concession to Russia but because he was
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convinced of the military merit of
an invasion of the
Continent. Greatly influenced by
Marshall,

he made his

decision primarily on military
grounds.

Thls underscores
once again the considerable ability
of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to influence decision-making
with respect to a
Second Front.

Aid to Russia:

Effect on Second Front Decisions

As we have seen, the American
Joint Chiefs of

Staff viewed the creation of

a

Second Front as an indis-

pensable instrument in wartime strategy.
was crucial for two reasons:

A Second Front

(1) only a direct assault

could destroy the German war machine and
Nazi state, and
(2) only a Second Front could offer substantial

relief to

Russia.

The importance of keeping Russia in the war
was

obvious.

If Russia were conquered, or forced to sue
for

peace terms, the bulk of the V/ehrmacht and Luftwaffe

would quickly be transferred to the West.

Such massive

German reinforcements would make the task of the Anglo-

American forces extraordinarily difficult, just as

a

similar move in 1918 had sorely tested the Western
Powers.

3

Military logic thus emphasized the critical

nature of preventing a Soviet defeat.

Q

On March 3, 1918, Russia had signed the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk, the terms of which were humiliating, and for
which Trotsky, the signatory, would later suffer some
abuse. The German Imperial Army East was transferred to
France and took part in the devastating March 21 offensive
around Amiens,
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Since a Second Front could
not be created immediately, even if quickly
launched, intermediate form
of assistance had to be
devised. The main assistance
effort was accomplished by providing
Russia with extensive
seaborne aid. American involvement
in this task predated
American entrance into the war.
the First Moscow
Protocol of October. 1<*1, the United
States, in concert
with Great Britain, agreed to convoy
supplies to Murmansk.
Vast quantities of foodstuffs and
war materiel were sent
to the Soviet Union in this
manner, despite enormous losses
to German U-boats and surface
raiders. Despite the

m

impor-

tance of these shipments to the Russian
war effort, this
form of assistance alone could not
prevent a Soviet defeat.

Although the aid strengthened the Soviets,
it did not
directly weaken the Germans. Aid to Russia

was thus under-

stood to be correlative with, and not a
substitute for. a
Second Front.
Ironically, however, the provision of aid
to Russia ultimately clashed with American
plans for an

invasion of France.

For Stalin and Molotov, the First Moscow Protocol
was important not only for the aid it promised, but also
as a litmus test of American intentions and fidelity to

the Soviet Union.

If the Americans lived up to the agree-

ment, it would be an indication that they took the war,

and the alliance, seriously, Further, if the Americans

honored the terms of the Protocol, they might also honor
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their "intentions" to launch a
Second Front. The P
rotocol
was important to Roosevelt
for similar reasons, as
it constituted the first form of
American-Soviet interaction.
As Roosevelt noted to Henry
Morgenthau,

"i do not want to
be in the same position as
the English (who made
promises
to Russia but didn't keep them).
...The only reason we
stand so well with the Russians
is that up to date we
have
kept our promises. "^ Anxious to
demonstrate Ms goodwm

to the ever suspicious Stalin,
Roosevelt was determined to

provide impressive aid and pledged a
total of 4.1 million
tons to be delivered in early 1942.
At first the operations went smoothly, and substantial
amounts of goods were

transferred to the Soviet Union from New Y
ork and Philadelphia, But despite this auspicious start,
problems

developed by the end of January, 1942.

An intensified

U-boat war off the East Coast of the United States,

coupled with MacArthur's increasingly strident
demands for
aid, caused the amount of shipping to the Soviet
Union
to

be drastically cut.

Admiral Emory S. Land, Chief of War

Shipping, decided on military grounds that assistance to

American forces and the protection of American lives had
priority over supplying the Soviet Union.

As a result,

the United States failed to meet the Russian aid

John M. Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries:
Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 81.

of War (Boston:

Years

101

requirements from January
through March.
time in accusing the
United States

Stalin lost no

of a breach of faith

Sensitive to such criticise,
and aware of the grave
military situation confronting
the

Asians, Roosevelt deeded
in late March, 1942, that
all pledges to the Soviet
Union
be met.
Not wishing to be charged
with putting Soviet
ahead of American interests,
Roosevelt insisted that both
the USSR and the Pacific
could receive satisfactory
aid.
The implication of this was
that the War Shipping
Division
was not operating at peak
efficiency, an allegation that
the Navy resented.
Nevertheless, the Navy made
herculean
efforts to meet all demands, although
MacArthur was later
to charge that his theatre had
been insufficiently provisioned. The importance that the
President attached to
aiding the USSR was plain enough for
all to see, and it was
equally clear that he would not tolerate
First Protocol.

a

breach of the

This "determined effort to placate the

Russian Bear" 10 and to win Stalin's approval
indicates
that Roosevelt already possessed a germinal
postwar vision.

10 C. J.
Bernardo, American M ilitary Policy:

Development Since_1775
p. 43d.

(

'

i:L

Its

Harrisbur g r^ti^p^Ii~CcTri^m

9

Averell Harriman in Special Envoy to Churchill
and Stalin (New York:
Random House, 1975) attributes such
postwar concerns to the President. Roosevelt hoped that
the "Big Three" would create a "Pax Europa" of sorts,
though the details of this concept remained nebulous.
James MacGregor Burns claims that Roosevelt had no postwar
vision and that he ignored "the relation between winning

n
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Roosevelt's political
motive3 ln p
iet aM

ZT r
starr.
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Unooncerned with winning
staiinig
Siting American gooawm>
oertainiy
heady postwar plans, the
military
leaders

program simply a3 a me
to the Sedans.
Hoosevelt

^
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Jo int C hlef 3
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infeot
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prolong „„ Russian
prolonging
a
,
resistance
and the military W

ere agreed on
the advisability or
sending ald , but for
The existence of these
two differed
ulIlerent Perspectives
on aiding Russia were to result
in occasional
military-executive
clashes. The difficulties
of supplying the
Soviets have
already been mentioned. The
exi^nM^ of* war sometimes
exigencies

™

demanded to military minds
that other geographical
areas
(Guadalcanal 1„ the Solomons,
for
instance) receive

temporary shipping priority.
to this policy £er se,

were not affected.

Roosevelt had no objection

as long as shipments
to the USSR

Such a dual mission could not
always

be met, however, an d Roosevelt
eventually came to realize
this. Even so, his persistent
efforts in promoting Russian aid did make the military
cautious in cutting such

W

d

ndi S emocra °y." The Lion
and the Fox
? 2
Harcourt,
Brace & World 19561 5 Zg?
m3 ° Ve stat
when compared to Harriman's
f
™erva«onf Harrlman
6V6nt '
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'
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aid.

As . result,

the natural tendency
Qf

^

second, was balanced
byy RKoose
oogPvpUIo
velt»s more international
perspective.

Stalin was no t terribly
interested in balanced
perspectives, or in the
needs of the African
Ar m ed Po rces
in the war effort.
It can be safely
asserted that he was
interested in the American
aid pro S ra m only for
what it

would provide the Sovietc
Union
unlon

'

m

^
Hisa brusque,
sometimes

insulting, communiques reveal
that he was not concerned
with "American-Soviet
interaction" or goodwill. An
agree»nt had been made to provide the USSR
with certain specified goods on a given timetable,
and Stalin expected that
the terms of the agreement
would be met. This seemingly
narrow and unsophisticated
outlook is more understandable
if one considers the situation
in which Stalin found himself.
The Soviet's plight was desperate
by any standard,
at least until 1943, and it was
fighting the Germans
virtually alone, as Britain had done in
1940.
Stalin
needed the proffered American aid, but
he also knew that
the Americans needed to keep the USSR
in the war.

Accord-

ingly, he could in some sense deal from a
position of

strength.

Too, he was certainly aware of Roosevelt's

desire to please him, and used this psychological
calling
card to advantage.

In any event, Stalin's singular aim of

acquiring as much American aid as he could, as quickly as
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possible, blinded Mra
t0 other factor
Mithei>
understood nor oared that
the United States
needed ships
to ferry armor and
munitions to New Zealand
and Australia
Nor did he appreciate
( ln any 3enae

^ ^

of

^

^^

^_

mendous losses the Allies
took in the Murmansk
convoy3 .
Some convoys suffered one
out of every three
ships sunk
with others damaged.* 2 Stalin's
failure to give proper'
consideration to America's war
situation am military needs
put him at loggerheads with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Chiefs, the War
Department, and War
Shipping had, by June of
1942, come close to fulfilling
the requirements set down in
the First Moscow
Protocol.

The military had even, albeit
reluctantly, agreed to send
the Russians over a hundred
fighter planes that could have
been put to use in the Pacific or
in Britain.

Clearly,
the military was prepared to make
sacrifices in order to

realize their strategic goal of keeping
the Soviet Union
in the war.
It must be emphasized that the
American military at all times regarded the USSR purely
as a component

12 n
k
September,

1Q leavin S Britain for Murmansk in
7
^n°
had lost one out of every three ships.
1942, J^~
>

Of those arriving at Murmansk, many were
cripoled
been forced to jettison cargo. As a rule, Stalin or had
chose
to decry such loss of supplies rather than note
the sacrificial spirit of his Allies. See Donald Maclntyre
The Naval War Against Hitler (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1971), p. 292ff.
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of strategy, and that their
actions were not dictated
by
altruistic or political motives.
As a result, once

preparations for a Second Front were
underway, the military felt no qualms about suggesting
that Russian aid be
cut to free shipping for invasion
use.

Just as military

aid had been offered to fulfill a
military plan, so It
would be cut better to implement that
plan. Although the
Soviets would be temporarily hurt by
the loss

of supplies,

they would in the long run benefit from
the launching of a
Second Front, the action which they had
for so long been
demanding.
The proposal to limit aid to the Soviet
Union and

utilize shipping for the logistics of invasion was
presented to Roosevelt.

The military argument was, succinctly,

that the United States did not have infinite war resources

and hence could not do everything asked of it.

Since an

invasion was the pivotal point of American strategic planning,

it must be given priority over all other operations

in terms of supply.

For the Joint Chiefs these facts were

obvious and did not present any problems.
wa3 not so optimistic.

The President

While agreeing with the military

logic and necessity of the proposal, he felt certain that
the Soviets would resent any cut in aid, however compelling

the reasons.

Nonetheless, given the limitations of American

shipping, Roosevelt saw no alternatives to accepting the

plan of the Joint Chiefs.

He allowed himself some hope
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that Stalin would. qp P +--u Q
th3t the red ^tion
in aid must ultimately be of advantage
to the Sov et Unio
Aware that the
decision to curtail
^urxiaii R„
Russian aid
threaten the cohesion
o f the alliance,
Koose.elt dete
to e X plain personally
the act to the
Sovie ts. Mo l 0 to
was summoned to the wm
w
White House for a
number of sessions
in
May, 1942, and informed
of the plan to reduce
4-

.

.

^

•

-*t

—

aid.

In llne

with the argument presented
to him by the Joint
Chiefs
Roosevelt stressed the

J

implications of q uic kly
ng .
Second Front and minimized
the
UflB Possible
oossib^ deleterious
*
effect
of reduced aid to Russia.
Molotov was not impressed
with
this reasoning and bluntly
dismissed it as ill-concealed
casuistry. He insisted on
knowing to what extent aid
would
be cut.
Roosevelt (adhering to military
advice)

Um
.

said that

military goods would not be
cut at all, but that general
supplies would be reduced by
at least two-thirds.
Molotov
regarded this as unacceptable
and intimated that the proposal was a betrayal of the
Soviet-American alliance.
According to James MacGregor Burns,
r P exchange followed.
}jj!
shifted to England,

Every ship
Roosevelt repeated
brought the Second Front closer to
realization; the Soviets could not have
their cake and eat it, too. Molotov
bristled at this. The Second Front
would be stronger if the First Front
still stood. What would happen, he asked
cuttingly, if the Soviets got less supply
and then no Second Front eventuated-?
13

13 James
MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: Soldier of
Freedom (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,
Inc.,

p•

<~-

34 .

1970)

'
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Molotov's remarks are notable
for a number of
reasons. First, they betray
an absolute lack of understanding of American wartime
abilities.
He

ignores the fact

that shipping was insufficient
to provide for both operations. Second, his remarks
illustrate Soviet intransigence.
The importance of compromise in
an alliance structure was
ignored. For Molotov (and, hence,
for Stalin) Soviet
interests were the only interests
that merited consideration.
Third, Molotov's rebuke once
again demonstrates
that the Soviets still did not trust
the Americans to
open a Second Front. This was motivated
by Stalin's
persisting belief that Roosevelt and
Churchill would try
to "bleed" the Soviet Union as much
as possible, lest
it emerge from the war too strong.

Although such an in-

clination may not have been absent in Churchill,
this
does not explain Roosevelt's motives for cutting
aid.

Molotov's accusation also ignores the a-political nature
of the Joint Chiefs, who had suggested the aid reduc-

tion in the first place.
The Molotov-Roosevelt clash could not have been

avoided, due to the unremitting obstinacy of the

Russians.

The plan, formulated by the American military,

was a reasonable one.

If anything,

remarkable for its scope.

it was

an ideal proposal,

The Joint Chiefs were not acting

out of a national parochialism (as they may have occasion-

ally done with the British during Arcadia), but weighed

carefully the needs of their hard-pressed Soviet Allies
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with the

.enema

to he expected from
. Second Pront
oal
o f the plan was t0
S
secure the eventual

the war; ln servlce
t „ thlg

^^

-as P«t in properperspective,

m

The

^ ^^

conclusion of

^

this instance the
Joint

Chiefs could not he accused
of shortsightedness
or special
Pleading. It would he
especially erroneous to
suggest
that they harbored
anti-Soviet sentiments at
this time.

It is true,

i„ fact, that the military
was astonished at
the violent Russian reaction
to the aid reduction
plan.
The America military had
acted in the highest
traditions
of an Allied war effort.
The initial decision to
send
aid to tossia had involved
military sacrifice,
an d the

Joint Chiefs had assented to
this since it contributed
to
the Allied war effort. The
decision to cut aid was made
in the same apirit and without
malice. The Joint Chiefs
erred in thinking that the Soviets
would willingly share
the burden of sacrifice to achieve
the eventual success
of the Allied war effort. Unfamiliar

with the nature of

Soviet politics and the peculiarities
of Stalin's regime,
the Joint Chiefs had expected the
alliance to move
in

accordance with the dictates of military
logic.

It became

obvious to them that this was not the case, and
that,

for the Soviets, the burden of alliance was a
strictly

one-sided affair.

The American military was to retain

this knowledge in all future dealings with the Soviets.
Thus, the antagonism of the Joint Chiefs and General Staff
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toward the Soviet Union can
he traced to Soviet
unreasonableness in May, 1942. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff
had
worked toward achieving a
"United Nations." end (a
Second
Front) which coincided with
Soviet desires. But rather
than cooperating in realizing
this end,
the Soviets

objected to the means (re-allocation
of shipping) and
ignored the overall implications
of the scheme,
addition, the Soviets questioned
American intentions.

m

The

effect of this attitude on the
American military was predictable. The Soviet demand for
continued aid
flew in

the face of military logic.

The American military's

respect for the Soviets decreased
accordingly.

Further,

It is reasonable to suspect that
Marshall and his asso-

ciates were angered by Molotov's questioning
of American
intentions to launch a Second Front. The
accusation

grated against the possibly atavistic, but very
real,
code of honor which was part of the military

atmosphere.

Such duplicity, or outright lying, was abhorrent to
"officers and gentlemen."

In any event, from this point

on the Chiefs of Staff regarded the Soviets with

a con-

trolled hostility, both in Second Front planning and other
areas as well.
The 1942 Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal to reduce

Soviet assistance precipitated an American-Soviet falling
out, but is also notable for another reason.

It illus-

trated the limits of Roosevelt's deference to Stalin.
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Despite intense abuse from
the Soviets. Roosevelt
did not
«aver in supporting the
military's plan. „, accepted

their

assessment of the situation
and of America's capabilities.
It may have proven
politically expedient to make
further
concessions to the Soviets,
or to ask the military to
revise their plan to reduce
Soviet aid
by two-thirds.

Roosevelt refused to do.

This

Following Stimson's advice.

Roosevelt "backed his team."

m

so doing, the President

certainly increased his stock
with the military establishment and allayed seme of the
fears he had aroused at
Arcadia. This conciliatory
effect
was important, as it

reduced some of the tensions that
had been mounting between
the Executive and the military.
It. in turn,

contributed
to effective American
participation in the war. and facili-

tated decision-making abilities with
the other Allies.
The unity of opinion existing between
the President and the Joint Chiefs was not
lost on the
Soviets.

Molotov informed Stalin that a decrease in
aid was
inevitable. Furthermore, the First Moscow Protocol

was

due to expire in July, 1942, and a Second
Protocol would

have to be agreed to if aid were to continue on a regular
and formal basis.

Thus, to insure that some minimal

level of aid was pledged, and to record that direct

military aid would not be curtailed, Molotov reluctantly
agreed to accept the reductions announced by Roosevelt.

Ill

Soviet acceptance of
reductions
ucrions di(
rtiri
i not mean
that
the is.ua had been
put t0 rest> Although
Protocol was signed by
Molotoy>
*.

^

^
^

maintained that the
<^ Q+
*ne UnitPri
united States
was doing less than
it
could for the Soviet
Union
n±on. Thi<,
This theme was
-

repeated by
the Soviet press and
by
1 o
sympathetic
y STmoath^f
elements in the United
States. To worsen matters
^iu, it;
it sn.,
soon became apparent that
even the reduced provisions
of the Second Protocol
would
not be met. The pledge
to retain the level of
direct

military aid Mainly plenes
tanks> and
,
had been m ade too hastily.
Statistics reaching the Joint
Chiefs m ade it clear that
more military hardware than
originally envisioned would be
needed in the Pacific and
in Britain. Military
equipment allocated
to Russia would

have to be siphoned off. 14

Roosevelt was dismayed by this

announcement, but once again backed
the Joint Chiefs.
The
Second Protocol had, after all,
contained a provision for
further reductions due to "unforeseen
changes which the
progress of the war may require." 15
Harry Hopkins was

p ;, 2 ? 5,
" If there were any miracles in
World »„„ fl^qk'
the snipbuilding
of 1942 would qualify."
Even ,n the lag time involved spurt
in
this
increased product7™ 5
solution unacceptable. The effects of the
sMnC?™shipbuilding would not be felt until
1943.
15

Maurice Matloff, Strategic Plann ing
^
n
tionfcrfare
(Washington, D.5Tr~0ffl cT' of
«,

for Coall-

Ch ief of Mi 11-

tary History, Dept. of the Army, 1953),
The phrase
p. 230.
had been included at the insistence of General
Marshall.
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given the task of informing
the Soviets of further
cuts
and the ensuing chorus of
protest took no one by
surprise.
Throughout the remainder of 1942
the Joint Chiefs were
given a free hand in determining
the type
and amount of

equipment to be removed from the
Soviet aid lists, significant amounts of materiel and
equipment were thus removed,
especially airplanes. The military
did not act frivo-

lously, however, but seem to have
limited themselves to
acquiring only those supplies that
were badly needed.

Their primary aim in all of this was
(aside from saving
American lives in the Pacific) to
provide better for

Second Front operations.

Although harboring

a resentment

against the Soviets, the military did
not allow this to
interfere with their strategic planning.
The growth of the military's decision-making

power with respect to Russian aid is remarkable.

Roose-

velt's initial decision to send aid was based
upon mili-

tary advice, but he had soon come to believe that
the Navy
was "dragging its feet" in meeting requirements.

As we

have noted, he demanded in March, 1942, that the program
be stepped up.

This period of criticism was a low point

for the military, but it was not to last long.

The Joint

Chiefs convinced Roosevelt that, if a Second Front were
to be opened in 1942, aid to Russia would have to be cut

back.

In M a y Roosevelt endorsed this proposal even in
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the face of Soviet
protest.

By
July
UJ -T» the
J "
tha President
p
had
given the military
unlimited power to de>
determine what item
were to h«
-re
he removed from
Soviet
,

^^

retirement lists.

Aia to
thus hecame an aimost
exclusively
domain,
where at llrat
firsf n- v,
hac* seen active
Presid^n
residential participatlQn

-sia

"

^.

in aliowin, this issue
to devolve to the
mi litar y
*
Hoosevelt si gnale d bo th
his
in the Joint
Starr, and his desire
to have a Second
Front created>
this .anner milltary
persuasiveness served to
countervail
Roosevelt's political
inclinations
,
oions.
it is also
probable
that^Roosevelfs increasing
reliance upon military
advice
Zi-rvis Russian aid corresponds to
his growing dlstru3t
of Stalin.
Roosevelt had now witnessed
Stalin's transforation from congenial partnership
to abusive hostility.
Just as these sudden
shifts baffled Churchill
and Karriman, so they confused
the President. Not
certain of what
to do in the face of
the unpredictable Soviets,
Roosevelt
was content to allow the
military an increased role
in
dealing with them. Not wishing
to become embroiled in
arguing such a limited issue as
an aid program, Roosevelt
ehose to deal with the Soviets
at higher levels.

^

tmt

^
^

Too,

by removing himself from the
thorny problem of aid, hi
limited his direct conflict with
Stalin

and thus facili-

tated his future dealings with the
Soviet leader.
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CHAPTER

iv

ANGLO-AMERICAN DISPUTES AND THE
POSTPONEMENT OP
THE SECOND FRONT

American relations with the
British in mid-1942
were certainly more cordial
than

the state of affairs then

existing between the United States
and the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, beneath the surface,

the spectre of a Second

Front continued to vex the
Anglo-American alliance. The
Arcadia discussions, while fruitful
in many respects,
failed to end disagreements on the
propriety of a European
invasion.
Roosevelt had forced his military
staff to
accept the British plan for a North
African invasion. The

military reluctantly followed their
orders, but were not
persuaded that the venture was wise.
The crisis in the

Pacific, as well as developments in the
European and African
theatres, forced the postponement of the
British plan in

March and left the Joint Chiefs free once again
to argue
the advantages of "their plan," an assault
on Europe.

Roose-

velt finally capitulated, revoked his endorsement of the

British operation, and in April tried to persuade Churchill
to do the same."'"

By February of 1942 Roosevelt saw fit to declare
the grand strategy governing operations in all areas
would continue to be the subject of study and decisions
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt
and Hopkins (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 510.
that
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The changing of Roosevelt's
Second Front decision
is testify to the
abilities and power of the
Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and especially of
General Marshall. W e have
previously noted the persistence
and skill

with which the

Joint Chiefs argued their views.

To this must be added

their ability to gather intelligence,
collate statistics,
and draft reports and policy
recommendations. 2 To a large
extent, this efficiency and
organization is attributable
to the reforms in the Army Staff
structure undertaken by

Elihu Root in 1903 and continued by
Marshall in the immediate pre-war period.
The resultant managerial and
organizational efficiency gave the Joint Chiefs
an "expert"

appearance, a look of competence which
greatly impressed
Roosevelt. In his wartime dealings with the
military

they always seemed to possess facts and considered
opinions
on every detail of the war. Thus, their advice
was
care-

fully weighed and their influence with the Commander-inChief became considerable.

With the sudden and unexpected

British reverses in North Africa, the President concluded
that the Joint Chiefs had been correct all along, and

2A

American military staffwork was thorough and
objectively impressive. Preparations by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff for Second Front planning "require three separate
staffs'... one for the present European theater, another for
the projected North African invasion, a third for the invasion of Europe from the West." Capt. Harry C. Butcher
My Thre e Years With Eisenhowe r (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1946), pp. 33-34.
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that an assault on Europe
should be launched as
soon as
possible
There were, of course,
other factors involved
in
Roosevelt's change of heart
on the Second Pront
issue. As
we have seen, Soviet
pressure for a Second Front
was formidable. Too, Roosevelt's
desire to enter the war
quickly
Played a role. British reverses
in Africa ma de that area
an unlikely theatre in which
to enter the war, given
the

possibility of military disaster.

An invasion of France

seemed a reasonable alternative,
especially since Marshall
claimed an invasion there could
take place
late in 1942.

A combination of factors was
responsible for Roosevelt's
decision to press for a cross -channel
assault.
From

April, 1942, until July, the primal
issue in Anglo-American
wartime planning would be the desirability
of launching a
Second Front in France.

Impressed by the persuasiveness of his
Joint
Chiefs, Roosevelt determined to let them
convince the

British to adopt the invasion plan.

General Marshall and

Admiral King were to be the main personalities
involved in
this effort. Marshall had been, after all,
the original
advocate of a Second Front.

Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs

must be regarded as more than mere advisors to the President, they had become diplomats as well.

On the issue of

a Second Front at least, their influence surpassed even

that of Harry Hopkins and Averill Harriman, both of

Who* became secondary
figure3
tion.

^
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re3pect

^

^

We .hal! now examine
the role of the
Joint Chiefs in
the post-Arcadia
discussions of a Second
Front, and the
eventual decision not to
launch such
«niM, an
operation in 1942
or in 1943.

Roosevelt's decision to
back the Second Front
proposal presented b the
Joint Chiefs took place
y
in late
March, official agreement
probably being made on
the
twenty-fifth. The President
realized that tta British
still
attached great hope to
"Super-Gymnast, - despite
its in-

definite postponement and the
bleak state of affairs
i„ the
African theatre. British fear
of losing the colonial
Middle East was intense, and
consequently

"Super-Gymnast,"
the success of which would
alleviate those fears, was
strongly favored. Churchill
especially was
ot the
proposed operation. It could thus
be expected that any

foj

attempt

abandon "Super-Gymnast" would meet
with great
resistance from the British.
to

Before presenting their Second

Front proposal to

Churchill, the American Joint Chiefs
decided to ascertain
British military opinion on the subject.

It was true that

the British Staff had objected to any
cross-channel assault

when they aired their views during Arcadia.

But the course

of the war had been greatly altered since then
and it was

possible that there had been a commensurate change in

British military opinion.

The U.S. Army General Staff
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found that a British memorandum
dated March 16 dealt
with the Second Front problem. The
document indicated
that the British military considered
possible an invasion at LeHavre in the summer of
1943. The British would
agree to such an invasion if German
strength and
morale

were greatly weakened by that time,

if German morale re-

mained high, and if twenty-five German
divisions remained
in France, the British would not
authorize an attack.
These preconditions, and the overall
cautious tone of

the memorandum, convinced the American
military that

their counterparts were not serious about an
invasion.
It was clear,

in any event, that the British Joint

Chiefs would not assent to a cross-channel operation
in
1942.

This apparent impasse prompted Hopkins to suggest

that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff not deal with

British counterparts but bring the Second Front proposal

directly to the Prime Minister.

Marshall, although dis-

appointed by the caution of the British military, refused
to do this.

First, Hopkins

»s

suggestion vitiated the prin-

ciple of "chain of command," a fundamental concept in

American military training.

It would have been grossly

improper to bypass the British Chiefs.

Secondly, the

British and American military leaders constituted the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the express purpose of discussing
strategy.

This imposed an obligation on the American

military to Inform their British partners of their aims.
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Nonetheless, the American Chiefs would
not object if Roosevelt discussed a Second Front with
Churchill while they were
working on the British military. This
dual course was
ultimately pursued.
As was true in so many other
instances, Marshall

took the lead in developing the Second
Front plan.

Together

with Eisenhower and the Operations Division
of the General
Staff (0-3), he added details to the still
sketchy Second

Front concept.

Keeping in mind the need to relievo the

Russians, Marshall decided that an invasion
force of at
least 600,000 ground troops must be committed to

the in-

vasion.

Support for this massive army would demand an

air fleet of some 6,500 aircraft.

Although percentages

were not yet certain, it was clear that a substantial
amount of this force would have to be British, since the

transport of Americans to England was
process.

a

relatively slow

This would doubtless reinforce British resistance

to the plan.

Despite this, Marshall continued work on the

formal proposal.

It was decided that the area "Calais-

Arra3-3t. Quentin" would be the invasion site, and teams
were set to examine the tides and terrain.

One problem

that developed almost immediately was the shortage of

landing craft in Britain or, for that matter, in the
United States.

A minimum of 7,000 such ships would be
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needed. 3

By then most American
vessel of thls type
haa
been sent to the P aclfi c
an d could not be
readily recalled
It became evident to
Marshall and his staff
that this was
a serious weakness in the
American pl an . without
lading

craft (a commodity seemingly
so insignificant in
the vast
panorama of the war) troops
could not be moved onto
the
invasion beaches, or the invasion
could not

take p l ao e on

the scale originally
proposed.

Determined not to abandon

the invasion plan, Marshall
sought to modify it. with
the
concurrence of the military staff
he proposed that ,
invasion of France still be undertaken,
but on a more modest

^

scale than originally envisioned.

This operation

(Sledgehammer) would secure a beachhead
and engage as many
German divisions as possible. Although
this action would
be a limited one, it was hoped that
the presence of Allied
forces on the continent would cause
Hitler to divert troops
from the Russian front. Further,
"Sledgehammer" would also
include a massive 3irwar a bove France,
Belgium and
the

Netherlands.

would force

It seemed likely that intensive a ir
ac tivity
a

diversion of German Luftflotte from Russia,

and hence considerably ease pressure on the Red
Army.

There was only enough transport av a il a ble'for one
transport division.

p. 266.
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The massive invasion
originally proposed by
Marshall was to be postponed,
according to his revised
plan
until 1943, by which time sufficient
landing craft should
have been acquired. This
operation (Roundup) would
end the
defensive posture of "Sledgehammer"
and carry the war to
the German heartland, thus
preventing the collapse of the
Soviet U n i on . In effect, Marshall
was proposing that the
real invasion be postponed until
1943, with a token effort,
a "pinprick" invasion, being
launched in 1942. This was a

substantial alteration of the plan
approved by Roosevelt,
and it raised a number of troubling
questions.

Operation

"Sledgehammer" seemed especially flawed for
the following
reasons
(1)

Would a small landing force be able to
hold

out against the strong Axis forces currently
in France?

The hunter might well become the hunted, given
the limited

nature of the operation.
(2)

Would such a limited effort seriously affect

the course of the fighting on the Russian front?

Molotov

claimed that forty German divisions must be withdrawn from
Russia; could "Sledgehammer" accomplish this?
(3)

With an intense air war raging, and with the

Germans able to concentrate their forces against

a

limited

beachhead, would it be possible to supply the invasion
force until "Roundup" in 1943?
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If the Soviet Union
collapsed i n 1942
would
,
the invasion force be
withdrawn,, since its mH
primary purpose
was to take pressure
off of Russia? Such
a withdrawal
would pose additional
logistical problems.
(4)

These potential problems
were considerable
and
caused yet another revision
in the original plan.
Sinoe
it was obvious that "Roundup/,
not "Sledgehammer,"
was the
decisive phase of the plan,
"Sledgeha^er" ought to be
de-emphasized. The main task
of the armed forces
would
be to implement "Roundup,"
not the 1942 assault.
It was
decided by Marshall and Eisenhower
that "Sledgeha^er"

should only be launched if the
collapse of the Soviet
Union seemed imminent in 1942.

if it appeared that the

Soviet forces were to hold out
through the winter, no 1942
assault would be needed, and every
effort would be made to
launch "Roundup" early in 1943. This
decision

was clearly

more momentous than Marshall realized,
since it meant the
probable absence of American intervention
in 1942. This
goal had, after all, been one of the
original reasons for
the plan.
The revised plan did not please the
Commander-in-

Chief.

He had placed great hopes on American
involvement

in Europe before the year was out.

Marshall was now tell-

ing him that this was unlikely, whereas before
there had

been no question but that a cross-channel effort would be
made in 1942.

Still confident in his military team,
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understanding the loglc
behlnd
revi3iong> anfl unawe
to see any alternatives,
Roosevelt endorsed the
pl an
However, it is reasonable
to suspeet that he
was no
longer fervently co^itted
to the operation and
that his
advocaey or the l an to
p
Churchm

^^

The decision of the m
ii ltary

3 eriously to alter
their original proposal is
interesting for a number
of
reasons. First, it indicates
uiid.0, as thev
that
tney h*,«
became more
engrossed with the details of
the plan, the began
to find
y
problems that they had not
anticipated. It

was one thin,

to propose a "theoretical"
invasion in general terms,
quite
another to launch such an invasion
against a real enemy
under less than ideal conditions.
The unrestrained confi-

dence the military exhibited at
Arcadia vanished as they
became familiar with the interstices
of the war.
The
intention to invade Prance was not
enough, the capability
to do so must also exist.
Originally, the Joint Chiefs
had dogmatically Insisted that a
1942 cross-channel invasion must be launched; the realities
of war had forced
them to become more flexible. Additionally,
in revising

4

Roosevelt's fidelity to Marshall's Second Front
plan was less than complete. He frequently became
enamored
schemes and had to be talked out of them by
^fTnate
£
Marshall or King. Roosevelt clearly wanted tothe
Army in more adventures than they could handle, involve
now and
a
C 0ff 0n the wi l deg t kind of dispersion debauch.,
?^ n
although
Mr. Roosevelt had agreed to support the idea of a
trans-channel attack, the concept was not as yet his own."
Henry L. Stimson, On Active S ervice In Peace a nd War (New
York: Harper Brothers, 1948)', pp. 416-617.
'

their operations plan,
tto Jolnt
characteristic for which
they h& ,
caution.
"Sledgehammer"

^^^^
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was not an lmpo3sible

^^

troops ana material
needed to launch it
were available.
The reason that it was
accord tentative status
was that
it involved great risks.
The probability of
success was
uncertain, and the American
military were unwilling
to
lose their first engagement
of the war.
the mood of
the Joint Chiefs of staff
at Arcadia can be
described as
audacious, their attitude by
April ±942,
104? rf
j *prij.,
might „
be ,labeled
"judicious." Thus
i>h«™. «„
nus a change
i„ the invasion plan
reflected
a change in the temperament
of the Joint Chiefs

„

M

of Staff.
The revised invasion scheme
became known as the
"Modified Plan," and "Sledgehammer"
was officially referred
to as an "emergency operation."
This "emergency operation"
to prevent the collapse of
Russia called for a September
or October invasion by five
divisions, half American aid
half British. With the Joint
Chiefs agreed on ttese final

details, Marshall and Admiral King
prepared to meet with
the British on April 8, 1942.
Hopkins accompanied them on
the trip, as a personal representative
of the President.

As had been anticipated, the
American proposal met

with stiff resistance from the British Joint
Chiefs.
notion of a 1942 landing, no matter how tentatively
was viewed as both absurd and dangerous.

Any
stated,

In addition,

unless there was a serious weakening of German
strength in
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the West, invasion
ln 1943 wa3 alsQ
floomed
The Americans, the
Brltish mmtary in3igte
estimating the strength and
tenacity
of Lne
the Qe™„
^ U1
German armed
?or ces . Marahall ana Ms
3taff retQrted
Brit
were overestimating German
strength. It was true'
he
argued, that any invasion
in 1942 0 r in 1943
would involve
sacrifices and appreciable
losses, a* the purpose
Qf
launching an invasion was to
secure the viability

^ ^^^^

^

^
^

^

of the

be made quickly.

„

an lnva3lon were

Soviets might collapse.

In

^

^

such an event Hitler could

throw his entire army to the
West and make an invasion
of the continent virtually
impossible. Not impressed
with
this dire prediction, the
British staff maintained that
the only way to "bleed" the
Germans was to defeat them in
North Africa and the Mediterranean.
The British Joint

Chiefs still believed that the old
"Super-Gymnast" plan
could be put into effect sometime

in the future.

The two military staffs were clearly
at logger-

heads.

Daily sessions took pl ace from April
8 through

April 13, without progress being made.

This complete

lack of agreement on strategy eventually
caused tempers
to run high, and there was a good deal
of rancor between

the two staffs.

British.

The animosity was largely due to the

They still regarded the American Joint Chiefs

as newcomers to war, unskilled in the waging of war.

To
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be lectured on strategy by
Marshall was regarded as
affrontery. As one member of
the British General
Staff
confessed, "We had as yet no
great respect for the
quality of their staff work, and
did not regard their
strategical conceptions as being
based on realities." 5
In view of this, it was probably
impossible for the
British to regard any American
proposal objectively.

Besides consulting the British
Joint Chiefs,
Marshall also expressed his opinions
to Churchill.
He was
assisted by Harry Hopkins whom Churchill
regarded with
a

certain affection.

Also, the Prime Minister had received

a letter from Roosevelt

which pointedly mentioned the

desire of the Anglo-American public for
a Second Front.
"Your people and mine demand the establishment
of

a front

to draw off pressure on the Russians, and
these peoples

are wise enough to see that the Russians are
killing more

Germans and destroying more equipment than you and
together." 6

Such

I

put

a message, while it would not have im-

pressed the British military staff, could be expected to
have an impact on the Prime Minister.

It became apparent

to Churchill that Roosevelt stood behind his military staff

5

Sir John Kennedy The Business of war (New York:
William Morrow & Co., 1958;, p. 280.
-

g

Robert Devine, Roosevelt and World War Two
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), pp. 88-89.
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in this mstter.

O

tahm

waa not enthusiastic
about the
prospects for ei ther
"Sledgehammer" or , Roundup/
he
did not share the deep
pessimism of Ms Chiefs
of S t a ff
indeed, relations between
the Prime Mlnlater
anfl
,

British military were
strainea> bQth becauge
of British military
disasters and

^

^
^

^

because of the "conservative" policies promoted
b y the chiefs.
To be sure'
Churchill still favored his
"Super-Cymnast" proposal
but
he noted that his staff
was not anxious to
launch this
endeavor either. The
"defense-mindedness" of the
British
military was infuriating to
Churchill.
Too, "Unlike his

soldiers, Churchill recognized
that successful AngloAmerican political cooperation
was necessarily antecedent
to all coalition strategic
7
planning."
Churchill decided
to accept the American invasion
plan, both to please
tl»

Americans and to express his
displeasure with the inactivity
of hie own military staff.
This did not mean
that

Churchill was convinced that
"Sledgehammer-Roundup" was
militarily sound. He endorsed it
because there
seemed

little alternative except military
inactivity throughout
1942 and possibly 1943.

In accepting the "purely mili-

tary" calculations of the American
Joint Chiefs, Churchill
was making a political concession
to his American Allies;

op •

C 1 "C

'Maurice Matloff, Strategic Plannl n g.
• f

p. 188,

.

.

.
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this was the sole reason
behind his commitment. The
Joint
Chiefs did not fathom
Churchill's intentions but
were
satisfied to have his formal
agreement.

Although Churchill had accepted
the modified
invasion plan presented by
Marshall,

he had done so only

after expressing his grave
reservations. Nonetheless, it
was an official acceptance
that Marshall had been
striving for and had achieved, a
meeting of minds was not
as important.

Churchill's endorsement of the plan

virtually guaranteed British participation,
but the
British military still had to be
consulted and persuaded
to desist from their criticisms.

Marshall was well aware

that a hostile reception from the
British Chiefs of Staff
might succeed, over a period of time,
in changing

Churchill's mind.

Too, unless the British military was

convinced of the desirability of the Second Front
plan,
and its probability of success, they might sabotage
the

implementation just as Marshall had attempted to sabotage
"Super-Gymnast."

Conscious "heeldragging" by the British

military would severely hamper any invasion effort, since
the British Army and Navy constituted an important part

of the invasion force.

Thus, the conferences with the

British Chiefs of Staff assumed a new dimension of
importance #
The decisive confrontation between the American
and British military staffs took place on April 14, 1942.
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Once again, Marshall presented
his ease for a
cress-channel
assault in 1943, possibly to be
preceded b y an "emergency
effort" in late 1942. The British
resurrected their
familiar objection that the
proposal was unrealistic,
support they recited a litany of
German divisions and support elements known to be in France.
Marshall retorted
that German strength in the area
was indeed formidable, but
might be even more so in the future,
especially if

m

the

Soviet Army failed to hold out.

Marshall stressed that a

compelling reason for the invasion was
the relief of the
critical Russian Front. The British, in

turn, acknowledged

the importance of assisting Russia,
but doubted that a

catastrophe on the French beaches would achieve
such an
Q
end.
As in the previous military meetings
of the

London

Conference, an impasse had been reached.

Since both sides

were arguing from conviction, concessions were
difficult.

Both sides remained convinced that they were following
the
dictates of military logic; compromising this logic thus

meant adopting an illogical plan.

The Chiefs were not, by

temperament or training, accustomed to what they regarded
as a betrayal of principle.

Put another way, both teams

argued their positions with the absolute certainty that
they were correct.

In addition, both side's realized that

the stakes of the issue were high.

From the British

vantage point, adoption of Marshall's scheme meant the

8

Ibid.
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probable destruction of entire
divisions, vast amounts
of materiel, and commensurate
destruction

of the morale

of soldiers and civilians
alike.

For the American staff,

refusal to launch a Second Front
was tantamount to writ-'
ing off the Soviet Union as
lost, sitting out the war
in
relative inactivity, and attempting
a future invasion
against depressingly superior German
forces.
Both the

British and the Americans, for their
own particular
reasons, viewed the situation in
apocalyptic terms.

In addition to their fear of a
military catastrophe, the British Chiefs were
impelled to reject the

Second Front plan for another reason as
well.
American proposal, were it adopted, would

The

necessitate the

marshaling of troops and equipment in Britain,
in preparation for the assault. Similarly, capital ships
and land-

ing craft (which, as noted, were in woefully short
supply)

would have to be reserved for the invasion.

This meant

that efforts to reinforce the British Eighth Army in Egypt
and its forces in the Indian Ocean area would have to be

drastically curtailed.

Faced with a seemingly desperate

situation already, these forces in all probability would not
survive the cutbacks.

The British staff was not willing

to suffer the loss of Africa or India for the sake of
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realizing "Sledgehammer-Roundup." 9
At this crucial Juncture
in the discussions
Churchill chose to exert his
influence. He intimated
to
Harry Hopkins (who acted
as a transmission
belt to
Marshall) that the British
General Staff might he
mo^
willing to agree to a Second
Front if Marshall could
gUarSntee that N ° rth Afrl
^d India rsed suffer no losses
of supply or reinforcement.
Despite the problems inherent
in such a sweeping guarantee,
Marshall understood

-

that it

was a concession well worth
making.

H e thus informed the

British General Staff that a
Second Front could be
launched without endangering
British efforts on other
fronts.

Following this session, the
energetic Prime
Minister instructed the General Staff
to make

a pro forma

acceptance of the American proposal.

Churchill's theme

was that Marshall need only be
given tentative assent,
not a formal pledge. In effect,
the British military
was instructed by Churchill not
to take the invasion

^

9
Churchill feared a German-Japanese link-up in
,,4,,,
the Middle East-India area.
In fact, such an eventuality

was more chimerical than substantial. Hitler
only toyed
with the possibility in an off-handed manner, and Japane
designs on India were relatively modest, as they never
viewed India as part of their Greater East Asian CoProsperity Sphere. See John Toland, The RisW Sun (New
~
York:
Random House, 1970).

e
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proposal very seriously. 10

With these behind-the-scenes
maneuvering by
Churchill, the impasse in
the military

discussions was

apparently broken.

The British agreed
both to a massive

1943 invasion of France, and to
the possibility of a
more limited assault late
in 1942.
la ret urn, Marshall
promised that the United States
would not object to
British efforts to supply North
Africa
and India.

By

securing this British "commitment,"
Marshall believed that
he had achieved a notable
diplomatic
victory.

In truth,'

however, he had been beguiled by
Churchill. Marshall,
the career soldier, was out
of his metier in the world of
alliance politics, whereas Churchill
was on familiar
ground. In retrospect it is clear
that Churchill was the
controlling force throughout the London
Conference. As

previously observed, he "endorsed" the
Marshall proposal
chiefly to appease Roosevelt and to ensure
the cohesive-

ness of the alliance.

He then managed to illustrate to

the Americans the importance the British
attached to the

defense of their colonies

(

a position that had infuriated

the American military at Arcadia).

Having made it clear

that every effort would be made to assist these colonies,

British General Brooke confided to intimates
that In the light of the existing situation, (Marshall's)
plana for Sept. 1942 were just fantastic." Arthur Bryant,
Turn of the Tide (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1957), p. 285.
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Churchill then Instructed his
generals to "accept" the
Second Front plan, assuring
them that
this acceptance

would not be binding. 11

He was certain that
continued

efforts in North Africa and the
Indian Ocean arena would
make any 1942 assault on Europe
Impossible. The realization of the invasion plan hinged
on the availability of
large numbers of British troops
and vessels. If sufficient numbers of these were detailed
to other theatres,
the proposed invasion simply
could not be carried out.
And Marshall had, after all, agreed
to allow the British
a free hand in defending their
colonies.

Marshall returned to the United States
quite

satisfied with the results of the London
Conference.
believed that the British were in earnest,

He

though he

thought it best to keep a close watch on them, lest
some
backsliding occur. Harry Hopkins appears to have been
more suspicious of British intentions.

He was troubled

by the fact that the British (both Churchill and the
military) had accepted the Modified Plan without being

convinced of Its merits.

He expressed this anxiety to

llr

Fhe British Imperial Staff utilized their delaying tactics once again, and to effect. As a disgruntled American staff officer observed in July 1942,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff "had assumed that the British
could mount an attack on Cherbourg within 60 days, but it
now appears that they need at least three months
maybe
four.
This would mean postponing the operation..."
Capt. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower
(New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1946), pp. 27-28.
'

—
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Marshall, but the general believed
that the British were
now "obliged" to take part in the
Second Front operations.
Hopkins, familiar with the interstices
of political bargaining, intuitively felt something
insincere
in th e

British acquiescence.

Marshall, at this stage of th e war

in any case, tended to take assurances
at face value.

In

addition, it is also likely that he deluded
himself into
accepting British pledges unquestioningly
,

due to his al-

most obsessive desire to launch a Second
Front.

After

all, at that time the American military
was impelled

by a sense of urgency, a craving to get
into the war

against Hitler.

Toward the attainment of that goal, the

Joint Chiefs felt that they had been constantly
frustrated
by British hesitancy.
Now, at last, it appeared
that

decisive action would be taken.

This was a mistaken

assumption.

Marshall's optimism concerning British intentions began to fade almost immediately upon his return
to Washington.

By the end of April the British command

had announced that India, Ceylon, and the garrisons of
the Indian Ocean were in desperate straits.

Massive

Japanese attacks there were expected momentarily.
As a result, air and ground units in Britain had been

earmarked for this area.

Marshall had, of course, agreed

in principle to such British actions.

His bitterness
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stemmed from the fact that the
British were allocating
troops to fend off an "anticipated"
Japanese attack.
To Marshall, it appeared that
the British command was
in a state of near panic. It
was more

likely, however,

that the British were simply
insuring that certain units
would not be available for
"Sledgehammer" in 1942. Despite this unwelcome British action,
Marshall did not believe that it would endanger his
invasion plans. A
major American operation, "Bolero,"
was being carried out
to counteract the British dispersion
of forces.
"Bolero"
was designed to transport large
numbers of American
troops and materiel to the British Isles,
for eventual
use in the planned cross-channel assaults.
If sufficient

American forces could be transported

to Britain,

the

invasion of the continent could be carried out
with minimal
British assistance.
"Bolero" was not to be easily accomplished, however.
The large scale of the operation meant that it would
re-

quire vast amounts of shipping.

This in itself was a

notable military problem, but it also provided Roosevelt

with

a

critical political problem.

Prior to April, 1942,

American shipping capabilities had been allocated to
various other operations -- with the assent of the Joint
Chiefs and the President.

The Pacific, China-Burma,

the Middle East, and, most importantly, the USSR had been

promised that shipping tonnage would be utilized for
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supply operations.

B y the end of April
it became

that the United States could
not fulfill these
oblations as well as shoulder the
"Bolero" burden. Marshall
argued that all supply efforts
should be cut back to
ensure adequate transport for
"Bolero." Agreeing that
the various supply efforts
were important,
he

sJted

that they should, nonetheless,
be regarded as secondary.
Aware of Roosevelt <s desire for
American involvement in
actual combat, Marshall noted
that only "Bolero" could

accomplish this end.
This issue was another critical
juncture in the
relationship of the Commander-in-Chief
with his military staff. Roosevelt had committed
himself to the

invasion of Europe.

He had gone so far as to reject
the

British grand strategy that he had accepted
at Arcadia.
Too, he had worked in consonance with
his military to

persuade the British to adopt the American
plan.
decided not to give "Bolero" exclusive priority,
in effect, be changing his mind once again.

If he
he would,

Such a deci-

sion would doubtless destroy the harmony he was now
ex-

periencing with his military staff.

Further, it would

probably mean that American forces would not engage the
Germans in 1942.
compelling.

The military reasons for "Bolero" were

A decision in favor of the operation would

also silence domestic "action now" critics.

If "Bolero"

were adopted, however, grave problems with the Allies
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were inevitable.

Chinese aid would have to
be reduced
drastically, and this would
prompt sharp criticism from
Chiang Kai-shek. Britain
had been promised aid for
the

Middle East.

Australia and New Zealand had
communicated
their harrowing fear of
invasion, and would regard
any
aid cutback as a betrayal
of trust (especially in
view
of MacArthur's strident claims
that the Pacific
was

being ignored in Washington).

American-Soviet relations

were constantly tense on the
issue of the MurmanskArchangel convoys. Stalin's response
to another reduction
in aid would certainly be sharp.
All of these prior claims,
'
Important for the cohesion of the
alliance, argued against
priority for "Bolero."
It is significant that Roosevelt once
again opted
to adopt the course suggested by
his military advisors.

The military chiefs were,

in this instance, pitted against

the alliance structure itself.

Roosevelt's friendship with

Churchill, and his desire to win Stalin's confidence and
approval, argued against adopting "Bolero."

Had Roosevelt

refused Marshall's request, a chorus of approval would
have been forthcoming from the other Allied leaders.

Biographers indicate that the President valued such approval
highly.

12

Still,

IP

"Bolero" was approved and given shipping

After their first wartime meeting, Roosevelt told
his aide 3 "how much he liked Churchill personally." The
President had been anxious to establish a good relationship
with Churchill as well as with Stalin. Joseph P. Lash,
Roosevelt an d Churchill. 1959-1941 (New York: V/. W. Norton
and Co., 1976), p. 400.
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priority.

The influence of the
Joint Chiefs upon Roosevelt, even in the faoe of
Allied criticism, is
affirmed
by this decision. Having
persuaded the President
of the
desirability of a Second Front
(against the advice of
the British), they had now
persuaded him to continue
on
the Second Front course,
despite the international
repercussions "Bolero" would cause.

Having been approved, "Bolero"
was set in motion
and American troops and air
contingents began arriving
in Britain in increasing numbers
in mid-1942. The President had made some concessions to
the British and Russians, but the operation proceeded
essentially

as proposed.

Marshall now took another step toward
achieving his Second
Front ambitions. To facilitate the
implementation of
"Bolero" and to supervise contingency
planning for
"Sledgehammer-Roundup," Marshall decided in late May,
1942,
to establish a "European Theater of Operations,
U.S.
Army"

(ETOUSA).

General Eisenhower, one of the initial Second

Front advocates, was placed in command.

Marshall's

objective was to signal to the British that American inva-

sion intentions were serious, and, with Eisenhower's assistance, to prod the British into action.

The development in-

dicates both Marshall's growing concern about British
hesitancy, and his increasingly sophisticated measures to

obtain their compliance with Second Front plans.
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Eisenhower's function was not
unlike that of a spy within
an enemy camp.
Returning from a London trip
on June 3,
he informed the Joint Chiefs
that their worst apprehensions could be confirmed; the
British military did not
regard the implementation of
"Sledgehammer" as likely.
There was absolutely no enthusiasm
for the operation

within the British General Staff.

Ang6I ed by what he
,

regarded (not without reason) as
British duplicity,
Marshall nonetheless refused to abandon

the Second Front

plan.

Just as Marshall was becoming aware
that the April
London Conference agreement had been a
chimera, Churchill
was acting to convert Roosevelt to the
British
viewpoint.

In his memorandum of June 20, 1942, the Prime
Minister

stated that the British "would share to the
full with

their American comrades the risks and sacrifices" 13
of a
Second Front (a statement which, as we have seen, was not
true).

But, the Prime Minister continued, there were

military problems of great magnitude involved in the plan
proposed by the American Joint Chiefs.

He repeated the

conviction of the British military staff that such an
invasion was doomed to failure,

l3 Maurice

arri

expressed his own

Matloff, op. cit., p. 239.
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desire for action in 1942.

"it ia in this setting,"
he

concluded, "that the operation
Gymnast should be studied." 14
Churchill thus appealed to (1)
Roosevelt's fear of an
initial American defeat, and
(2) his desire to see
American
forces in combat in 1942. The Prime
Minister had shrewdly
determined the President's weak points,
and had
hoped to

revive interest in an Anglo-American
invasion of Northwest
Africa. Aware that the American military
was committed to
a Second Front in Europe, Churchill
suspected
that the

President retained more flexibility.
Once again the pressure was on the
President to

make a decision;

either abandon or stand by the proposal

advanced by his Joint Chiefs.

Churchill had, however,

interjected a crucial new factor into the decision-making
milieu.

He argued that "Gymnast"

(invasion of North Africa)

provided an alternative to "Sledgehammer" for American
intervention against Hitler in 1942.

In addition, it must

be recalled that in the "Modified Plan" drafted by Marshall,
the 1942 invasion had been de-emphasized, and was regarded

only as a possible emergency operation.

It remained quite

probable that no assault would be launched until the

spring of 1943.

Roosevelt, though displeased with this

development, had seen no alternative but to accept it.

Churchill now offered a plan for American involvement in

Ibid., p. 240.
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1942 that had a greater degree of
certainty than Marshall's
scheme. The temptation to revert
to "Gymnast" was

strengthened by Churchill's dire warnings
of a debacle on
the French littoral. Churchill's
message combined

a siren
song with a prophecy of disaster to
telling effect. Roosevelt began to hesitate in his commitment
to Marshall's
Second Front plan. He did not, however,

indicate that he

was willing to abandon the advice of his
military staff.
Roosevelt's vacillation soon became evident
to
the Joint Chiefs.

Marshall and King, aware of the Presi-

dent's desire to see action within the year, began
to
restate the possibility of a 1942 landing in more
appealing (if less honest) terms.

There was a substantial

amount of deceit in this, since, if anything, "Sledgehammer"
appeared less likely to occur now than it had in March,
1942.

That Marshall and King woro willing to engage in such
dubious tactics further indicates the almost obsessive

dimensions that their commitment to a Second Front had
assumed.

Also, this act testifies to the fact that the

Joint Chiefs now realized that their plan was in serious

jeopardy.
The events of June 20, 1942, greatly strengthened

Churchill's hand in the promotion of "Gymnast."

On that

date Tobruk, an important North African seaport and defensive base of British, operations, capitulated to Rommel's
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Afrika Korps.

Over 25,000 British troops fell
into

Ge:
srman

hands.

In addition to its military value, Tobruk
had also
been a symbol of British determination. As a
result, its

loss presented Britain with a moral blow as
well.

Churchill

now resumed his "Gymnast" arguments from a new
angle.

He

asserted that an invasion of North Africa was now
imperative, since unless such an operation took place, the
entire

Middle East might be lost.

In addition, the Prime Minister

claimed that a victory against Rommel was needed to restore
British self-confidence and morale.

Roosevelt was impressed

with this argument and, although not yet abandoning
Marshall* s proposal, resolved to assist Churchill in some
way.

He pledged the immediate dispatch of armor and air-

craft to North Africa, with the understanding that the

equipment would be manned by British troops.
The promise of more equipment for the British

defense of Egypt did not please the American military staff,
but neither did it throw them into a state of despair.

Roosevelt had, after all, refused to abandon his approval
of "Sledge hammer- Roundup. "

Even so, it was apparent that

the eloquent Prime Minister had not lost his persuasive

impact on the President.

The antipathy of the American

military staff toward Churchill increased; it was an aversion that was to persist until the end of the war.

In

spite of the Joint Chiefs' animosity, Churchill's proposal
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was receiving increasingly
serious attention from
the
Commander-in-Chief. Roosevelt
began to regard
as a more realistic scheme
than the problem-ridden
and
vaguely-dated "Sledgehammer-Roundup."
Despite the
assurances of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Roosevelt could
not exorcise the unsettling
feeling that Marshall's
plan
was more wishful than substantial.
He did not doubt

»,„t«

Marshall's military logic; a Second
Front in Europe was
theoretically compelling. But military
logic and good

intentions were not enough, and
Roosevelt doubted the
capacity of the armed forces to bring
their plan to
fruition. Roosevelt's suspicions at
this point seem to be
inchoate and largely intuitive, but
certain facts existed
that augured poorly for Marshall's i an>
p

p irstj the

shortage of landing craft was a continuing
problem. There
was, in addition, a shortage of cargo and
support vessels,
due to the naval demands of the war in the
Pacific.

Second, the extent of British participation in the
opera-

tion was increasingly problematical.

The possibility

existed that the British might not cooperate at all in

European invasion.

a

Such divisiveness would be shattering

to future Anglo-American alliance politics.

A third point

that vexed Roosevelt was the overall uncertainty of the

proposed European invasion.

A firm date of assault had

yet to be fixed (could not really be set due to the

shortages of the materiel previously mentioned), leaving
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open the possibility that
no military action might
take
Place until mid-1943. Time
and again Roosevelt had
insisted
on a speedy commitment of
American arms; "SledgehammerRoundup" no longer promised
such a commitment.

All of these factors contributed
to Roosevelt's
growing disenchantment with
Marshall's Second
Front pro-

posal.

Still, it is significant that,
despite his apprehensions, Roosevelt did not order
the military to adopt
Churchill's plan. To an extent, this
indicates Roosevelt's

unwillingness directly to challenge his
Joint Chiefs,
doubtless because he was still hesitant
to contest their
expertise in things military. He also
had the
foresight

to realize that any order to adopt
Churchill's plan would

severely irritate the Joint Chiefs.

The disgruntled

Chiefs would direct their bitterness not
only at the

British but at Roosevelt as well, just as they had
following the President's Arcadia decision. To avoid such

diffi-

culties with his military staff, Roosevelt decided to
issue no order with regard to "Gymnast."

Rather, he sought

to restrict the options open to the Joint Chiefs.

In a

succinct but important memorandum to Marshall, Roosevelt
made it clear that he desired, and expected, some type of

military action against Hitler in 1942.

main concern could not be misinterpreted:

The President's

"it is of the

highest importance that United States ground troops be

145

brought into action against
the enemy in 1942.
statement seemingly gives a

This

great degree of latitude
to
the military staff.
If Marshall and King
could persuade
the British to cooperate
in a cross-channel assault,
and
if it were absolutely certain
that such an operation
could be expedited in 1942,
Roosevelt would not object.
"
However, if the British remained
unconvinced, and if a
1942 invasion remained tentative,
contingent upon a number
of variables, he would insist
that alternate action be
taken.
Thus, the strategic course to be
followed by the
United States depended upon the
persuasive powers of

Marshall and King.

Nonetheless, Roosevelt was certainly

aware (more aware than the Joint Chiefs)
that any change
in the British position was unlikely.
The final round of Anglo-American talks
to decide
the fate of a Second Front in 1942 began
on July 18, in

London.

The American military mustered an impressive

team for these obviously critical discussions.

In addi-

tion to Marshall and King, Admiral Stark and Generals

Eisenhower and Spaatz (representing the Army Air Corps)
were also present.

These officers were unanimous in their

endorsement of Marshall's plan, and shared an intense
dislike of any proposed North African venture.

The argu-

ments and military logic of both the British and American

Ibid ., p. 277.
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camps have been described
in detail above in previous
Pages. Suffice it to note
that these arguments remained
unchanged and that, despite
desperate activity by the
American military, the British
could not be won over to
the Marshall plan.
Frustrated by wha, they
regarded as

British obduracy, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff were forced
to acknowledge defeat by
July 22. Their anger could not,
of course, be directed
against Roosevelt since he had not
actually endorsed or ordered the
endorsement of the
British plan. The political
cunning behind the President's
discrete directive in thus evident.
He had managed to

secure the abandonment of the
American military proposal

without evoking the open resentment
of his military
staff. 16
It would be difficult to overestimate
the impor-

tance of the July London conference.

In a series of talks

spanning approximately one week, all of the
conflict and

uncertainty that had plagued the Allied decision-makers
for months had been removed.

Forced to abandon their own

strategic formulations, the American Joint Chiefs now

16 m

True, some resentment existed. After the
abandonment of his plan, Marshall remarked that "In my discussions with our politicians I have found more brass heads
among them than brass hats among the soldiers." Trumball
Higgins, Soft Underbelly (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1968),
Such displays of petulance should not be overp. 29.
emphasized, however, since no real rift between Roosevelt
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed over this acceptance
of "Gymnast."
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worked energetically to ensure that
"Gymnast" did not
meet the dire fate they had earlier
assigned to it.

'

To

be sure,

their misgivings persisted, but
there seemed no
alternative to an assault on North Africa.
In addition,
the American military staff regarded
the stillbirth of
"Sledgehammer-Roundup" as due to their own
lack of persuasiveness, and not as the result of any
external interference.
If they had not possessed this
self-perception,

it is clear that future relations with the
Commander-in-

Chief would have been strained.

Roosevelt had shrewdly

avoided this problem and maintained the cohesiveness
both
of the American civilian-military team and of
the alliance
structure.
For a brief period, from February until July,
1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been the principal

architects of American grand strategy.

Their Commander-in-

Chief had in fact deferred to them in matters of wartime
decision-making.

This was a notable achievement for the

military establishment.

Roosevelt's temporary failure to

restrict the power of his military staff is curious.

Throughout the Arcadia Conference he had acted decisively
as Commander-in-Chief, properly treating his military

staff as subordinates.

Willing to consider their advice,

he nonetheless retained the capacity to reject and over-

ride their opinions.

But this capacity for such helmsman-

ship quickly deteriorated.

This is attributable to two
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factors.

First, Roosevelt was vigorous!,
pressed by his
military staff to alter Ms
initial decision. The
f im
and constant conviction of
the military that North
Africa
meant disaster eventually had
a telling imp act.
addition, the unanticipated Allied
reverses in FebruaryApril made Rossevelt aware of his
fallibility.

m

Axis victories ate away at the
President's selfconfidence and his confidence in
the British.
The realization that Churchill and the British
military had been
caught off-balance in Africa and the
Pacific caused
Roosevelt to pay more attention to
the Cassandra-like
warnings of his own staff. Convinced
by these events that
he had made a mistake at Arcadia,
the President removed
himself from the decision-making process
and the resultant
vacuum was filled by the military. A similar
situation
occurred in the Soviet Union following the
German blitzkrieg in 1941. Stalin, shaken by a succession
of rapid

German victories, was unable to exercise his decisionmaking power for

a

number of weeks, retreating to his

dacha outside Moscow.

In his absence all strategic deci-

sions were made by the Marshals of the Red Army.

And

earlier in Prance, the 1940 German assault caused Reynaud

virtually to abandon the reins of government, forcing
Generals Gamelin and Weygand respectively to become the
prime decision-makers.
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Seen in this light,
Roosevelt' a capitulation does
not appear unique,
all three

m

instances cited above,

the civilian political
leadership wa3 temporarily
incapacitated by the shock of war.
The military, trained to
accept
and function with the horrors
and uncertainties of combat,
assumed command in their stead. I
n both the cases of

Roosevelt and Stalin, however, the
withdrawal from
decision-making proved temporary.
The Soviet leader effectively regained composure and
control of the government
by mid-July, 1941. Prom that point
on the power of Red

Army general officers was severely
curtailed.
Roosevelt
resumed control of wartime decision-making
by July of 1942.
His directive to Marshall informing
the General
to resolve

the second Front problem one way or
another is an indica-

tion of his renewed authority.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

were served notice that they were once again
subordinates
to the Commander-in-Chief.

This resilience and subsequent

re-emergence of the political leader

as

leader bespeaks a

gradual ability to cope with a new political landscape.
The initial confusion afflicting the political

leadership is understandable.

For Roosevelt especially,

the decisions he was expected to make as Commander-in-

Chief differed vastly from his decision-making role as
peacetime President.

This point should not be underesti-

mated as a basal factor in explaining his temporary loss
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As pre-war President, his

decisions were frequently momentous but
did not involve
the direct destruction of thousands
of lives or

possibly

fatal damage to the nations.

Thus, the brutalizing impli-

cations of wartime strategic planning
presented an unfamiliar and awesome responsibility. Too,
whereas
the

President could more or less control national
political
occurrences during peacetime, he was unable
to control

the course of the war.

The conflictual nature and inter-

national scope of war brought with it a lessening
of

Presidential ability to affect his environment.

Roosevelt

could legislate domestic policy, but he could not control
the adversities of the war simply by issuing directives.

War brought in its wake the apparent dissipation of the
President's ability to affect the world around him.

Impressed by the efficiency of his military staff, Roosevelt allowed them to make more and more decisions.

Here,

after all, were men at ease in the atmosphere of warmaking.

Eventually, however, after exposure to the new

terrain of war, and with a commensurate and gradual

familiarizing process, Roosevelt (like Stalin) was able to
reassert his control.

With Stalin the process had taken a

17

James MacGregor Burns The Lion and the Fox
(New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1956), Roosevelt is characterized as a President essentially concerned with domestic
affairs who felt uncomfortable in the unfamiliar environment of foreign policy.
•
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number of weeks, with Roosevelt
a number of ra onths.
in
both cases the military
leaders were force, to
reli nq uis h
some of their decision-making
prerogatives.
To use another perspective,
let us examine the

behavior of the military staff
in the absence of strong
civilian-political leadership. It
is evident that the

Joint Chiefs acted in a broader
capacity than that usually
accorded mere "Presidential
advisors" from February until
July, 1942.
effect, they were not
participants in
deciding on the direction wartime
strategy should take,
but formulators of that strategy.
p 0 r five months the'
Joint Chiefs ran the war without
serious interference (or
contribution) from civilian political
sources. The President's hesitancy to act was not balanced
by a resurgence

m

of political activity from other
quarters.

Department under Cordell Hull remained

The State

a virtual

pariah in

the decision-making community, Harry
Hopkins echoed his

Chief's lack of decisiveness, and Secretary
Stimson consistently endorsed the proposals of the Joint
Chiefs.

The

military staff operated in a power vacuum in Washington;
their formulations were seriously opposed only by the
British.

Within the military establishment, General Marshall,

Chief of the Joint Chiefs, was the predominant personality.
Thus,

it can be argued that he became, for a time, the

single most powerful man in Washington.
states

As Mark Watson
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Never before did- one man, through
chain of command have such a largehis own
sibility for the Army's very pattern.respon. . for
tha * di ° ta
employment
in skillful coordination with other
forces
American and Allied, for the very timing
of its actions offensive and
defensive-all of these involving a multitude
of
political and pogistical consideration
familiar at the time only to the Chief
Staff and to a very small group around of
0

^

in'st^T

him.-

1-

In a limited sense, it might be said that Marshall
served
as surrogate Commander-in-Chief,

If the power of the military during this period

was indeed excessive, can it be demonstrated that this

constituted an abuse of power?

It can be argued, of course

that the very accrual of power by the military presented
an abuse.

In refutation it must be stated that the Joint

Chiefs had little alternative to accepting pre-eminent

leadership on strategic matters.

Civilian political

sources failed to step into the decision-making arena.

To be sure, it

is

evident that the Joint Chiefs welcomed

the opportunity to determine strategy.

Arcadia conference their role
sive.

v/as

Even during the

not passive but aggres-

During early 1942 the military possessed

a

plan of

strategic action and worked vigorously to implement it.
The freedom of action created by Roosevelt's retreat from

decision-making was thus pleasing to them.

It is signifi-

cant, however, that the Joint Chiefs did not seek to

18 Mark Watson, Chief of Staff (Washington, D.C.:
Historical Division, Dept. of Army, 1945), p. 1.
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extend their power beyond the

i 33 ue

of a Second Front.

Their interest was to see that
a Second Front in Europe
be realized.
Their involvement in other

issues (aid to

Russia, secondary character of
Middle East conflict) took
place only because these issues
affected the launching of
the Second Front. Similarly,
the military's concern with
postwar goals was entirely negative
(if entirely
naive):

postwar goals should not interfere
with the waging of the
war.
In short, the Joint Chiefs gave
no indication of
desiring power for its own sake, but only
as a means of

effecting their strategic plans. 19
Despite their control of strategic decision-

making during this period, it would bo misleading

to sug-

gest that the Commander-in-Chief was ignored by
tho Joint
Chiefs.

Marshall's continual contact with Rooscvolt

attests to a desire on the part of the military to keep

him informed.

In any evont, his constitutional supremacy

was never forgotten by the military leadership.

The Joint

Chiefs were ambitious, but theso ambitions had real

19 "The functions
and duties of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff were not formally defined during the war." Henry L.
Stirnson, On Ac tive Service . . . (New York: Harper Brothers,
1948), p. 427. Thus an "abuse of powor" should not be conceived of in a legalistic or constitutional sense. Rather,
an abuse of powor by the military would consist of
(1) an attempt to undercut the authority of the Commanderin-Chief, and (2) an attempt at duplicity or disobedience
of lawful orders.
ii
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limitations, and should not be viewed apart
from their
dedication to a strategic plan.

Forced to abandon their plan in June of
1942,
the Chiefs did so without attempting to force

the Presi-

dent's hand as they had done in February. 20

In this

sense the military staff displayed more maturity
and

sensitivity to the civilian-military relationship than
they had at the outset of the war.

u This was undoubtedly due to the

Joint Chiefs'
awareness that "the President insists that American
troops must be in action against Germany some place
during 1942." Capt. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Yea rs
With E isenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 19467,
p. 33.
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CHAPTER

V

POLITICS, "TORCH, " AND FURTHER
SECOND FRONT PIANS

American top military opinion had clearly
lost
round in the debate with the British
on a Second Front,

a

and its influence on the President
seemed to have once
again declined. The Joint Chiefs' relation
with the President was acquiring the appearance of a
roller coaster ride.
The Joint Chiefs had, with grave misgivings,
acquiesced in
the British proposal for a North African
invasion. The

operation's codename was changed from the uninspiring
"Gymnast" to the more martial "Torch," and November,
1942,
was set as the target date. An American General, George

S.

Pat ton, was named commander of the operation. 1

course of "Torch" need not concern us,

as

it no longer

played a role in the Second Front decisions.
say that "Torch" did not signal the

end

The further

Suffice it to

of American

Second

Front proposals, but simply served to postpone them.

Although

invasion took place on November 8, 1942.
Although Eisenhower was titular commander, it was Patton who
landed with the troops and carried out the campaign. "The
end of the fighting left a more complex pattern in Northwest Africa than in territories farther east. The former
Italian colonies were under British military occupation, and
Egypt for the time being under British politico-military
l-The

control, but in Northwest Africa there were first, French
authority, secondly, the American and British military commands, and their civilian representatives; and thirdly,
the Sultan of Morocco and Bey of Tunis and the nationalist
movements as well." Guy Wint, Total War (New York: Random
House, 1972), p. 352.
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"Torch" appeared to indicate the
triumph of British grand
strategy, this appearance was deceiving.
The Second Front
concept of Marshall proved to be
unexpectedly recrudescent,
testimony to the singular importance
attached to it by the
American military. The Joint Chiefs
could not easily
reconcile themselves to abandoning a
plan that they regarded
as the only sure road to victory.
Despite their pro fo;>rma
acquiescence to Churchill's Mediterranean
strategy, the

American military (notably Marshall and
Eisenhower) were
still convinced that an attack on Europe was
imperative.

This conviction was, for a time, quietly held,
as the

North African campaign ran its course.

Although Allied attention focused almost
exclusively on Africa during the closing months of 1942
and the first half of 1943, it was not the only area of

Anglo-American activity.

Operation "Bolero," the ferrying

of U.S. troops to the British Isles, continued as the

African campaign progressed.
Marshall as the precursor of

Originally envisioned by
a

Second Front, "Bolero" was

valuable in itself and thus allowed to continue.
month, the American garrison in Britain grew.

men and material assembled were,

North Africa.

Even so,

a

to be sure,

Month by

Some of the

utilized in

massive surplus of soldiers re-

mained on the island, available and uncommitted.

Quite

possibly, the mere presence of these inactive troops
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rekindled the Joint Chiefs' interest
in an assault on Europe.
Despite the activity in North Africa,
a

might still be launched
leaders agreed.

-

cross-channel attack

provided the various political

And, significantly, Roosevelt
had not yet com-

mitted himself to any action beyond
the destruction of Axis
forces in Africa.
Once again, this provided a
persistent
Marshall with an opportunity to lobby
for his invasion plan.
Even at this stage, with fierce fighting
against Rommel's

vaunted Afrika Korps still in progress,
Churchill was known
to be thinking in terms of an attack
on the Balkans or Greece. 2
As in the past, the energetic Prime
Minister was Marshall's
main nemesis. If the American Chiefs had been
opposed to

Churchill's African venture, they were appalled by the
prospect of war in the Balkans. Fighting in that theatre
cer-

tainly would not determine the outcome of the war, and,
again, it would be a fight directed away from Germany, not

toward it.

The idea of investing Greece was no more attrac-

tive to the American military for the same reasons.

In addi-

tion, an attack on Greece might have been seen as an attempt
to

recover the British prestige lost in the Greek debacle of

April 1941.

This would constitute another "political" consider-

ation to which the Joint Chiefs had been violently opposed

"Churchill hinted at a drive through the Ljubljana
Gap and into Hungary." Robert Payne, The Marshall Story
(New York:
Prentice-Hall, 1951), p. 193. The Prime Minister's store of "peripheral runs" was apparently inexhaustible,
see Maurice Matloff, St r ategic Planning for Coalition W arfare
1942-1943 (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office,
1953), pp. 200-229.

;
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all along.

Political motives had appeared during
the conduct of "Torch," much to the dismay of
the American military.
Roosevelt and the OSS refused to treat
the operation
in solely military terms.
"The political complications

were

provided by the existence of rival French
authorities and
American misreading of their comparative values." 3

To the

Joint Chiefs, such diplomatic nuances were
unimportant and
had no place in the ccnduct of war. If the war
did extend
to the Balkans or to Greece, the Chiefs feared
that further
political ramifications would develop. Thus, to prohibit

Roosevelt from embarking on further misadventures, the military decided to present the President with a viable strategic plan before Churchill could.

Casablanca:

This did not prove possible.

Churchill's Advisory of a "Soft Underbelly"

The Casablanca Conference of January, 1943, besides

providing the setting for President Roosevelt's "unconditional surrender" announcement, also saw the determination
of strategy for the remainder of the year.

picture was colored by two facts:

The strategic

there was a large Anglo-

American force in Britain, and another one in Tunisia.

The

army group in Britain posed a threat to France, and, as

a

3 Guy Wint, op.
Northwe st Afri c a:

clt., p. 347. See also George F.
Seizing the Init iative in th e West
Howe,
(Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Chief
of Military History, 1957), pp. 676-677.
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result of its presence, Hitler had
ordered the constracti on
of a West Wall on that coast.
The victorious army ln Tunisi
a
could, with equal ease, be transported
to Sicily or Italy,
the Balkan countries, or Greece and
Crete. For reasons of
logistics and coordination, only one of
these two potential
forces could be utilized. Casablanca would
determine which
force was to receive priority. A brief
account of
the

Casablanca discussions is necessary at this
point.
The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
had not

undergone any change since the London meeting in
June.

Marshall argued that further operations in the Mediterranean
would prove "interminable" and inconclusive, and would not
significantly contribute to the destruction of the German

war machine.

A British riposte to this argument was de-

livered by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke who repeated the

logistical difficulties Involvod in preparing
Channel invasion.

a cross-

Because of the logistical problems,

Brooke stated, an assault on France could not be undertaken

until late summer, 1943.

In the meantime, due to the

demands of the invasion, the shipping of materiel to the

Soviet Union would suffer.

Thus, he argued, a Second Front

would hinder rather than assist the Red Army.

In any event,

Brooke concluded, the Germans were still strong in Franco,
and an attack probably would not succeed.

Marshall dis-

missed Brooke's argument as specious casuistry, but Churchill
supported the view expressed by his Field Marshal.

If the
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Germans were presently strong in
Prance, they must be forced
to disperse their forces.
This could be accomplished
if the
Allies launched attacks on various
outlying areas
Sicily,'
the Italian coast, Greece, and/or
the Balkans. This would
have the double effect of dispersing
Axis forces and also of
drawing German attention from the
Soviet Union. Essentially,
Churchill was arguing that peripheral
attacks served as a
first step in realizing a Second Front.

~

With the two alternate strategies presented,
Roosevelt "continued to occupy a middle-of-the-road
position
4
between Marshall and Churchill."
The British and American
military teams continued to press for their
respective

strategies.

At one point, however, Eisenhower was forced

into a significant admission.

Upon prodding, he agreed with

Churchill that initial estimates of the shipping needed for
invasion had been far too low.

Further, the initial state-

ment on the number of divisions needed had also been too low.
This revision in "Sledgehammer-Roundup" was both unantici-

pated and serious.

If the new shipping demands necessary for

a Second Front were to be met, aid to Russia would have to be

reduced.

This admission (which the General Staff attempted

to make light of) almost certainly caused Roosevelt to look

more favorably upon a Mediterranean strategy.

In an effort

to eliminate rancor between the British and American military

4 Maurice

Matloff, op. cit., p. 23.
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staffs the President offered an unconvincing
"compromise"
which wa 3 in fact a thinly-veiled acceptance
of the British
position. Roosevelt proposed that (1) an attack
on Sicily
or Sardinia be launched from Tunisia,
(2) troop buildups in
the British Isles continue,

(3) aid to Russia be reduced if

convoy losses or other exigencies became prohibitive,

(4)

a

Second Front in France be launched in 1943 if German
strength
there deteriorated rapidly. 5 The final two points dealt

merely with possible contingency actions, and were without
real substance.

The salient feature of Roosevelt's "com-

promise" was commitment to major action in the Mediterranean
theatre.

The British had once again managed to persuade an

American President to adopt their military advice over the
advice of his own staff.

Interestingly, the Joint Chiefs

accepted this reverse calmly, without the petulance they
had exhibited at earlier conferences.

The main reasons for

this unprecedented restraint appear to be

twofold:

first,

the Joint Chiefs had originally described "Torch" in terms

of apoxalyptic catastrophe, and these dire predictions had

not been borne out.

mal loss of lives.

"Torch" had succeeded, and with a miniHence, the Joint Chiefs were face to

face with their own fallibility.

Secondly, the overall war

situation in early 1943 was not as bleak as it had been a
year before.

The German Wehrmach t was no longer invincible,

The Conference at Casablanca (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 713-714.
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the Russian Front had held,
and the Japanese offensive in
the Pacific had reached its
zenith. The sense of urgency

which had been associated with a
Second Front waa thus somewhat expiated. Although it
remained
the preferred strategy

of the American military, it had
become, almost imperceptibly,
something less than a lif e-or-death
issue. Accordingly, we

can advance the proposition that,
with respect to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the intensity of their
Second Front beliefs
diminished as the course of the war became
more favorable.

Casablanca was remarkable for other reasons besides
the new tolerance exhibited by the Joint
Chiefs.

Presi-

dent Roosevelt's role at Casablanca illustrated
not only
his continued superiority to his military staff
in stra-

tegic decision-making, but his growing superiority within
the alliance structure as well.

The enormous contribu-

tions of American production to the war effort, coupled

with recent feats of American arms, now made Roosevelt the
senior partner in the Anglo-American alliance.

This had

become so apparent that certain British diplomats lodged

thinly-veiled complaints.

Harold Macmillan, for example,

thought the British had been reduced to the status of Greeks
in the war court of the Emperor Claudius.

Britain in the

United Nations, like Italy in the Axis, found itself playing a supporting role.

Roosevelt was now the primary

decision-maker for the Anglo-Americans,

Cnurchill, though

still a person to be reckoned with, no longer had the
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magnetic effect on Roosevelt that he
had had in 1941-1942.
Pernaps tellingly, the President did
not even deign to
consult the Prime Minister before issuing
his famous

"unconditional surrender" announcement.

Churchill's in-

fluence on Roosevelt was clearly waning,
and we should not
suppose that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were unaware of it.
This may partially explain their restraint
at Casablanca:
they could afford to bide their time, since
Churchill was
a falling star.

Even if Casablanca seemed to signal the deterio-

ration of Churchill's influence on Roosevelt, it was
still
clear that commitment had been made to an attack on

Sicily,

while "There was no indication when the invasion of Normandy

would take place."

The directive for an invasion of Sicily

(HUSKY) had been issued on January 23, 1943.

However, this

did not necessarily mean that a long-range Mediterranean

strategy had been adopted.

Given its small geographical

size and weak garrison, the conquest of Sicily would not, in
the opinion of military planners, be a military operation

of great duration.

would end.

With the capture of Messina, the campaign

At that time, future strategy would again have

to be decided upon.

The Joint Chiefs intended to use this

opportunity to argue their case for the curtailment of

Mediterranean activity and the resumption of planning for

Robert Payne, op. cit. y p. 193.
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"Overlord."

This time Marshall and his
cohorts were
determined to have their way.

The next formal discussion of
grand strategy was
the "Trident" conference of May
12, 1945, which took
place at Washington, D.C. Only the
Americans and British
attended, as Stalin maintained that
the war still prevented
him from leaving the USSR. As the
conference drew
near,

the Americans had only to give a
cursory glance at a situation map to see what the British proposal
would be. Allied
forces were in North Africa, and were in
the process of

conquering Sicily.
air base.

Malta provided a valuable Mediterranean

In essence, the Anglo-American war machine
was

poised like a dagger at the Italian peninsula.

Accordingly,

Churchill and the Imperial General Staff would argue that
Italy should be invested, and that it was the logical spot
to strike, given the deployment of Allied forces.

At the

same time, the British anticipated American objections, so

much so that General Brooke "Shuddered over the coming
rr

clashes with Marshall and King."
not without foundation.

This presentiment was

Unlike Casablanca, "Trident" was

to be the scene of intense American animosity toward the

British.
As in the past, the British presented a united

front against American military opinion.

7

Brooke, serving

Forrest Pogue, George C . Marshall; Organize r of
Victory. 1943-1945 (New York: ViHrig Press, 1973),
pp. 193-194.
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as spokesman, stated flatly that
the prospects for an invasion of France would not be good
until 1945 or possibly

Prior to that time Allied efforts
should be exclusively devoted to subduing Italy,
invading
1946.

the Balkans, and

reconquering the Aegean.

This strategic proposal,
though

nominally the product of the British military,
bore the
unmistakable imprint of a Churchill scheme.
Not

unexpectedly,

the Prime Minister endorsed the plan in
fulsome terms.

The

rebuttal by the Joint Chiefs was not presented
dispassionately.

General Marshall insisted that the course of
the
war would not be decided in Italy or in the Balkans.

Tac-

tically, these areas were well-suited for defensive
opera-

tions, and effective German resistance could be expected.

Strategically, the bulk of the German forces would not be

engaged in these theatres, and the operations would thus
be of little help to the Soviet Union.

More importantly,

if the British proposal was adopted "Overlord" would cer-

tainly be postponed for an extended period of time.

It

had, in Marshall's opinion, been postponed long enough.

Behind a thin veneer of civility, Marshall made it plain
that his tolerance of British intransigence was reaching its
o

limit.

The British, in Marshall's view, had "gotten their

^Marshall's attitude was partially dictated by
logistical concerns. "The Americans demanded a firm agreement on long-range strategy because they needed to set goals
for military production and allot men and supplies for the
various theatres." Forrest Pogue, Ibid. , p. 194.
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way" since 1941, and as a
result the Germans still
had not
been critically taxed. I n
addition, Marshall was
certainly
aware of War Department reports
which
indicated that

British production and mobilization
had reached their peak,
and were already in decline.
The American
contribution to'

the Anglo-American war effort
was not only predominant,
but would now become increasingly
so.
To Marshall-s precise
mind, this decrease in British
strength entailed a commeri3urate decrease in onrisn
Br1t-l<*Vi status.
at-a+^n
A« continued adoption
of their strategy was thus illogical.

Other members of the Army General Staff
attributed

political motives to the British proposal.

General Embrick

voiced the opinion "that the British proposals
were predicated upon their desire to obtain a permanent
control of the

Mediterranean sea." 9

with this assessment.

Admiral King was inclined to

a

gree

Although it is possible that Marshall

instigated this line of reasoning, there
dence to support the contention.

is no solid evi-

More likely, this was a

spontaneous outburst against "perfidious Albion," and a

manifestation of long-smoldering anti-British prejudice.

Whatever the reasons, this hostile display by the American

military caught the British delegation off guard.

Signifi-

cantly, Roosevelt did not rise to the defense of his British

Allies.

He too may have believed that the British were

9

Ibld., p. 200.
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looking after their post-war
colonial interests,
event, the allegation cast
the British

m

any

proposal ln a new
light, and put its advocates
on the defensive.
In addition to attacking
British motives, the

American military team unexpectedly
advanced
ranean strategy of its own.
Marshall

a

Mediter-

stated that he would

not oppose a limited assault on
Italy.

This did not

signal a change in American strategic
thinking, but was
strictly a matter of expedience.
Aware of the large fo rces

already in the Mediterranean, Marshall
did not object too
the use of some of them in Italy,
provided

the remainde)r

could be transferred to the United K
lngdom#

In othep word

^

Marshall would support a limited attack
on Italy, not because he saw It as important, but because
it could be

accomplished without affecting "Overlord."

The Joint Chiefs

of Staff agreed that such an attack would
be acceptable,

provided the campaign was not pursued north of Rome.

This

acceptance hinged upon British acquiescence to two
American
demands:

(1)

the transfer of seven divisions from the

Mediterranean to Britain by November

1,

1943, and (2) the

initiation of an intensive air bomber offensive against the

Normandy area in Prance.

Churchill expressed his willing-

ness to accept these demands in return for an invasion of
Italy sometime in September. 10 It was doubtless clear to

the Prime Minister that the two American demands were

Maurice Matloff, op. clt .. pp. 195-198.
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preparatory steps toward the
realization of "Overlord."
Nonetheless, he did not appear
overly concerned.
In

return
for these preliminary "Overlord"
activities he had received
a firm go-ahead for his
Mediterranean
venture,

it is

likely that Churchill believed
involvement in Italy would
"snowball," and the Allies would
inexorably be forced from
their modest plan to a more ambitious
project. This had
been his method of operation all
along. Churchill had
wrung consent from his Ally on a
step-by-step basis. First
the Americans had agreed to supply
British forces in Egypt.
Somewhat later they had participated in
the North African
Invasion. Following this, they had been
persuaded to attack
Sicily. The Americans had now agreed to
invade Italy
and

take the Italian capital.

Churchill's belief that the

President could be persuaded to endorse further
Mediterranean
operations was thus not without foundation.

The American

military had consistently condemned British strategic suggestions, and Roosevelt had just as consistently ignored
them.

Although aware that Marshall and other members of the

Joint Chiefs had some impact on the President, Churchill did

not regard them as equals in terms of influence.

As a

result, he was certain that "Overlord" could again be avoided,

despite preliminary preparations.

Churchill had underestimated Marshall, however,
and also failed to notice that Roosevelt's attitude was

changing.

Although Churchill had emerged the victor in
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strategic decision-making from Arcadia
onward, the protestations of the Joint Chiefs had,
cumulatively, affected the
President.

We have noted that Roosevelt was
favorably

impressed by the efficiency of his
military staff.
impression persisted. Marshall had, by

This

1943, become

especially important.

"As the conferences succeeded
one

another his stature increased.

He would analyze a situation

trenchantly and with a lucidity which was often
lacking in
Arnold and King and which was wholly lacking in
the

Commander-in-Chief." 11

During "Trident" Roosevelt had not

censured his military for their pointedly anti-British
remarks, and had endorsed their "demands" involving a Second
Front.

The significance of this apparently did not register

fully with Churchill.
Roosevelt's enchantment with the British was

clearly less intense than in the past, and this may not have

been entirely due to the influence of Marshall or other
military staff officers.

A concern for the impact of the

war on domestic politics had affected the President in the
past and continued to do so.

The war was dragging on,

bringing with it an increase in American casualties.

It was

now apparent that British strategy would not bring the war
to a quick conclusion.

If the President were to retain his

popularity at home, some hope of defeating the Axis in the

Robert Payne, op. cit ., p. 214.
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reasonably near future had to be offered.

This would not

be accomplished by a war of attrition
in Italy, the Balkans,
and the Aegean.
Similarly, the public might well
begin to
ask why American troops were engaged in
such non-essential
theatres
It is also probable that Roosevelt
by now shared

the suspicion of his military staff that
Churchill was

interested in protecting the colonies of the
British Empire.
In 1942 Roosevelt had offered some unsolicited

criticisms of

the colonial policy, and Churchill had replied,
in effect,

that the President should tend to his own business. 12

Roosevelt did not take this advice, however, and continued
to voice his distaste for British colonialism throughout the

war.

Thus, Roosevelt would certainly be hesitant to pursue

a strategy that

might serve to reinforce this system.

It

did not occur to him that Churchill's Mediterranean

strategy might have as its purpose the creation of an anti-

Soviet barrier in Europe.
If Roosevelt's motivations for drifting apart from

the British are obscure with respect to "Trident," they

would become somewhat clearer during the conference at Quebec
in August of 1943.
The "Quadrant" conference at Quebec (August 14-24,

1943) was in many respects a repeat of the "Trident"

Francis Loewenheim, ed., Roosev elt and Churchill
Their Se cret Correspondence . (New York: E. P. Dutton and
Co., 1975T"

:
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performance.

The British once again
attempted to postpone
decisions on "Overlord" and
pursued further Mediterranean
13
considerations.
This attitade meant, of
course, that
they had not taken the "Trident"
decisions seriously and
regarded nothing said in Washington
as binding. Yet their
fortunes in deciding Anglo-American
strategy were perceptibly changing. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff woula not be
put off, and, more importantly,
Roosevelt backed them
entirely.

Roosevelt's endorsement of the Joint
Chiefs'
Second Front plans had emerged piecemeal,
f irat at Casablanca
and more expressly during "Trident." He
was fully behind
"Overlord" and wanted to see it carried out
in the spring
of 1944.

His position on the Second Front,
formerly flexible

and ever-shifting, had jelled.

If in the past the President

had been beguiled or blinded by the cunning,
delaying tactics of Churchill, he resolved to dismiss the Prime
Minis-

ter's arguments.

Marshall's prediction that the British

would always find reasons

to

delay a Second Front "inter-

minably" had been borne out, and Roosevelt had tired of the
game.

Further,

it is possible that Roosevelt felt that

Churchill had been outwitting him, "playing him along," in

decision-making and finally determined

to

put an end to this.

The po33ible influence of domestic politics as a

°By August 17, with Quadrant still in session,
Sicily fell to the invading forces of Generals Patton and
Montgome ry
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motive for Roosevelt's hardening
of resolve emerges more
clearly at Quebec than during
"Trident." The 1944 elections were fast approaching and
the war had not yet been
brought home to Germany. General
Marshall, increasingly
perspicacious, mentioned this to
Roosevelt at every oppor^
tunity.
"Although Marshall made no reference
to the
pos-

sible reaction of the American
public in the November
presidential elections, his implication was
14
clear."

This,

in addition to the other factors,
put Roosevelt firmly

behind the Second Front proposals.
The Joint Chiefs continued to display at
Quebec
the aggressive advocacy of "Overlord" that
they had demon-

strated in May.

The relationship between the British and

American military staffs was not only tense but hostile.
"British insistence on expanding the Italian operations
provoked (Admiral) King to very undiplomatic language, to use a

mild term." 15

A British request for additional troops

(to

offset the divisions sent to Britain in May) brought an

angry reaction from Marshall and a warning for the President.
"The President should also be apprised that an additional

force of seven divisions would in reality constitute an

expeditionary force available for use in the Balkans." 16

14

Forrest Pogue, op. cit., p. 196.

15

Admiral William Leahy, I Was There (New York:
McGraw-Hill Co., Inc., 1950), p. 175. King's bluntness
offended the British staff members on a number of occasions.
16 Maurice Matloff,

op. cit.

,

p. 213.
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Roosevelt heeded Marshall»s
nan s advlM
advice throughout the
stormy
coherence. The President
was no longer a referee
,
ing Judgment and
objectively considering
all arguments.
His partisanship on
questions pertaining to
"Overlord" was
-nifest. This pro-"Overlord"
attitude also meant that
the
Mediterranean would become
a secondary theatre
tions:

of opera* 7 1944 it had earned
the epithet "the forgotten

front."

Although planning for
"Overlord" had not yet been
Put in final form, it was
increasingly
apparent that its

implementation was simply

a

matter of time.

Churchill and his staff left
the Quebec conference
in a spirit of despondency.
The Prime Minister had not been
able to work his customary
magic on Roosevelt. At the final
session of "Quadrant,"

^^ ^
e

ent and the ?rlme Minister
ratified the plan to make a crossel nVa3i ° n from England in May,
i
T
1944.
it
was to be the principal
Britisn-United States ground and air
effort against the Axis in Europe.

ia^

There would be no turning back
from this,

as

Roosevelt's

Partially as a result of the British desire for
<
mnr^ intensive
more
action in Italy, and in hopes of breaking
the stalemate at Monte Cassino, an
amphibious invasion was
launched at Anzio-Ne ttuno. This invasion was a disaster
V
Allies. Among the American casualties was General
i° J ?
Marshall's
stepson, Allan Brown, Second Lieutenant, US Army,
killed by a German sniper. Any effect that this may have
had on Marshall's disinclination to pursue the Italian
campaign can only be guessed at.
xo

"1

Admiral William Leahy, op. cit., p. 177.
Marshall still did not entirely trusT"tTIo" President
"Although pleased that the President had accepted the proposal,
Marshall admitted to Stimson that he was not certain exactly
what this entailed." Forest Pogue, op. cit,, p. 196.
.
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long period of vacillation had ended.
Postwar evidence suggests that
the reason for
Churchill's gloom transcended the issue
of anti-Axis
19
strategy.
With the tide of the war clearly
changed in
favor of the Allied powers, the Soviet
Union assumed a new
and menacing significance. With the
crumbling
of the

German-Italian empire, the chance presented
itself for the
Red Army to gobble up vast European
territories.
Nazi

hegemony over the Contiment might well be replaced
by
Communist hegemony. Determined to prevent such an

occur-

rence, Churchill presented his Mediterranean strategy.

A

strong Allied posture in the Mediterranean and in the
Balkans

might thwart Soviet ambitions and halt the advance of the
Red Army.

Churchill, unlike Roosevelt, did not trust Stalin.

Thus, the decision against extensive Mediterranean involve-

ment was regarded by Churchill as carrying frightening

19

In Cairo on December 2, 1943, Churchill confided
to his physician that "You don't understand. . .we 've got to
do something about the bloody Russians." His physician
noted in 1966 that "This meant nothing to me at the time...
but I wonder now whether it wasn't the first indication
that Winston had arrived at the conclusion that if he wanted
to help the Eastern Europe countries he must get there before the Red Army." Lord Moran, Churchill. Taken From the
Diar ies of Lord Moran (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966),
Speaking in more general terms, Adam Ulam has con~pl 155.
cluded that "Both in his diplomatic activity at the time and
In his writings later on, Churchill gave testimony to his
conviction that, with the war over, Russia would be an invincible colossus bound to have her way on every point of
the European settlement unless checked by the mo3t determined and concerted action." Adam Ulam, The R ivals; Amer ica
and Russia since World W ar II (New York: Viking Press, 1971)",
p. 7.
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implications far beyond the context of the war
against
Hitler.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not share
Churchill

concern with Soviet designs.

This is mainly attributable

to their preoccupation with the war against Germany.

None

theless, they did recognize that the Soviet Union was
grow
ing inexorably stronger.

A Joint Chiefs of Staff memoran-

dum observed that "With Germany crushed there is no power
in Europe to oppose her (Russia's) tremendous military

forces."

This was the same conclusion the Prime Minis to

had come to.

In contrast to Churchill, the Joint Chiefs

did not regard the prospect as requiring a strong Western

presence in Europe.

Rather,

they argued,

The conclusions from this are obvious.
Since Russia is the decisive factor in
the war she mu3t be given every assistance and every effort must be made to
obtain her friendship. Likewise, since
without question she will dominate
Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it
is even more essential to develop and
maintain the mo3t friendly relations
with Russia. 21

The Joint Chiefs regarded the possibility of Russian hege-

mony over Europe as demanding a conciliatory, not conflictual, reaction.

As a consequence, they did not see any

2 °This document, "Russia's Position" is quoted
by Robert Payne, op. cit., p. 205.

2l Ibid.

176

merit In Churchill's Mediterranean formula.

Their pri-

mary, almost singular, concern was
the war against Hitler,
their plans did not extend beyond this
horizon. As a re-

sult they remained convinced that "Overlord"
was without
equal as an operation of strategic significance.

Teheran:

The Final Debates

Up to this point we have noted the shifting fortunes of the American military staff in their Second
Pro

advocacy.

I

The year 1943 had witnessed the increasing

effectiveness of their arguments at the "Trident" and
"Quadrant" conferences, but their seeming triumphs lacked

finality due to Churchill's constant diplomatic maneuvers.
The opinionated and garrulous Prime Minister could not

bring himself to accept for long the American "Overlord"
plan.

The Americans, especially Marshall, had wearied of

this inconstancy.

"Wherever he turned, he was faced with

the accusing stare of the Prime Minister, who seemed

determined to thwart him."

22

Churchill had seemed to

acquiesce in a Second Front by the conclusion of the Quebec
conference, but soon returned to his own Mediterranean and

Aegean arguments.

American annoyance at this development

reached new peaks, apparent even to the British.
Churchill's personal physician noted in his diary,

Ibid ., p. 193.

As
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I have noticed lately a certain
hardening of purpose in the American camp. They left Quebec in
great heart, assured that everything was settled for good. And
here is the British Prime Minister at his old game again. There
is an ominous sharpness in their
speech when they say that they
are not going to allow things to
be messed up in this way indefinitely. 23

The upcoming three-power conference at Teheran would
serve
as the ultimate battleground of Anglo-American
differences.

As we shall see, the decisive nature of the conference
owed much to the presence of Marshal Josef Stalin.
The sessions at Teheran took place between

November 28, and December

1,

1943.

As in the past, there

were both formal and informal meetings of the participants.

The personal relationship between Roosevelt and

Churchill had clearly peaked, with Churchill feeling in-

creasingly slighted by the President.

Indeed, Roosevelt

engaged in a number of meetings with Stalin at which the
Prime Minister was not present, and which he had not been
24
asked to attend.
It is somewhat beyond the purview of
this paper to inquire into the reasons for the cooling of
the Churchill-Roosevelt partnership, but Churchill's

ord Moran, op . ci

24 Ibid.,

p.

144.

. ,

p.

141.
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previous anti-Second Front schemes certainly played

a role.

His obduracy on this point had finally become an
annoyance
to the President, who regarded the political interests
of

the British Empire as increasingly irrelevant.

Churchill's

former role as fair-haired boy of the President, was now

filled by Josef Stalin,

Additionally, the Soviet Supreme

Marshal wa3 to play a role formerly held by Roosevelt;
at Teheran Stalin would be the "tie-breaker," the man who

cast the decisive vote.
The conference sessions opened along familiar lines.

Speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and, increasingly,
for the President), Marshall detailed plans for the initia-

tion of "Overlord," tentatively set for early May, 1944.
He also pointedly noted that the British had agreed at

Quebec to give priority to the proposed cross-Channel

assault.

The British had made such an agreement and this

caused Churchill some difficulties in advancing his newest
25
project, an attack upon Rhodes.

His argument took the

following, somewhat confused, form.
1,

"Overlord" has strategic priority.

2.

If "Overlord" is to succeed, German
strength and morale in France must
be sapped.

b

Churchill's Interest in the Rhodes project
came
to him out of the blue. He makes no menapparently
tion of such an operation prior to Teheran.
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3.

To draw off German divisions, and to
cause additional dis-spirit in the
Wehrmacht . the isle of Rhodes should
be attacked, along with an offensive
to aid partisans in the Balkans. As
an added dividend, such an attack
might draw off German forces from
the Eastern Front.

4.

In coordination with these military
operations, a diplomatic effort
should be made to bring Turkey into
the war on the side of the Allies.
This would put further pressure on
the Reich, and further imperil its
hold on France.

5.

The proposed operations might cause
the postponement of "Overlord," but
would ultimately facilitate its

implementation.

Members of the British delegation at Teheran have
since noted that Churchill expected Stalin to be enthused

by this proposal, since it hinted at relief for the Red
If Stalin agreed to back the British plan, Roosevelt

Army.

would be forced into a defensive posture, and the counsel
of the Joint Chiefs might once again be thwarted.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were predictably un-

impressed by Churchill's Rhodes scheme.

Strategically, it

was another example of the British preference for circuitous

thinking.

Beyond that, Marshall saw it as "a British attempt

to relate a military operation with political considera-

tions."

26

Admiral King's vision of

a

British plot to domin-

ate the Mediterranean and Aegean were once again summoned
up.

Without heat, Roosevelt explained that he would not

26 Maurice Matloff, op.

c it.,

p.

359.
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endorse any plan which would delay
"Overlord."

The Anglo-

American strategic debate had reached its
familiar impasse.
The impasse was broken by Stalin, who
to

—

Churchill's chagrin

—

dismissed the British plan as timid,

and endorsed "Overlord."

In terms that were unmistakable,

Stalin declared that "Russia is interested only in
"Over27
lord."
in comparison to the Second Front, all other
military adventures were insignificant.

Rhodes was not

a

critical theatre, and Stalin regarded the entrance of Turkey
28
into the war as unlikely.
As for assisting the Red Army,
this could be best accomplished through an invasion of

France and a thrust at the German heartland.
In retrospect, it seems curious that Churchill

should have expected any other reaction from Stalin.

Throughout the war, the Soviet press, and Stalin's communiques, had impatiently pressed for a Second Front.

The

Marshal had rebuked the Western Allies in bitter terms when
a

Second Front had not been launched in 1942 and 1945.

Having regarded the North African and Italian campaigns as

minor episodes, there was no reason for him to view an
attack on Rhodes or the Balkans in a different light.

27
pp

One

Lord Mo ran, op. cit ., p. 147.

In addition, Stalin may have already been entertaining thoughts of securing Turkish territory by force of
arms
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suspects that only wishful thinking,
and perhaps desperation, blinded the Prime Minister to
this fact.
In addition,
we have stated that one reason for
Churchill's plan was
a

desire to limit the expansion of Russia
through the advances
of her military forces.
It is quite reasonable to expect
that Stalin, always paranoid of Western
intentions, saw
this rather clearly.
The presence of British and American
troops in Greece, the Balkans, and Turkey could only
result
in trouble after, or during, the conclusion of hostilities.

Even while the Teheran conferences were in progress, there
was sporadic fighting between Communist and Royalist

partisans in Yugoslavia and Greece.
Stalin's support of United States military views

caught Churchill off guard, but did not silence him.

He

continued to express fear that "Overlord" would be launched
too hastily, resulting in a military debacle without

parallel in the war.

divisions in France

"If the Germans had thirty to forty
I

did not think the force we were going

to put across the Channel would be able to hold on."

29

The

Prime Minister did not allow himself to be persuaded by the

optimistic estimates produced by Marshall and the Operations Division of the General Staff.

forecasts now proved futile, however.

Churchill's gloomy

Much to Marshall's

29 Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring . (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), p. 390. It is possible that,
by this time, the difficulties encountered at Anzio-Nettuno
reinforced Churchill's anxieties about a cross-Channel attack,
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satisfaction, Roosevelt would not balk
from his commitment
to the Second Front.
Stalin proved equally
inflexible.

In

thinly-veiled terms, he hinted that the British
had no
stomach for a fight with the flower of the

German Army.

They preferred minor contests against second-rate
troops
in indecisive theatres.
For the remainder of the

conference

"Stalin kept needling Churchill without mercy." 50

Stalin

saved his praise for the Americans, without whom,
he said,
the war would have certainly been lost.

were probably calculated.

These histrionics

It was evident that Britain

would emerge from the war gravely weakened.

The United

States, on the other hand, would come out of the war

stronger than before, she would be the new champion of the
democratic West.

It

would thus be wise for Stalin to play

up to the Americans, while he could afford to ignore the
British, whose star had set.

In the future, it would be

the United States, not Great Britain, with which the Soviet

Union would have to deal.
The rift between Churchill, on the one hand, and

Roosevelt and Stalin, on the other, was heightened by their

suspicion of British "political" Interests

—

the same

suspicion that had motivated the American military staff
throughout the war.

Roosevelt had, since 1941, downplayed

30 Averell Harriman, op. cit., p. 273. Chapter 12
of this volume offers a number of instances of this.
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Ms

anti-colonialist sentiments while Marshall
and King had
not.
The President was not so discreet
at
Teheran, perhaps

owing to Stalin's presence.

For the first time the Presi-

dent clearly expressed his views on the
shape of the postwar world. During an informal session
at which Churchill
was present, Roosevelt and Stalin happily
set about re-

creating the world, and declared that colonial
territories
should be granted independent status. That
this would
include British colonies was never expressly
stated, but the
implications were clear enough. 31 The Prime Minister,
a

convinced imperialist, found the discussion too much to
bear
in silence.

"Britain, he said, would hold fast to her

territories and bases, and no one would take them away from

her without going to war." 32

This statement seems

to

confirm

the suspicion the Joint Chiefs of Staff had carried all

along that the British were interested in more than defeating Hitler.

In a sense, Teheran proved to

be

the vindica-

tion of Marshall and King.

31

Roosevelt "did not refer specifically to the
British Empire; nevertheless its implications were evident,
and it was in this spirit that Roosevelt pressed for British
moves that would have the effect of diminishing the scope of
Empire." George Woodcock, Who Killed the Brit is h Empire?
(New York:
New York Times Book Co., 1974), p. 293. Churchill's
defense of Empire became increasingly anachronistic. By
1945 "American opinion was only part of a climate of antiimperial thought..." Ibid., p. 295. This might help to
explain Churchill's 1945 election defeat at the hands of
the Labour Party.
32 W. Averell Harriman,

op.

cit ..

p.

274.
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The importance of the Teheran
sessions in settling

strategic differences on a Second Front
cannot be overemphasized.
Just as 1943 saw the decline of
British influenc e
on the issue, so Teheran provided the coup
de p;race .

provided a recessional for the British:

It

they would not

succeed in shaping a major strategic decision
for the remainder of the war.
It is fitting at this point to inquire
into why

the British ultimately failed in their alternate
Second

Front proposals, and why they failed when they did.
is,

Th<

.

actually, no single reason but rather a combination

factors
First,

it

is

important to note that, from 1941 on,

the British had an adversary relation with the American

military on strategic questions.

Thus, even when their

influence with Roosevelt was at its peak, they were faced

with constant criticism from the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
who at no time were willing to accept the governing logic

behind British "peripheral run" doctrine.

As a result,

Roosevelt was always under pressure to abandon or revise
his endorsements of various British proposals.

The per-

suasiveness of the British position was further weakened

by an inevitable side-effect of their conservative strategy
the war dragged on.

Further, the duration of the war

threatened to be "interminable" (to use Marshall's term)

without challenging German rule in

a

critical theatre,

-
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Europe.

We have demonstrated that this
factor was important to the President, as it could
affect his domestic

political standing and popularity at the polls.

Also, it

possible that Roosevelt was aware of his own
fragile
health, and wished to see the conclusion of
the war before
his death.
Since British strategy would prolong
is

the war,

the President eventually decided to back
the more audacious

and promising plans of his own military advisors.

Second, Roosevelt had been virtually alone in his

initial trust in and respect for the British.

The Joint

Chiefs, along with Secretary of War Stimson, believed that
the British were primarily interested in securing their

own national interests.

As we have demonstrated, this

allegation was not without substance.

Churchill never

wavered in his determination to preserve the British Empire,
and the Imperial General Staff tended to follow the lead of

their Prime Minister.

As the British allegiance to the

Empire became more and more pronounced, the American military began to see an atavistic motive behind every British

proposal.

The charges of the outspoken Admiral King ob-

tained from this environment of suspicion.

It is difficult

to deny that Roosevelt himself was eventually affected by

that attitude, probably in early 1943.

He was no longer

Roosevelt was especially determined to see India
removed from the yoke of British imperialist policy. At
Teheran, the President and Stalin discussed the Indian
problem, without the knowledge of Churchill.
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willing to give the British the benefit of the
doubt visa-vis their intentions on strategic proposals.

Roosevelt

was willing to fight a war to preserve Great
Britain, but
not to maintain the British Empire, a territory
he viewed
as obsolete.

Finally, there is the question of Churchill's

anti-Communism as contributing to the decline in his
relationship with Roosevelt.

Churchill's antagonism toward

Stalin was evident in 19^0 (see Chapter III), and never

really disappeared.

His anti-Soviet sentiments were not

aroused so long as Russia was threatened by the German invasion.

With the turn of the tide on the Eastern Front,

however, the Prime Minister's old fears of Russian expansionism re-emerged.

This, as we have explained, was in part

responsible for his interest in the "soft underbelly" of
Europe.

Neither Roosevelt nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff

regarded Russia as a danger to be guarded against.

This

was in part due to their disinclination to face postwar
and geographical realities.

For his part, the President

preferred to think in vague terms of a four-power "United
Nations" keeping peace in a new world.

He would thus be

irritated by any Churchillian suggestion that they gird

themselves against an "Ally," the Soviet Union.

The Joint

Chiefs, for their part, were unwilling to think far beyond
the contest against Germany and Japan.

Indeed, their main

interest was in bringing Russia into the war in the
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Pacific theatre.
To be sure, too much can be made of
Churchill's

anti-Soviet leanings,

in 1943 it was little more than
a

secondary theme in the totality of his thought.

His fear

of Russia was still rather inchoate, and
would not clearly

emerge until the end of 1944.

enough in 1943 to
by Stalin.

be

Nonetheless, it was evident

recognized by Roosevelt and certainly

Since this attitude of Churchill's put addi-

tional strain on the three-power alliance, it contributed
to the cooling of the Roosevelt-Churchill friendship.

We have posited three reasons for

Churchill split.

the

Roosevelt-

In two of the three cases, the Chiefs of

Staff were involved in shaping the President's attitude
toward the British.

Also, two of the three points of con-

flict between the President and Prime Minister revolved
around the issue of a Second Front.
an arena for Anglo-American conflict.

This issue provided

Roosevelt saw in

the Second Front an alternative to the increasingly unattraC'

tive proposals of the British.

A Second Front in France

would have these advantages:
1.

It might end the war quickly.

2.

It would not render assistance to the
British In their aspiration to rebuild
the colonial Empire.

3.

It would please Stalin and thus bring
the "United Nations" closer to reality.
Churchill's strategy would have the

opposite effect.
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If this formula can be taken
as valid, It suggests

that Roosevelt's endorsement
of a Second Front was not
dictated solely by strategic
concerns. Opposition to the
British Empire, and a vision of
the "United Nations" were
political, not military, motivations.
Thus, although the
President backed the plan of his
military advisors at
Teheran, he was doing so for his own
reasons.
Just as Teheran marked a new low
point for the

fortunes of the British Prime Minister,
so it marked the
almost exponential rise of American military
influence.

Given a clear mandate by the combined forces
of Roosevelt
and Stalin, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw
nearly all of

their strategic proposals adopted from December
1943 until
the end of the European war in May, 1945.
The ability
of

the British General Staff to block American
ambitions

proved negligible.

The British objected to plans for an

invasion of southern France to follow "Overlord."

Their

protests were futile, and the operation was eventually

carried out.

The British objected to General Arnold's

proposal that the American air forces be placed under all-

American command (rather than joint Anglo-American command).

All-American command was effected in 1944.

Down the line

it was American military proposals which were ultimately

adopted.

34

34

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, formed during the

See Maurice Matloff, op. cit., Chapter 7.
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Arcadia conference at Washington, proved
to
structure. There is no evidence to

be a

hollow

indicate that it ever

functioned as a decision-making body on
military affairs
for the alliance. Although this was the

initial intention,

the raison d'etre ,

the organization was nothing
more than a

forum for debate.

Strategic differences between the
two
camps were discussed, but agreements were
not arrived

at.

In short, the Combined Chiefs of Staff could
not effectively

function because of the deep adversary relationship
between
the British and American military staffs.

possible to transcend national differences.

It proved im-

In addition,

the body was essentially helpless since all matters of
Grand

Strategy had to be referred to Churchill and Roosevelt.
Real decisions were made by these statesmen, with the

Combined Chiefs splitting up to advocate their respective
proposals.

And, it was in the role of advocates that the

military representatives were able to wield their influence.
Prom the outset of Anglo-American collaboration,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

led by the dynamic Marshall, had

demonstrated an aggressive spirit in arguing their position
(the launching of a Second Front).

British military repre-

sentatives had been more docile, giving deference to the
wishes of the

-Prime

Minister.

The American military refused

to abandon their position even when it seemed certain that

other opinions had carried the day.

This obstinate posture
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was in no small measure responsible for
the final adoption
of Second Front strategy.
In contrast, the British General

Staff proved more fatalistic.

After the conclusion of the

Teheran conference, their objections to American
strategy
were half-hearted, and they were not vigorous in

pressing

for Aegean and Balkan involvements.

This fatalism made it

increasingly easy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have
their strategic suggestions approved without serious conflict.

The vastly increased powers of the Joint Chiefs

would be evident in the year 1944.
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CHAPTER
THE SECOND FRONT REALIZED:

VI

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Historical Summary
In terms of the high-level military and
political

discussions of Second Front policy, Teheran proved
to be
the end of the road.

Another three-power meeting of minds

would not take place until the Yalta conference of February
1945.

Bi-lateral meetings betv/een the British and Ameri-

cans continued to take place regularly after Teheran, and

Churchill and Brooke continually voiced reservations about
"Overlord," but to no avail.

D-day for the invasion had

been tentatively set for the first of May, 1944.

The

alliance of opinion between Roosevelt, Stalin, and the

American military was, of course, crucial in reaching this
But it is also certain that British anxiety over

decision.
a

Second Front was lessened by events of war.

That is, by

January, 1944, it was starkly apparent that the Axis was

going down to almost inevitable defeat.
of the war,

Italy was out

Germany was losing Finland and other satel-

lites, Hitler's offensive at Kursk had been resoundingly

crushed.

The apocalyptic vision of an Allied catastrophe

in France became increasingly unconvincing.

There were

no longer compelling reasons for postponing the long-

delayed Second Front.

Thus, the strategic decisions made

at Teheran proved final.

Roosevelt had named General
Eisenhower Commander
of the European Theatre of Operations,
with full
respon-

sibility for "Overlord."

it had been generally assumed

in American and British quarters that
Marshall would be
given this post.
He desired the appointment,
and seemed
the natural selection as Chief of Staff.
Too,
he had

demonstrated time and again his ability to
stand up to
Churchill and the Imperial British Staff. The

reasons

for Marshall's failure to secure the
appointment, however,
lie not in his weaknesses but in his strengths.

His un-

questioned primacy on the American military staff, and
his evident decision-making ability, made Marshall

invaluable in Washington.

Put bluntly, Roosevelt did not

want to lose him, and probably did not want to begin working with a new Chief of Staff at this stage of the war.
This is a further indication that staff officers, not

field commanders, v/ere the primary source of military

authority at this time, unlike their predecessors of the
First World War.

important status.

Marshall especially must be accorded
Indeed, Harold Macmillan may not have

been far wrong when he described the American Chief of
Staff as "the most powerful figure in the United States
after the President.""'"

Even

a more modest assessment of

Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War (New York:
Harper and Row, 1968), p. 415.
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Marshall nmst recognize that his
advisory and decisionmaking authority far outstripped
that of two civilian
leaders, the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of War.
With his appointment a 3 Supreme
Commander in
Europe, Eisenhower too became a
decision-maker
of

formidable dimensions.

Formerly a subordinate of Marshall,

he now enjoyed a special status.

to two factors:

His powers are attributable

his direct control of "Overlord,"
and his

permanent presence in Britain.

He

thus served as the

"front line" against any last-ditch efforts
by the British
to sabotage the invasion.

This is in fact what happened

in early 1944, and our historical summary will
now focus

on this point.

Churchill's gloomy predictions as to "Overlord's"
fate were no longer of concern to the Americans, and
cer-

tainly not to Eisenhower.

By the end of 1943 prepara-

tions were well under way for the operation, and there was

virtually no chance that the assault would be called off.

Coordination of the attack with the British was still
fraught with difficulties, however.

The main point of

contention revolved around use of the combined Anglo-

American air forces.
France necessitated
area to be attacked.

Establishment of a Second Front in
a

heavy air offensive against the
Thus, Eisenhov/er (with the concur-

rence of Arnold) requested that coastal targets in
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Normandy be given priority in Allied sorties. 2

Under

normal circumstances this request would nave
been noncontroversial. Unfortunately, recent military

intelligence

reports had revealed the presence of flying
bomb and rocket
sites in various regions of Nazi-occupied Europe.
These

weapons, whose effectiveness could only be guessed
at,
were clearly intended for use against Britain in
the near
future. 3

Fearful of a second blitz on London, the British

Staff demanded that priority be given to the destruction
of the new German weapons.

Air Marshal Tedder was

especially vociferous in urging this course.

The matter

was taken up with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but the

Americans could not be persuaded to redirect the air
offensive from "Overlord" areas to the rocket sites.

The

Anglo-American disagreement continued into March, 1944,

with neither side willing to make some form

of compromise.

Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1945-1944 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, Office of the Chief of Military History,
Dept. Army, 1959).
The German Verge ltungswaf f en proved to be a
formidable weapon. Launched first as flying bombs and
later as rockets, these devices were directed mainly at
London and Antwerp. London productivity was cut down by
approximately one-sixth, and 9,000 civilians were killed.
German Secret Weapons
See David Irving, The Mare 3 Nest:
(Boston:
Little, Brown, and Co., 1965)
T

This refusal to see or consider a middle course is

reminiscent of the Arcadia impasse of 1942.

in 1944,

however, the American military no longer had to combat
the opinions of their Commander-in-Chief, who had in the

past come to the rescue of the British.

Aware that

Roosevelt would no longer interfere, Eisenhower acted
forcefully.

On March 22 he instructed British military

representatives to "inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff
that unless the matter is settled at once

relief from this command." 4

I

will request

Doubtless aware that such

a

move would provoke American and probably Soviet wrath,
the British backed down.

Eisenhower, in his capacity as

Supreme Commander, was granted specific authority to

direct the air war, including use of all British air
forces.

Explaining his insistence on controlling all

Allied forces, Eisenhower stated in his memoirs that
"when

a

battle needs the last ounce of available force,

the commander must not be in the position of depending

upon request and negotiation to get it."

The

Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (WashingGovernment Printing Office, Office of the Chie
ton, D.C.:
of Military History, Dept. Army, 1954), p. 125. It is of
course possible that Eisenhower's threat was a bluff.
Nonetheless, it demonstrated that he was dealing from a
position of strength.
5

Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New Yorkj
Doubleday and Co., 1948).
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preponderance of American strength
had by March, 1944,
reached such a point that the
British we re forced to let
as subalterns to the American
giant.

With this final

struggle between Eisenhower and the
Imperial Staff, even
the pretense of equality was
taken away. For the British,
and certainly for the defiantly
nationalistic Prime Minister, this incident must have been
a humiliating demonstra-

tion of British decision-making impotence.
The argument over utilization of the
air forces has
other implications as well. it clearly
indicates that on the

military level (Combined Chiefs of Staff) the
alliance structure was hollow. Even at this stage of the
struggle, with
the tide of war obviously in their favor, the
two military

staffs were unable to function smoothly as a single
unit.
It could be reasonably argued that this incapacity was

understandable in

a 1942 or

1943 context.

Smoothly run-

ning bodies do not spring ready-made into existence, but
take some time to mature and evolve into an efficient

organization.

Nationalistic thinking (a necessary and

inexorable commodity in any military establishment) does
not easily give way to a coalition perspective demanding

compromise.

Only after a certain passage of time can two

military teams be expected to merge and to sublimate their
individual characters.

This argument, while not without

merit, cannot explain the state of the alliance at such a
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late date as March, 19^.

The continuing difficulties

between the British and American military
leaders seem to
indicate that neither side took coalition
warfare very
seriously. That is, neither side made an
effort to reject
the prejudices they held.
It is accurate to maintain that the
Combined Chiefs

of Staff remained a chimera throughout
the war (existing

mainly in press dispatches), and the American
and British
forces fought as distinctly national armies,
unless one

or the other was forced to adapt by external
pressure.

Throughout 1944-19^5 it was the British who would have
to
adapt to the wishes of an American Supreme Commander.
That he occasionally chose to defer to their requests
only allowed the British military to save face.

These

requests were like supplications to the throne, and did
not alter the subordinate role of the British.
A Second Front was not established on May 1, 19kk

as had been decided at Teheran.

Last minute delays were

due to technical and capricious problems, however, not
to diplomatic difficulties.

"When it became necessary

to enlarge the assault area and seek more landing craft,

the date was changed to the end of May."^

Problems

with the weather and the tides caused a further delay

Forrest Pogue, op. cit.

,

p.

16?.

t
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until June
cleared.

5,

when the weather along the Channel coast

Eisenhower decided that the invasion would take

place on June 6, in spite of last-minute British advice
to delay it.

Up to the very last, Churchill "refused to

let his expectations conquer his doubts."

"Overlord," the largest and most ambitious

amphibious assault in history, was a singular success.

Allied casualties were light, probably due to the lowgrade German defenders in the Normandy area.

Moreover,

the victorious landing was certainly due in part to the

massive bombings of the beachhead that took place at

Eisenhower's behest.

In any event, the fears that gripped

Churchill and his military staff proved to be entirely
unfounded.

"Overlord" was never in danger of being driven

back into the sea, nor was the Channel "choked with
British and American corpses," as the Prime Minister had
envisioned.

From the Arcadia discussions onward, the American
military staff had argued that

would serve as

a

a

Second Front in France

dagger thrust into the heart of Germany.

Marshall and his Joint

Chiefs consistently viewed such

an operation as the only one capable of ending the war

7

Dwight Eisenhower, op. cit ., p. 243.
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against Hitler.

The validity of this opinion
is born

out by historical fact.

Three months after the "Overlord"

landings, all of France was cleared of
German armed forces.
A little more than one month after
the invasion, the

Stauffenberg coup attempt against Hitler
took place.
conspiracy materialized because non-National

The

Socialist Ger-

man military leaders saw the war in the West

as hopeless.

Finally, the war in Europe ended eleven
months after the Second
Front had been opened, and Allied troops stood
on the far
side of the Rhine.
The rapid conclusion of the war in the

spring of 1945 would clearly have been impossible if
British

"peripheral run" strategy had carried the day at Teheran.
Thus, although "history does not reveal its alternatives,"
the Second Front can be credited with bringing about vic-

tory in the West.

In their unyielding advocacy of a

Second Front, the American military was ultimately vindicated.

Conclusions:

The Military Relationship With
The Commander-in-Chief

Examination of the Second Front decisions allows
us to extrapolate a number of cautious conclusions on the

relationship between Roosevelt and his military during
World War Two.

In doing so we should view this relation-

ship as against past relationships between the American

military and Presidents.

In this manner we are able to
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chart an evolution in the American decision-making
structure during wartime. It becomes evident that this
structure has undergone great change since 1776.

Decisions on the Second Front were effected

without the participation of two formerly powerful forces,
the Secretary of War, and the commanders in the field.

has been observed in Chapter

I,

As

field officers have exerted

considerable influence on decision-making since Washington.

For numerous reasons (poor communications, closeness to
the battle, charismatic appeal) the decision-making power
of the field commander was retained in relatively unbroken

sequence from the War of Revolution until the end of

War One (1918).

V/orld

This broad decision-making prerogative

was, however, beyond the ken of the various field commanders

fighting in 1941-1945.

General officers such as MacArthur,

Bradley, Patton and Clark were effectively reduced to mak-

ing tactical decisions.

Strategic decisions were handled

by the Commander-in-Chief, with the assistance

of the

Joint Chiefs and their subordinates on the General Staff.

Command responsibility had manifestly shifted to these
staff officers, most of whom had never heard the sound of
guns or experienced small-unit battle.

What were the

reasons for the sudden eclipse of the field commanders?
It may well be that the nature of the Second

World War was fundamentally different from all previous
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armed struggles involving the United States.
true for two reasons.

This was

First, the 1941-1945 contest was

total war in a different sense from the First
World War,

both in terms of how it was fought, and why it was
fought.
The scope of the war and the nature of innovative
tactics

employed (blitzkrieg, mass bombing, retributive acts) made

civilians as vulnerable as uniformed combatants.
not been the case during 1914-1918.

This had

Since the scourge of

war was not restricted to army groups, it was inappropriate
for army commanders to serve as primary wartime decisionmakers.

There were non-military considerations and conse-

quences to be reviewed involving civilian politicians,
and ultimately national leaders.

This accounts substan-

tially for the reduced purview of field commanders.

More

important than the manner in which the war was fought were
the reasons why it was fought.

Unlike the "Great War,

"

World War Two was not primarily waged against the expansion of German arms but against the ideological system that

impelled it.

It was not enough to win back German con-

quests, but rather to destroy a dark nemesis, National

Socialism and kindred creeds.

This prompted Roosevelt's

statement on "unconditional surrender" at Casablanca.
Accordingly, the war became an ideological war, its spirit
not inaccurately captured in Eisenhower's phrase, "Crusade
in Europe."

Since ideology is quintessentially

a

politi-

cal matter, politicians actively determine the goals of
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such wars.

It is this factor which was
responsible for

Roosevelt's direct participation in strategy,
and the
triumph of reasonably far-sighted staff
officers over their
warrior comrades. Strategy was beyond the
metier of field
commanders, and they were reduced to technicians
implementing plans decided upon at higher levels.
The second main reason for the decline
of the

field commanders can be traced to the demands of
coalition
warfare. The United States was bound in an alliance with
two distant and internally distinct states.

Maintenance

of the alliance demanded (as we have seen) both diplomacy
and compromise.

The almost constant inter-alliance quar-

rels on Grand Strategy attest to the fragile bonds holding
the Three Powers together.

There is no precedent for this

situation in American history.

America's alliance in

World War One was a far simpler affair, and was effectively
restricted to Britain and France.

American armies fought

alongside these national armies but remained under American
command.
one,

More importantly, the alliance was not

a

fragile

and there was no occasion for strategic controversy,

the war being static in nature.

During World War Two,

strategy had to be constantly made and revised to keep up

with fluid situations.

This in itself put a premium on

conciliation and compromise.

Further, the Three-Power

alliance was composed of diverse national systems, providing a built-in tension.

Thus, the very nature of the alliance
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reduced the authority of the field
officers and increased
the role of the Commander-in-Chief.
We have explained the lack of field
commanders'

decision-making but not the power of high
level staff
officers. The decline of the field
commanders

should not

be viewed as the cause of the commensurate
ascent of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

That is, the Joint Chiefs did not

acquire power simply because the field officers
had none
and a "power vacuum" had been created. Such
an explanation is not supported by concrete realities.

The success

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was due to two factors*
(1)

their demonstrable competence, and

(2)

their monolithic

organization.

Operating efficiently as a reliable source of

information and analysis, and maintaining

a solid front in

presenting their views, the Chiefs were impressive advocates.

President Roosevelt's unf amiliarity with military

affairs, as well as the increasingly technical nature of

war itself, perforce maximized his reliance on the military
staff.

As Hans Speier has observed,

"As science and

technology increased man's comfort, war, too, became more
o

scientific and technologically more efficient."

(New York:
p. 115.

These

Hans Speier, Social O rder and the Risks of War
George W. Stewart Publishers, Inc., 1952),

204

rather than the duties of the field commanders were
the
basic reasons for the rise of the general staff structure.

Taken as a unit, the Joint Chiefs of Staff functioned

wel'i

as a high-level organization capable of coordinating and

expediting the war effort.

Field Commanders were no

longer able to perform such sweeping tasks.
In addition to the decline of field officers, the

Second World War also saw the eclipse of a formerly powerful civilian decision-maker, the Secretary of War.

The

traditionally extensive role of the Secretary in wartime

described in Chapter

I.

is

Before the emergence of a general

staff, the Secretary of War served as an Intermediary be-

tween commanders in the field and the Commander-in-Chief.

In cases where the President was not active as Commanderin-Chief, the Secretary of War assumed his duties as a

surrogate.

Too, the Secretary of War was frequently at

loggerheads with his military subordinates.

With the

development of a general staff under Elihu Root, however,
the Secretaryship suffered an inevitable weakening of

authority.

This was so because functions once exclusively

delegated to the Secretary of War -- overall command,
coordination, logistical responsibility

departments of the general staff.

—

now devolved to

That Secretary Lansing

retained notable power during World War One can be

attributed to the weakness of the military staff.

Since
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Pershing acted as the primary military
representative
(refusing to defer to the Chief of Staff),

and the military

staff was accorded little responsibility,
the Secretary
was able to keep his prerogatives. By

1941, however, the

military staff structure had been reorganized.

It now

operated effectively and thus took over many
of the functions previously accorded the Secretary of War.
As

a re-

sult, the Secretary (Stimson) was reduced to the
role of
"yes man" for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In effect, the

Joint Chiefs had usurped power from the Secretary.

This

in turn increased the range of responsibilities of the

military staff to a level they had never before enjoyed.
Clearly, the traditional wartime decision-making

hierarchy had undergone drastic change by 1941.

The Joint

Chiefs of Staff had, for the first time, become the pri-

mary voice of military opinion.

As we have attempted to

demonstrate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff was without serious
rival, and answered only to the Commander-in-Chief,
The military ran the war because
the civilian leaders wanted them
to run the war.
On strategic
matters the only civilian control
was the President's.... Civilian
supremacy became Presidential supremacy, as the Joint Chiefs were
given direct access to Roosevelt.

This returns us to our central interest, the

Forrest Pogue, op. cit ., p. 204

206

relationship between the Commander-in-Chief and his
military subordinates. From our examination of the Second
Front decisions we can draw a number of observations.

It

should first be understood that Roosevelt acted as an
active Commander-in-Chief who was directly involved in the

determination of Grand Strategy.
active role than Lincoln had.

He took an even more

Nonetheless, his personal

involvement was less extensive than Churchill's, who did
not hesitate to make even tactical decisions.

Evidently

there were certain areas regarded by the President as the

exclusive realm of military experts.

Although an active strategic decision-maker,
Roosevelt was not consistently active.

We have noted that

between Arcadia and Casablanca, the President absented himself from strategic affairs, and allowed the Joint Chiefs
to make decisions virtually on their own.

We have sug-

gested that this delegation of authority was due to Roosevelt's temporary unf amiliarity in the new wartime environ-

ment.

Following Casablanca, however, Presidential in-

volvement in strategic matters remained at

a high pitch.

Thus, civilian leadership of the war effort was maintained
and the military were not given free rein for any extended

period of time
The pattern of Roosevelt's decision-making vis-a-vis
flexible.
the Second Front also indicates that his views were
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Generally it can be said that Roosevelt
shifted from an
initial preference for British ideas
to a

preference for

the opinions of his military staff.

The early acceptance

of British strategy can be attributed
in part to the per-

suasive powers of Churchill, as well
as to an understandable inclination to regard the British
military as more

experienced than his own staff.

The events of late 1942

seem to have shaken the President's confidence
in the
British, however. Now realizing their fallibility,

Roose-

velt appears to have considered more carefully the
advice
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In addition, Marshall had
made the telling point that acceptance of British strategy,

though minimizing risks, was bound to prolong the war.
The effect that a lengthy war might have on domestic

politics (and on his own popularity) made the President
more inclined to endorse a Second Front operation.

These

were the initial reasons for his abandonment of the British
strategic position.
Only later did Roosevelt begin to suspect British
intentions, and see in their strategic plans traces of a

vestigial colonialism.

These suspicions are evident in

mid-1943 when Roosevelt failed to censure the outspoken
remarks of Admiral King,

More importantly, his anti-

colonial pronouncements (especially with Stalin at Teheran)
take on a more imperative tone.

The continued warnings of

the Joint Chiefs concerning British intentions doubtless
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played a role In the formation of this
attitude. It is
another example of their growing influence
with the President. Also, Roosevelt's increasingly
anti-Bri
tish atti-

tude owes something to Stalin, but we
will deal with that
in a later section.

Roosevelt came to adopt the positions of his

military advisors on the advisability of

a Second Front

and to share their suspicion of British
imperialism.

did so, however, for reasons of his own.

He

While the Joint

Chiefs thought consistently and entirely in military
terms,
the President retained a broader perspective,

including

the political consequences of his decisions.

Thus,

although by late 1943 he tended to endorse all the opinions
of the Joint Chiefs, he did so for his own reasons, which
is

further evidence that civilian control over the direc-

tion of the war was never lost.

Despite the fact that Roosevelt always maintained
himself as the ultimate American decision-making authority,
the power he conceded to his military staff should not be

underestimated.

During the war years, all other branches

of the government were effectively ignored.

With the

almost singular exception of Harry Hopkins, only military
advisors affected the President's decisions.

To be sure,

wartime clearly demands the ministrations of military
experts, but this nonetheless poses problems in a democratic

republic.

The question may appropriately be asked, did the
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military abuse their prerogatives with respect to
the decisions concerning the Second Front, and how are the
activities of the military staff to be described?

In characterizing the role of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, special attention must be paid to General Marshall,

whose activities occupy a major portion of this study,

It

is difficult to contest the observation of Harold Macmillan

that Marshall was the most powerful American figure, next
to the President.

As Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

he enjoyed a special relationship to the President in serv-

ing as the primary military spokesman.

Marshall

also

is

responsible for the monolithic front presented by the Joint
Chiefs.

In his meetings with the President, or with foreign

dignitaries, he presented a unanimity of American military
opinion.

This strengthened his hand in the presentation

of a proposal, as is evident in matters pertaining to the

Second Front.
We have commented on Marshall's distrust of

"politicians," a term he used indiscriminately to describe

any civilian authority.

This attitude was common to the

Joint Chiefs, and to Eisenhower as well.

The voicing of

this attitude by Marshall and other staff officers was

unprofessional, since commenting on the shortcomings of

civilian leaders exceeds the functions of the military.
This prejudice, which has historical precedence in the

American military, eventually got Marshall and the Joint

210
Chiefs of Staff into trouble.

Although the matter did not

involve the Second Front issue, it is
relevant enough to be
mentioned here.
In December of 1943, in the face of
labor strikes
in the United States, Marshall denounced the
unions and

government sympathizers in strong

terras.

William Green,

president of the American Federation of Labor,
responded
that Marshall had overstepped his authority, and warned
that the military was becoming involved in civilian
affairs.

Marshall was defended by the President, but was nonetheless
stung by the criticism.

By 1944, Congress, roused by

Green's accusation, began investigations of the War Department.

Eventually thirty committees and sub-committees

were involved in these investigative activities, in an
attempt to prove "the thesis that the Army and the Navy
have an inordinate ambition to control the civilian economy...." 10 The investigations came to nothing but did

signal that Congross considered the authority of the Chiefs
as excessive and dangerous.

The hostility probably would

not have arisen if Marshall and his subordinates had exercised more tolerance and discretion toward politicians.
The Congressional activity was probably also in response to

Forrest Pogue, George C. Mars hall; Or gani zer
Viking Press, 1973), p. 197.
ory
(New York:
Vict
of
allegation was "The red herring
that
the
maintains
Pogue
issue."
basic
that beclouds the

211

their being "left out in the cold"
in wartime decisionmaking. V/hatever the reasons, it
was a warning to the
military to confine itself to strategic
affairs.

At the same time, the importance
of the aforementioned incident should not be exaggerated.
Like
McClellan, Marshall and the joint Chiefs
never entertained
thoughts of defying civilian control or
changing the nature
of the Republic. At most, they made the
impossible

(though understandable) request that they be
left alone in
deciding military issues. There is no evidence
to suggest
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (or any section of
the mili-

tary community) desired martial law or military control
of

civilian affairs.

Presidential control was never ques-

tioned, although the President's decisions were frequently

criticized.

The attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

toward the Commander-in-Chief can perhaps be accurately
characterized as an uneasy deference.

Placed in the histori'

cal context of military-Executive relations, this attitude
is not unusual.

The military aversion to "political motives" in

wartime decision-making has been sufficiently commented
upon.

However, it bears noting that the Joint Chiefs

were aware of Roosevelt's political concerns, and were
not above using this knowledge to effect.

Thus, Marshall

constantly informed the President that various Britishsponsored operations would prolong the war, knowing that
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Roosevelt feared this for domestic
political reasons.
The tactic, developed in the post-Arcadia
timeframe,

illustrates the evolving sophistication of
the Joint
Chiefs advocacy. This technique certainly
assisted
the military in gaining Roosevelt's endorsement
of their
proposals.
It is best understood as a form of
salesmanship, and should not be interpreted as an
abuse of the
Joint Chiefs* advisory capacity.
A further issue of interest revolves around the

fidelity of the military staff to their Second Front idea.
The constancy which they exhibited toward "their plan"
is notable,

especially in contrast to the fatalistic

resignation that eventually afflicted the British
Imperial Staff.

Ordered at various junctures to abandon

plans for a Second Front, the Joint Chiefs of Staff never
did so.

Forced to work on alternate schemes ("Torch," for

example), they did so half-heartedly and were always eager
to resurrect "Sledgehammer" or "Super-Gymnast."

Their

unwillingness to accept alternate operations comes close
to constituting a sort of covert disobedience.

Even so,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not refuse to follow orders
(in the traditional sense).

Attempts to sabotage the

acceptance of British plans (see Chapter II) can be

reasonably viewed as a form of insubordination.

From

another perspective, however, the Chiefs, in their capacity
as military advisors, were pressing for acceptance of what
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they saw as a critical operation.

In a

sense, an abuse

of their authority would have
occurred had they accepted
a plan they regarded as
inferior or, worse, disastrous.

In retrospect, the inclination
of the American
military staff to distrust civilian
decision-makers, arrf
to hold to their own opinions
on strategic matters, should
not be judged too severely.
To characterize these tendencies as an abuse of authority or
an attempt to extend

military prerogatives seems overly harsh.

Throughout this

study an attempt has been made to
demonstrate that
whatever the actions of the American military

—
staff —

there was never an intention to go beyond
their proper

relationship with the Commander-in-Chief.

Although overly

zealous in pressing for a Second Front, they did
not intend
to by-pass or ignore civilian control of policy.

If the

Joint Chiefs can be said to be guilty of anything, it is

their lack of sophistication in imders^ding their role in
the decision-making process.

Their continued petulance

and rancor towards "politicians," 11 both domestic and

Marshall retained his dislike of politicians
after the war. Commenting on Eisenhower 's difficulties as
President, he remarked, "I knew he wouldn't like it up
there once he got up there with all those politicians."
U.S. News and World Reports, Vol. XLVII, No. 18, Nov. 2,
"The Story General Marshall Told Me," John Suther1959.
land,

p.

56.
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foreign, reveals a surprising naivete of
the complexities
of foreign policy.

General Marshall and the other Chiefs of
Staff
failed to understand the maxim of Clausewitz
that

"War is

only a part of political intercourse, therefore
by no

means an independent thing in itself." 12

That is, war

can never be regarded as divorced from politics.

The Joint

Chiefs seem to have adopted the less cogent observation
of Ludendorff that,

once begun, war is properly the exclu-

sive domain of the military.

Marshall was inclined to re-

gard civilians as interlopers in their wartime realm.

Even so, this inclination was more visceral than cerebral,
something felt rather than well thought out.

Accordingly,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not so much abuse their role

in the decision-making structure as they failed to under-

stand it.
This failure to understand fully the role of

civilian decision-makers in wartime is something for which
the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be held accountable.

Their

"Ludendorff" view of war and politics could well have led
to dangerous abuses

of military pov/er, but it did not.

The

visceral anti-political stance of the American military
was simply not strong enough to overcome observance of their

1

England:

Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Harmondsworth,
Pelican Classics, 1968), p. 402.
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oath to uphold the Constitution, and
of the historical
tradition of grudging deference to
civilian
authority.

Nonetheless, the strategic decision-making
process would
have functioned more smoothly had the
Joint Chiefs possessed a more sophisticated outlook.
The persistence with which the Joint
Chiefs argued
their own views had advantages as well as
disadvantages.

They did, after all, have
strategic planning.

a

legitimate role to play in

Secretary of War Stimson noted that,

as military advisors to the Chief Executive,
the Joint

Chiefs of Staff "had a most salutory effect on the
Presi-

dent's weakness for snap decisions . "13

Had the military

been less obdurate in their opinions on Grand Strategy,
the West might have been plunged into a number of mili-

tary adventures of dubious merit.

Still and all, their

position would have been better served had their dealings

with the President and his advisors been less of an adversary relationship.

In this connection it

is

perhaps rele-

vant to note that the relations between General William

Westmoreland and President Johnson during the Vietnam era
were far more conciliatory than the Marshall-Roosevelt

encounters.

This may indicate the evolution of military

understanding of their role to a more sophisticated level

Henry L. Stimson, On Active Service in Peace
and War , p. 428.
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than in 1941-1945. 14
The American Military and the
Alii ance

A final point to be considered is
the role of the

American military staff within the alliance
structure.
Here too the performance of the Joint
Chiefs can be
faulted. Confronted with a Three-Power

coalition, the

American military contributed to, rather than
eased,
existing tensions. To be sure, the Joint Chiefs

cannot

be criticized for disagreeing with the strategic
concep-

tions advanced by Britain or Russia.

As military experts

they were clearly entitled to present their views on any

strategic proposal.

Nevertheless, coalition warfare de-

mands both diplomatic prowess and a sensitivity to the
needs and interests of Allied powers.

Staff lacked these traits.

The Joint Chiefs of

Throughout the wartime con-

ferences, the American military exhibited a disinclination
to regard their Allies objectively and fairly.

Their mis-

trust of the British, coupled with their failure to appreciate the role played by Russia, cannot be attributed to

strategic differences alone.

Rather, these attitudes

point up what Harold Macmillan called an "almost patho-

logical"

suspicion of foreigners.

The result was to

Of course, it may also indicate a weakness or
error on Johnson's part: inordinate faith in decisions
made by the military.
15 Harold Macmillan,

_ojyL _cit s

,

p. 423.

217

make an uneasy alliance even
more uneasy. The manifest
duty of the Joint Chiefs was
to make the alliance structure as workable as possible;
their prejudices prevented
them from so doing. It was not
the duty of the Joint
Chiefs to assess the motives and
intentions of the British
and Soviets, but simply to examine
their strategic proposals, and to draft plans advantageous
to the alliance as
a whole.

'

It can be said with some justification
that the

Joint Chiefs of Staff ignored coalition
warfare.

Evidence

provided by their failure to appreciate the
contribution of the Soviet Union to the war effort.
The minimal
importance they attached to aiding the Soviet Union
is

is

eloquent testimony.

Moreover, their rejection of British

advice early in the war seems high-handed, at least in
the

context of a coalition war effort.

The suspicion that the

Joint Chiefs desired to wage unilateral war on Germany is
thus given substance.

The American military did not feel

comfortable in the alliance structure and regarded supra-

national considerations as somehow unpatriotic.

Evidently,

the Joint Chiefs were more nationalistic than their Com-

mander-in-Chief and this interfered in their dealings with
the British or Soviets.
The nationalism and resultant anti-British and

anti-Russian stance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff once again
reveals a lack of political sophistication.

The views of
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the military were not in step with those of the
President.

Steeped in a national tradition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were unable to rise above it.

This was perhaps their most

glaring deficiency during the war.

In an environment that

demanded political sensitivity as well as martial ability,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be found wanting.

Granted

extensive decision-making powers within the top stratum of
the alliance, they failed to understand that "strictly

military thinking" was inappropriate and anachronistic.
The Joint Chiefs were confronted with a war which had

marked political complexities and consequences, yet their

training had not prepared them for such

a

situation.

We have observed the inclination of the American

military staff to disdain any concern with politics and
diplomacy.

This inclination is apparent with respect to

the Second Front decisions ard goes far to explain the dis-

putativeness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff toward the
President, and toward Allied leaders.

The desire of these

staff officers to take the narrow, military view is understandable given the historical hostility toward civilian

interference in wartime affairs.

Even

so,

the difficulties

caused by the Joint Chiefs, and their considerable blindness to the political implications of the war are telling.

Their position and powers prevented them from remaining
political
mere soldiers and required an appreciation of the

world and international relations.

Their failure to
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understand this, rather than any positive abuse of power,
was their true weakness.

Since 1945, the political world has become more

complex.

The emergence of superpowers engaged in national

or ideological struggle, as well as their capacity for

global destruction, puts a further premium on politically-

sensitive military leaders.

This fact emerges clearly

with respect to the Truman-MacArthur confrontation.
maintain that the v/aging of war

is

To

solely the concern of

military men is no longer a tenable position.

The origin

of this truth can be traced back to the Second World War,

and is exemplified in the military's role in the Second Front

decis ions

Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief

Conventional wisdom asserts that Roosevelt was

strong President, and a man of decisiveness.

a

This is

incontrovertibly true with respect to his performance in
domestic politics, and needs no further elaboration.

By

comparison, his role in the Second Front decisions betrays
a

more timorous nature.

The changing course of Second Front

strategy is a chronology of Roosevelt's submission to
influences from various quarters:

by Stalin, Churchill,

the British staff, Marshall and the Joint Chiefs.

At dif-

ferent times Roosevelt endorsed the respective positions
favored by each.

From Arcadia on,

the President was
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surrounded by persuasive policy advocates, and seemed
almost

infinitely malleable.

That is, he was receptive rather

than originative of Second Front ideas.

He did not act

decisively on the issue, but altered his opinions frequently
and diffidently.

It was this vacillation that exasperated

both Churchill and Marshall.
We have observed that in the role of Commander-in-

Chief,

troubled by ultimate responsibility for American

military fortunes, Roosevelt seemed insecure.

Although

occupying a position of enormous power, he failed to act
powerfully, thus insuring his role as "kingmaker" rather
than king.

Wartime developments, as well as personal indecisiveness, also tended to curb Roosevelt's authority.

It

should be recognized that from 1941 until 1943 the outcome
of the war was still in doubt.

The war was brutalizing to

morale as well as materiel, and the Allies suffered

appalling losses as well as gained remarkable victories.
In this uncertain atmosphere the political visions of

Roosevelt (and Churchill for that matter) had to defer to

military exigencies.

war was

a

Since a victorious conclusion to the

prerequisite to all other considerations, the

counsel of military technicians was at

a

premium.

In this

respect the situation itself limited Roosevelt's authority
as Commander-in-Chief.

Had the war been a more limited

conflict (on the scale of

a

Korea or Vietnam), and had the

221

outcome never been in doubt, the hand
of the Commander-inChief would have been strengthened.
President Johnson was
able to exercise detailed control of
the Vietnam war because
the specter of an American military defeat
did not seem to
exist. Thus, political considerations and
goals could

play a large role in the conduct of that war.

It may well

be that the existence of a "strong" Commanderin-Chief is

dependent upon the wartime situation as well as on Presidential character.
The portrait of Roosevelt that emerges is not of
a

strong Commander-in-Chief, but of an insecure one rely-

ing heavily upon outside advice.

To the extent that out-

side advisors sensed his insecurity, they could be expected
to try to have

their own views adopted by the

President.

Throughout the war he was hesitant in making policy over
and against the advice of "experts."

Only when it became

clear that the experts themselves disagreed did he feel

compelled to act.
Despite his reliance upon military advice, and the

status consequently enjoyed by the Joint Chiefs (especially
Marshall), Roosevelt was never in thralldom to their

opinions.

The freedom of action given Marshall and King

was due ultimately to Roosevelt's allowing them a loose
rein.

As we have observed, the President was able to curb

their enthusiasms now and again.

By comparison, some of

his predecessors were unable to exercise much power over
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their military subordinates (Lincoln and Wilson fall
into
this unhappy category, Truman would later join them). 16

Why was Roosevelt able to exert more control over the military?

For the first time in American history the
Commander-in-Chief was dealing mainly with
based General Staff rather than with

a

stationed on some remote battlefront.
his control over military leaders.

could now be communicated directly.

a

Washington-

field commander
This vastly improved

Orders and instructions

Opinions could be re-

ceived and arguments resolved with celerity.

The Joint

Chiefs of Staff constituted a new link in the chain of

command and revolutionized the control of far-flung armies.
The importance of having a military staff in con-

stant contact with the Commander-in-Chief should not be

minimized.

It insured that the President would be in-

formed of the military situation, and thus be in a posi-

tion to control it.

By comparison, civilian control over

field commanders had proven almost impossible, attaining

16 Charles S. Campbell, The Tr ansformation of
American Foreign Relations. 1865^1900 (New York: Harper
and Row, 1976), p. 177. The sometimes heavy-handed and
unauthorized actions of the American military were commonplace in the post-civil-war period. Separated by vast

distances from the authorities in Washington, military
commanders in overseas locations at times had little recourse but to order military commands in their own name.
Results were sometimes unfortunate, as with the invasion
of Hawaii by American troops on January 17, 1893.
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crisis proportions during World War One.

Haig,

Pershing,

and Foch conducted the war largely on their own terms,
laws unto themselves, because the political leaders were

separated from the battle geographically and in terms of
information.

In Great Britain, "The civilian head of the

British democracy found himself unable to impose his will
on his generals."

17

Similarly, in France, "Petain merely

made a pretense of carrying out the directives which he
felt were unwise."

These military figures justified the

extent of their power by implying that the technical intricacies of the war were beyond the ken of civilians.
As we have seen, the Joint Chiefs' claim to

special knowledge was far more modest than that
First World War field commanders.

of the

The Chiefs did not so

much attempt to exclude the President from military
In any

affairs as to guide his decision-making hand.

event, the presence of the Joint Chiefs in Washington, and
the fact that they were trained as managers and not

warriors, prohibited a replay of the World War
scenario.

0 ne

To this extent the nature of the general staff

itself greatly increased Roosevelt's control over his

military.
The Interminable Problem
It is clear that Roosevelt was the ultimate

author of American military policy, although

he was heavily
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influenced by the constant advice and
occasional strategems of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
A dramatic civilianmilitary struggle for decision-making power,
on

the scale

of World War One, did not take place.

Nonetheless, it is

equally evident that a state of tension existed
between the
civilian and military branches of government. The
potential
dangers inherent in this tension should not be
underesti-

mated for the

f

ollowing reasons.

The tension between the American military staff
and the Chief Executive was partly due to the gulf the

Joint Chiefs saw (or placed) between themselves as soldiers
and civilian members of the government.

The slighting

references of the Joint Chiefs towards politicians seems
to reveal the presence of "the primeval veneration of

atrength and freely chosen risks." 19

Which is to say that

the military staff saw themselves as warriors not only

separated from politicians, but heirs to
tradition.

a more

honorable

That such a view holds seeds of danger for

a

democratic society needs no elaboration.
As we have seen, the tension between Roosevelt and
the military was not due solely to the latters

'

contempt

for politicians, but to their aversion to political con-

siderations

as

well.

In this sense the rigid profession-

alism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be regarded both

Speier, Social Order and the Risks of War

,

p.

127.

225
as a blessing and a curse.

On the positive side, a mili-

tary unwillingness to consider political motives in wartime

carries with it a disinclination to meddle in politics.
This attitude minimizes the risk of the military acting
to usurp political power,

or serving as an intrigue-

ridden praetorian guard.

Still and all, the American mili-

tary's fear and loathing of the political implications
of the war is troublesome.

The Joint Chiefs were, after

all, the ultimate military authorities, operating in the

highest level of government.

Thus involved with Grand

Strategy, a purposeful blindness to political concerns is

indefensible.

A general staff awareness of political

realities is not the equivalent of a military intervention
in politics.

It is unreasonable to suggest that the Joint

Chiefs of Staff could not have become aware of the political world without acting upon it.

Such an awareness of

politics would have done much to mitigate their conflict

with Roosevelt and the Allies.
By sanctimoniously avoiding the political impli-

cations and ramifications of Grand Strategy, the military

avoided one danger and wandered into another.

Their

avoidance of political involvement caused them to see

purely military concerns as aga inst politics, and perhaps
as above politics.

There is a danger endemic in the

belief that strictly military concerns are noble and polit:
cal concerns craven.

From such a viewpoint obtains an

226

inclination for the military to accord their own opinions
excessive respect.

The Joint Chiefs' refusal to abandon

their Second Front strategy contains this inclination, and
seems close to insubordination (despite its happy ending).

Swaddled under the cloak of "purely military thinking"
there seems to lie non-political thinking, and across a

thin line, anti-political thinking.

This attitude was

present in Second Front dec is ion- making, if only as

potential threat.

Even

so,

a

the military inclination for

purely military thinking is disturbing for its exclusiveness.

A military that is suspicious of politicians and

the political is hardly a healthy organization.

It is such

situation that has in the past given rise to the ques20
tion, "Who will guard those who guard?"

a

2Q "Sed

q uis

custodiet ipsos custodes?"

—

Decimus Juvenal
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